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A PROPOSAL FOR PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS 
ON HIRING PERMANENT STRIKER 
REPLACEMENTS: "A FAR, FAR BETTER 
THING" THAN THE WORKPLACE 
FAIRNESS ACT 
WILLIAM R. CORBEIT* 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Mackay Ra­
dio & Telegraph Co. in 1938, employers have been permitted to 
hire permanent replacements for striking employees. The hiring 
of permanent replacements deprives employees engaged in an 
economic strike of their right to immediate reinstatement to their 
jobs at the conclusion of the strike. Although, under the substan­
tive law, the "Mackay doctrine" applies to economic strikes but 
not unfair labor practice strikes, in practice employers perma­
nently replace employees engaged in both types of strikes. This is 
possible because the unfair labor practice proceedings, which de­
termine the type of strike, occur long after employers hire perma­
nent replacements. 
In recent years the Mackay doctrine has come under in­
creasing attack. Numerous proposals to modify or overturn the 
doctrine have been made, including bills introduced in Congress 
during the past six years. Indeed, in the 103d Congress, the 
House of Representatives passed a bill that would overturn Mac­
kay, and a companion bill awaits action on the Senate floor. In 
this Article, Professor Corbett argues that, although the current 
law regarding striker replacement should be changed, some as­
pects of the law should be preserved-principally, the distinction 
between economic strikes and unfair labor practice strikes. 
After considering prior proposals to reform the law, Profes­
sor Corbett advocates a new proposal that would use procedural 
devices to limit permanent replacement in practice to economic 
strikes. The proposal would require employers to notify the Na­
tional Labor Relations Board of their intention to hire permanent 
replacements. That notification would trigger an interim ban on 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State University; 
B.S., Auburn University; J.D., The University of Alabama School of Law. I thank Leonard Bier­
man, Rafael Gely, James W. Bowers, John M. Church, John Devlin, Samuel Estreicher, Thon:ias 
C. Galligan, Jr., Douglas E. Ray, and Harold F. See for their helpful comments and co�s
.
ultat10n 
on earlier drafts of this Article. I also thank Andree Matherne, Marylou Goode, and He1d1 Howat 
for their research assistance, and Gladys Dreher for her technical assistance. This Article was 
written with the support of research grants from the Paul M. Hebert Law Center. 
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such hiring until expedited proceedings determined the.charac
ter­
ization of the strike. Professor Corbett argues .that this p
ropos.al 
would reduce the uncertainty faced by all parties to a labor dis­
pute and enable them to act based on kno�ledge of the .applicable 
replacement rights of the employer and remstatement nghts of the 
striking employees. 
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[A] union takes a bull by the horns when it determines the 
cause of a strike. It may strike over what it thinks is an unfair 
labor practice only to be told years later by the B oard and the 
courts that no violation occurred. Then strikers take potluck as 
strikers who may be replaced. An employer' s margin for error is 
no wider. 1  
PROLOGUE: A TALE O F  Two LABOR BAITLES 
"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times . . . . "2 The year 
was 1992, and for organized labor it was a time when two great battles were 
fought against management in two cities. Notwithstanding great expecta­
tions of at least one victory, organized labor, after waging determined cam­
paigns, lost both. But in those losses, labor may have set the stage for a 
future victory-the demise of the much-maligned fifty-six-year-old doc-
1. Frank H. Stewart, Conversion of Strikes: Economic to Unfair labor Practice, 45 VA. L. 
REv. 1322, 1326 (1959) (footnotes omitted). 
2. CHARLES DrcKENS, A TALE OF Two CmES 2 (Silver Burdett 1982) (1859). 
816 NORTH CAROLINA I.A W  R
EVIEW [Vol. 72 
trine from the Supreme Court decision NLRB v. Macka
y Radio & Telegraph 
Co.3 
In October 1935, the union representing a unit of employ
ees at Mac-
kay Radio and Telegraph Company called a strike becaus
e the employer 
would not agree to the terms of a collective bargaining agreem
ent. To 
maintain operations during the strike, the em�loyer. mov
ed employ�es from 
its other offices to San Francisco.4 The strike failed and the stokers re­
quested that the employer allow them to return to work. The employer 
agreed, subject to the promise it had made to ele�en of the repla�ements 
brought in from other offices that they could stay m the San Fran�1sco of­
fice if they wished. Eventually, only five of the replacements wished to 
remain in San Francisco. As a result, the employer reinstated all strikers 
except five of the most active union supporters who had played prominent 
roles in the strike. 5 The employees who were not reinstated filed unfair 
labor practice (ULP)6 charges with the National Labor Relations Board 
3. 304 U.S. 333 ( 1 938). According to Professor Weiler, "[F]ew rules of American labor 
law have been as heavily criticized as the legality of hiring permanent strike replacements." Paul 
Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representa· 
tion, 98 HARV. L. REv. 35 1 ,  393 ( 1984). 
4. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 337. 
5. Id. at 339. 
6. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act establishes the basic rights of employees 
covered by the Act: "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con­
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 
U.S.C. § 157 ( 1 988). The Act also provides that covered employees have the right to refrain from 
engaging in the foregoing activities. Id. Section 8 of the Act creates the means for enforcing the 
substantive rights created by § 7 by declaring specific types of conduct by employers and labor 
organizations to be unfair labor practices. Id. § 158.  "The Act's unfair labor practice provisions 
place certain restrictions on actions of employers and labor organizations in their relations with 
employees, as well as with each other." 55 NLRB ANN. REP. 3 ( 1 992) (covering fiscal year 
1990). 
Section 8(a) of the Act describes conduct of employers that constitutes ULPs. It is a viola­
tion of § 8(a)( l )  to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l )  (1 988). An example of a§ 8(a)( l )  violation is an 
employer's threatening to fire employees o r  take other retaliatory actions if the employees elect a 
union as their collective bargaining representative. An employer violates § 8(a)(2) if it "domi­
nate[s] or interfere[s] with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contrib­
ute[s] financial or other support to it." Id. § 1 58(a)(2). Examples of such a ULP include forming 
a com�any union or forming and dominating employee participation committees. See, e.g., Elec­
�ron:ati��· Inc., 309 N .. L.R.B. 990, 998 (1992). Section 8(a)(3) prohibits employers from discrim­matmg m regard t? hire or tenure of ei:ipl?yment or any other term or condition of employment 
to encourage or discourage membership m any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) 
(1988)._ !his most commonly filed ULP charge, 55 NLRB ANN. REP., supra, at 1 37 tbl. 2, is 
ex�mphf1ed by an ��p.loyer's discharging an employee because of the employee's engaging in u�1on �up�o� or act1V1t1es. An employer violates§ 8(a)(4) of the Act if it "discharge[s] or other­
wise disc��nate[s] against an employee beca�se he has filed charges or given testimony under 
[the Act� . 29 U .�.C. § 1�8(a)(4)(1988). Section 8(a)(5) prohibits an employer from "refus[ing] 
to bargam collectively with the representatives of [its] employees." Id. § 1 5 8(a)(5). An em-
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(NLRB or "the Board"). The Board held that the employer had committed 
ULPs by discriminating against the five employees because of their union 
support and activities.7 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforce­
ment of the B oard's  order, 8 and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the Board's finding was supported by the evidence.9 In addition to approv­
ing the Board ' s  finding of discrimination, the Court stated as follows: 
Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employ­
ees with others in an effort to carry on the business. Although 
§ 13 [of the National Labor Relations Act] provides, "nothing in 
this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or 
diminish in any way the right to strike," it does not follow that an 
employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the 
right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left 
vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those hired 
to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to re­
sume their employment, in order to create places for them. 10 
With that statement11 the Mackay doctrine was born. Under that 
ployer engages in bad faith bargaining in violation of § 8(a)(5) if, for example, it refuses to meet 
and bargain with the bargaining representatives, engages in surface bargaining (not directed to­
ward reaching an agreement), or refuses to provide the bargaining representatives with relevant 
information to which they are entitled upon request. 
Section 8(b), added to the Act by the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1 947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 
(1947), establishes certain conduct by labor organizations to be ULPs. The number of annual 
ULP charges alleging violations by unions is far smaller than the number of charges alleging 
employer violations. 55 NLRB ANN. REP., supra, at 137 tbl. 2. Included among union ULPs are 
the following types of conduct: "restrain[ing] or coerc[ing]" employees in the exercise of their 
§ 7 rights, or an employer in the selection of its collective bargaining representatives, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(l); generally, "caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause an employer to discriminate against 
an employee in violation of[§ 8(a)(3)]," id. § 158(b)(2); failing to satisfy the duty to bargain in 
good faith, id. § 158(b)(3); engaging in secondary boycotts, id. § 158(b)(4); charging discrimina­
tory or excessive initiation fees under a union shop agreement, id. § 158(b)(5); causing or attempt­
ing to cause an employer to pay for work that has neither been performed nor is to be performed, 
id. § 158(b)(6); and engaging in recognitional picketing under specified circumstances, id. 
§ 158(b)(7). Section 8(e) prohibits unions and employers from entering into "hot cargo" agree­
ments, in which an employer agrees to refrain from dealing with the products of another employer. 
Id. § 158(e). 
7. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., l N.L.R.B. 201, 218 (1936). 
8. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 92 F.2d 761, 765, adhering on reh'g to 87 F.2d 611 
(9th Cir. 1937). 
9. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 346-47. 
10. Id. at 345-46. 
11. Numerous commentators have argued that the Supreme Court's statement in Mackay 
regarding an employer's right to hire permanent replacements is merely dicta. E.g., Juuus G. 
GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRAC­
TICE 139 (1988); Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 295, 
299-300 (1991); Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 631 (1966). 
Although often repeated, this view is not unanimous. Professor Baird has argued that, since the 
Wagner Act was silent on whether an employer could hire replacements for striking employees, 
the Court found it necessary to make this detennination before addressing the more specific ques-
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doctrine, employers may lawfully hir
e "permanent"12 re�lacen_ients for em­
ployees engaged in economic strikes. 
Thus, employers invoking the Mac­
kay doctrine have been permitted to hire
 perma�ent �eplac�i:ients and deny 
immediate reinstatement to economic str
ikers 1f their pos1t1ons have been 
filled. In the last decade the doctrine has 
become one of the most vehe­
mently debated issues in labor law. 1
3 The battles of 1992 threatened to 
overthrow Mackay, and they presaged future 
conflicts. 
ti on of whether the selection of strikers for reinstatement
 was discriminatory. If the Court had 
interpreted the Act as prohibiting the hiring of permanent r
eplacements, then the more specific 
question would have been moot. Charles W. Baird, On Strik
ers and Their Replacements, 12 
Gov'T UNION REV., Summer 1991, at 1, 8; see also DANIEL V. 
YAGER, EMPLOYMENT PoucY 
FOUNDATION, LOADING THE SCALES: Is THE BALANCE BETWEEN TH
E RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE 
RIGHT TO OPERATE IN NEED OF REFORM? 40 (1993) (arguing that it was e
ssential for the Court to 
clarify rule regarding permanent replacement of strikers). 
Regardless of whether the Mackay doctrine was dicta, the point is practically insign
ificant, 
since the courts and the Board have repeatedly reaffirmed the doctrine. See, e.g., Sam
uel Es­
treicher, Strikers and Replacements, 38 LAB. L.J. 287, 289 (1987) ("It is simply too late in the day 
to reopen Mackay Radio."); George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a 
Misnomer- "Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378, 385 ( 1969) (recognizing that 
Mackay is uncontroverted doctrine). The Supreme Court's continued adherence to Mackay's per­
manent replacement doctrine is demonstrated by the Court's decision in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 
U.S. 491, 504-05 n.8 (1983) (recognizing that an employer's refusal to fire permanent replace­
ments to reinstate returning strikers does not constitute a ULP). M oreover, Congress ratified the 
doctrine by enacting that portion of the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 
519 (1959), which gave employees "engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to rein­
statement," 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988), voting rights in NLRB elections held within 12 months 
of the commencement of a strike. Estreicher, supra, at 289 (recognizing the 1959 amendment as 
congressional ratification of the Mackay doctrine). 
12. "��rmanent," as used in this context, has a meaning quite different from the commonly 
used defimtton. !n short, permanent replacement means the employer does not intend to discharge 
the rep�acement m order to reinstate a striking employee when the strike ends or when the striker 
otherwise requests reinstateme�t. _
Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286. 1293 (1993) 
�:;u�abaugh, M,7mber, concurrmg m part and dissenting in part) (stating that, in lexicon of labor 
• permanent means employer intends to retain replacement even after strike is over)· DouG 
LAS E. RAY & EMERY w B L M 
. . ,. 
B 
· ARTI..E, ABOR- ANAGEMENT RELATIONS: STRI KES, LOCKOUTS AND 
OYCOTTS §_6.03, at 5 (1992) (explaining distinctions between temporary and permanent rcplacc­;;e
7
ntsi�fa;��
1
Westf�ll, Striker Replacements and Employee Freedom of Choice, 7 LAB. LAW. 
dur
�
tion o
� 
stri
�
e)
�notmg
l 
tha� permanent means employment term is not "explicitly limited" to 
knap· The Emplo;e��
e � so 
d 
urr �·
8
�n�rson, "Permanent" Replacements of Strikers After Bel­
tion �f meaning of "p
s
erm
uan a
t?• 1 
. A RSHALL L. REV. 321, 325-37 (1985) (discussing cvolu-
anen rep acernent). 
13· Introducing a roundtable discussi f h . 
Professor Samuel Estreicher noted some of
o
� 
o t e Mackay doctnne at a co
_
nference in 1990, 
made in recent years: 
t e proposals to abrogate the doctnne that have been 
[l]f there is to be change, what form should i ? . . . 
replacements ? A p · . b . 
t take· A flat proh1b1t10n on permanent 
· · · · rov1s1on arrmg repl d · a strike ? A · · . . 
acernents urmg, say, the first ten weeks of 
· · · · prov1s1on requmng proof that th 
tions with temporary replacements? A rovi . 
e e��loyer could not maintain opera-
mit to interest arbitration and 
·
1 .f
P 
h 
sion requmng an employer to offer to sub-
, on Y 1 t at offer is d b . employe_r resort to replacements? 
spume Y the union, can the 
Samuel Estre1cher, Strikers and Replacements· Intro YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNUAL NATION 
. ductory Comments, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW 
AL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 17 22 (Bru St . d , no em e ., 
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Rising Action 
The first of the battles was fought in Congress. In Washington, D.C., 
labor and management engaged in one of the most important legislative 
struggles of the 102d Congress. On July 17, 1991, the United States House 
of Representatives passed H.R. 5, 14 a bill to overturn Mackay; the bill 
would have amended the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or "the 
Act"), 15 making it a ULP for employers to hire or threaten to hire perma­
nent replacements during strikes. 16 An almost identical bill, S. 55, 17 was 
soon under consideration in Senate committees.18 
As the battle continued in Washington, another conflict began in Peo­
ria, Illinois where Caterpillar, Illinois's largest manufacturer, is based. Cat­
erpillar is the world's largest manufacturer of heavy equipment and the 
nation's second-leading net export manufacturer.19 In recent times, how­
ever, it had suffered losses due, in part, to increased foreign competition. 
Sales had dropped twenty percent since 1990, and in 1991 Caterpillar lost 
$404 million.20 The United Auto Workers of America (UAW) is the pow­
erful union, 900,000 members strong,21 which represented approximately 
16,000 Caterpillar employees at plants in four states.22 The collective bar­
gaining agreement between the UAW and Caterpillar was to expire at mid­
night on September 30, 1991.23 As the expiration date drew near, 
1990). For a discussion of legislation proposed in the last six years to overturn or modify the 
doctrine, see infra note 74. For a sampling of books and articles written on the doctrine, see infra 
notes 84-86. 
14. H.R. 5, 102d Cong., l st Sess. (1991). The margin of 247 to 182 indicated that the House 
would not have been able to override a p romised veto by President Bush. Striker Replacement 
Bill Faces Uncertain Future in Senate, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 143, at A-17 (July 25, 1991). 
15. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). 
16. 137 CONG. REc. H5518-90 (daily ed. July 17, 1991) (debate and passage of bill); Gail 
McCallion, Strike Replacements, CRS IssUE BRIEF (Cong. Res. Serv., Libr. of Cong., Wash. 
D.C.), July I, 1992, at CRS-3; John G. McDonald, Note, leveling the Playing Field or Tipping 
the Scales? Pending Strike legislation: The Latest Battlefield Between Labor and Manage­
ment-An Alternative Solution, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 971, 971-72 (1991). 
17. S. 55, l 02d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
18. See McCallion, supra note 16, at CRS-3. 
19. Philip Dine, Bitter Feelings on Labor War Engulf Peoria, ST. Lorns PosT-D1sPATCH, 
Apr. 10, 1992, at 12D. 
20. Rally Backing Caterpillar Strikers Draws 20,000 Union Members to Peoria, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A-7 (Mar. 24, 1992). 
21. Strikers Disobey Caterpillar Order to Report to Work, TIMEs-PrcAYUNE (New Orleans), 
Apr. 7, 1992, at D-2. 
22. Auto Workers Reach Tentative Agreement with Deere & Co., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 
195, at A-9 (Oct. 8, 1991). 
23. Negotiators Extend Caterpillar Pact While Talks for New Contract Underway, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 190, at A-6 (Oct. 1, 1991). 
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negotiators for the UAW and Caterpillar agreed to exten
d the contract in-
.d .k 24 definitely to av01 a stn e. 
The UAW announced that Deere & Co. (Deere), Caterpillar's chief 
domestic rival had been selected as the target for establishing
 a pattern 
collective bar�aining agreement for the agricultural, construction
, and 
heavy equipment industry.25 On October 5, 1991, t�e UAW reac?ed a ten­
tative agreement with Deere26 and turned its attention to Caterpillar. The 
prospect for an agreement between the UAW an� Cat.
erpillar looked bl�ak 
because Caterpillar, for the first time in the relat10nsh1p between the umon 
and the employer, announced that it would not be a part of pattern 
bargaining. 27 
On November 4, 1991, the UAW launched a limited strike against Cat­
erpillar at two of its Illinois plants.28 On November 7, Caterpillar retaliated 
by announcing a selective lockout of employees in specific departments of 
its plants in Peoria, East Peoria, and Aurora, lllinois.29 Caterpillar moved 
managerial and salaried employees into jobs vacated by strikers in order to 
maintain production and meet customer demand. 30 On December 5, the 
UAW filed a ULP charge against Caterpillar, alleging that the employer had 
violated section 8(a)(5)31 of the NLRA by refusing to provide the union 
with information necessary to process a grievance and fulfill its duty as the 
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees and section 
8(a)(4)32 by discriminating and retaliating against employees because they 
24. Id. In their tumultuous bargaining history, there had been a 205-day strike in 1982-83. 
Rally Backing Caterpillar Strikers Draws 20,000 Union Members to Peoria, supra note 20. 
25. Negotiators Extend Caterpillar Pact While Talks for New Contract Underway, supra 
note 23. The announcement meant that the UAW would take a bargaining position that Caterpil­
lar must agree to a contract like that which the UAW negotiated with Deere. 
26. Auto Workers Reach Tentative Agreement with Deere & Co., supra note 22. 
27. See UAW's Bieber Tells Locked-Out Caterpillar Workers to Stay Home, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) .�o. �9: at A-6 (Feb. 12, 1992). Caterpillar claimed that it could not remain globally competttive 1f 1t agreed to a contract like that which existed between the UAW and Deere. See 
About 300 Caterpillar Strikers Have Crossed Picket Lines, Company Says, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BN�) No. 67, at A-9 (Apr. 7, 1992) (reporting Caterpillar Group President Gerald Flaherty's 
ass�rtion that the company viewed pattern bargaining as outdated); Rally Backing Caterpillar 
Strikers Draws 20,000 Union Members to Peoria, supra note 20. A UAW officer characterized 
Caterpillar's resistance to pattern bargaining as "bottom line greed" and "a philosophical bent that 
the� want to take on th�
' 
UAW and d� what nob�dy else has been able to do, so they can be the 
darh�gs of Wall Street. Rally Backing Caterpillar Strikers Draws 20,000 Union Members to 
Peoria, supra note 20 (quoting UAW secretary-treasurer Bill Casstevens). 
28. Auto Workers Launches Limited Strike at Two Caterpillar Inc. Plants in Illinois, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 214, at A-3 (Nov. 5, 1991) . 
. 29. Caterpillar Announces Selective Lockout of About 6,000 UAW-Represented Employees Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 217, at A-10 (Nov. 8, 1991). 
' 
D .1
30
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· M
b 
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R
nagers, Salaried Employees Taking Up Slack at Caterpillar Plants Affected By Strike, ai Y a 
· ep. (BNA) No. 230, at A-1 (Nov. 29, 1991). 
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). 
32. Id. § 158(a)(4). 
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had filed ULP charges against the employer.33 In January 1992, Caterpillar 
announced that it had suffered losses of $318 million for the fourth quarter 
of 1991.34 
After sporadic negotiations between the union and the employer, Cat­
erpillar announced on February 7, 1992, that it was ending the lockout of 
employees at its East Peoria and Aurora plants and was asking that the 
employees return to work by February 16.35 The UAW responded by ex­
panding the strike and instructing the employees who had been locked out 
not to report to work without a collective bargaining agreement. 36 
Negotiations in February remained unavailing, as the union continued 
to insist on a collective bargaining agreement patterned on the Deere con­
tract. 37 On February 19, the UAW rejected what Caterpillar declared to be 
its final offer. 38 Two days after rejecting the offer, the union expanded the 
strike to Caterpillar's Mossville, Illinois plant, adding 2,750 employees to 
the 8,000 already on strike.39 
On March 6, after the union had rejected three of its contract propos­
als, Caterpillar announced that the parties were at an impasse in their nego­
tiations.40 Negotiations resumed on March 25.41 Two days later, the UAW 
filed additional ULP charges against Caterpillar, alleging that the employer 
had violated the Act by conducting surveillance of picketing employees, 
conducting surveillance of union officials, stealing picket signs, physically 
threatening picketing employees, and threatening them with discharge.42 
With the collapse of negotiations and the filing of ULP charges, the UAW 
33. Charge Against Employer, Case 33-CA-9624 (Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.) (filed Dec. 5, 
1991). 
34. Caterpillar Absorbs $318 Million Loss, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at A-20 (Jan. 23, 
1992). 
35. Caterpillar Trying to Renew Talks With UAW, Says it Will End Lockout, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 28, at A-4 (Feb. 11, 1992). 
36. UAW's Bieber Tells Locked·Out Caterpillar Workers to Stay Home, supra note 27. 
37. Id.; UAW Rejects New Contract Proposal That Caterpillar Says ls Final Offer, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at A-9 (Feb. 21, 1992). 
38. UAW Rejects New Contract Proposal That Caterpillar Says ls Final Offer, supra note 
37. 
39. UAW Expands Strike Against Caterpillar, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at A-19 (Feb. 
25, 1992). 
40. Caterpillar Declares Impasse in UAW Talks, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at A-16 
(Mar. 9, 1992). The union invited Caterpillar to return to the bargaining table on March 17, but 
the employer declined, claiming its negotiators were unavailable. UAW Wants Meeting With Cat­
erpillar, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 54, at A-16 (Mar. 19, 1992). 
41. Caterpillar-UAW Talks Resume, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at A-16 (Mar. 26, 
1992). 
42. Charge Against Employer, Case 33-CA-9768 (Nat' I Labor Relations Bd.) (filed Mar. 27, 
1992). 
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declared that it considered the strike an unfair labor practice strike rather 
than an economic strike. 43 
As the conflict between Caterpillar and the UAW escalated, the rela­
tionship between the battles in Peoria and Washington, D.C. became in­
creasingly clear. Both were battles about strikes and the balance between 
the rights of employees and employers. After months of negotiations and 
strategic maneuvers by one of the strongest unions and one of the most 
powerful employers in the nation, the reason for the legislative confronta­
tion in the nation's Capital was on the verge of graphic depiction in Peoria, 
Illinois. 
Climax 
On April 1, 1992, Caterpillar deployed its ultimate weapon-the Mac­
kay doctrine. After five months of a strike by its UAW-represented em­
ployees, Caterpillar announced that strikers who did not return to work by 
April 6 might lose their positions to returning strikers, employees recalled 
from layoff, or permanent replacements.44 Furthermore, the announcement 
stated that Caterpillar would reduce its workforce by ten to fifteen per­
cent. 45 The UAW responded to the ultimatum by expanding the strike and 
43. VA W Files ULP Charges Against Caterpillar; Contract Talks Break Off Without Resolu­
tion, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 61, at A- 12 (March 30, 1992). For discussion of the distinctions 
between ULP strikes and economic strikes, see infra Part II.A and note 1 16. 
44. Caterpillar Tells Strikers to Return to Work; UAW Authorizes Strikes Against Four More 
Plants, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 64, at A- 12 (Apr. 2, 1992); Caterpillar Threatens Strikers' 
Jobs, ST. Loms PosT-DISPATCH, Apr. 2, 1992, at SB. The article in the Daily Labor Report 
actually stated that Caterpillar "said it will fire workers who refuse [to return to work]." Caterpil­
lar Tells Strikers to Return to Work; VA W Authorizes Strikes Against Four More Plants, supra. A 
correction was published in the next day's issue: "[A] statement from Caterpillar warned that 
strikers who choose not to return 'may lose their place in a reduced work force. They could be 
replaced by a returning striker, an employee recalled from layoff, or a permanent new hire.' " 
Correction, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 65, at I (Apr. 3, 1992). The difference between the two 
reported announcements may seem insignificant; if Caterpillar had made the announcement as 
first reported, however, it would have violated § 8(a)(l )  of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l), and 
perhaps converted what may have been an economic strike into a ULP strike, with drastic conse­
quences to be described below. See, e.g., Trident Seafoods Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 566, 570 (1979) 
(holding that, by issuing discharge notices to employees engaged in economic strike, employer 
committed ULP that converted strike from economic to ULP strike), enforced, 642 F.2d 1 1 48 (9th 
Cir. 1981); see also 2 AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw: THE BoARD, THE 
CouRTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr 1 102 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) 
[hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw] (recognizing that employer's statements regarding 
replacement or reinstatement of striking employees may be basis on which strike is characterized 
as ULP or economic strike). That the Daily Labor Report would inadvertently substitute "fire" for 
"permanently replace" is, in the view of many commentators, consistent with the fact that employ­
ees are likely to perceive no difference between permanent replacement and discharge. See infra 
note 106. 
45. Analysts Say VA W-Caterpillar Dispute Could Have Significant Ramifications, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 65, at A- 15 (Apr. 3, 1 992). This announced reduction in force further jeopard­
ized the striking employees' prospects for reinstatement. An employer that does not reinstate 
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authorizing members to strike at four additional Illinois plants. 46 On April 
2, the UAW continued its counteroffensive by filing another set of ULP 
charges against Caterpillar.47 The union subsequently filed additional ULP 
charges, with at least one specifically alleging that the strike had been con­
verted to a ULP strike. 48 
The employer, by announcing its decision to hire permanent replace­
ments, transformed the employees' picket line into a moat between certain 
jobs and uncertain reinstatement rights. The striking employees were con­
fronted with the difficult decision of whether to cross that moat.49 As the 
strikers considered their options and the prospect of losing their livelihoods, 
observers speculated about the impact of the UAW-Caterpillar labor dispute 
on the future of collective bargaining in the United States. 50 
With the battle at its height in Peoria, the importance of the conflict 
was not lost on politicians.51 Proponents of the bills to ban the hiring of 
economic strikers can avoid liability for a ULP if i t  can satisfy the burden of proving a "legitimate 
and substantial business justification[ ]" for refusing to reinstate them. NLRB v: Fleetwood 
Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967). Changes in operations such as downsizing, if not moti­
vated by intent to discriminate against union activities, can satisfy the employer's burden. Id. at 
379. 
46. Caterpillar Tells Strikers to Return to Work; UAW Authorizes Strikes Against Four More 
Plants, supra note 44; Caterpillar Threatens Strikers' Jobs, supra note 44. 
47. Charge Against Employer, Case 33-CA-9767 (Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.) (filed Apr. 2, 
1992). The charge alleged various violations of §§ 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5) of the Act: bad faith 
bargaining by Caterpillar as evidenced by the implementation of its final contract offer without 
reaching an impasse in bargaining; illegal surveillance of union activity; manipulation of employ­
ees' seniority and job retention rights; interference with the right of strikers to picket near plants' 
gates; refusal to provide the union with information relevant to the fulfillment of its duties as  
collective bargaining representative; bargaining to impasse on a nonmandatory bargaining subject; 
and bad faith bargaining as evidenced by direct dealing with union members. 
48. Charge Against Employer, Case 33-CA-9775 (Nat'! Labor Relations Bd.) (filed Apr. 8,  
1992). The charge stated, in relevant part, that "[s]ince on or about April 1, 1992, the current 
strike has been converted to an unfair Jabor practice strike by the Employer's announcement that it 
intends to hire permanent replacements for bargaining unit employees who are engaged in the 
lawful exercise of their Section 7 rights." 
49. Strikers were receiving $100 per week from the UAW's $800 million strike fund. Rally 
Backing Caterpillar Strikers Draws 20,000 Union Members to Peoria, supra note 20. Addition­
ally, the UAW paid a $2,000 bonus to those who had been on strike since the beginning. Id. 
50. Professor Harley Shaiken assessed Caterpillar's ultimatum as  "redefining the rules" of  
collective bargaining. He suggested that the resolution of  the UAW-Caterpillar dispute could 
shape labor relations for the 1990s. Analysts Say UAW-Caterpillar Dispute Could Have Signifi­
cant Ramifications, supra note 45; see also For UAW, "A Question of Survival": Caterpillar's 
"Hardball" Step Called a Gamble, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1992, at Cl (quoting various analysts on 
potential ramifications of  the dispute). 
51. On April 8, Governor Clinton, then the front-runner for the Democratic presidential nom­
ination, visited the striking employees at the Peoria plant in a show of support, Cynthia Todd, 
Clinton Backs Strikers' Rights, ST. Louts PosT-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 1992, at A l ,  and a group o f  
senators sent a letter to the Secretary of Labor encouraging her to intervene in the dispute, I 5 
Senators Urge Martin to Intervene in Caterpillar Strike, Appoint Mediator, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 69, at A-18 (Apr. 9, 1992). 
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permanent replacements pointed to the dispute as a stark example of the 
need for the legislation; conversely, opponents of the legislation argued that 
the confrontation demonstrated why employers need the right to hire per­
manent replacements when they have offered unions fair contracts that un­
ions reject. 52 
Falling Action 
On April 6, approximately 300 striking Caterpillar employees returned 
to work.53 Caterpillar then raised the stakes by placing advertisements in 
local newspapers seeking "permanent employees to replace non-returning 
striking workers" and offering wages from $16.12 to $17.85 per hour with 
"excellent benefits" and pensions.54 Caterpillar reported receiving an over­
whelming response to the advertisements from people interested in the re­
placement positions.55 Even striking employees who had not crossed the 
picket lines with the "first wave" acknowledged both the increasing pres­
sure to return in order to preserve their jobs56 and the frustration of feeling 
that the battle and their livelihoods were slipping beyond their control.57 As 
of April 13, an estimated 750 strikers had crossed the picket lines and re­
turned to work. 58 As the "crossovers" drove through the picket line, their 
coemployees shouted insults and filmed them so their names could be 
posted at the union hall.59 
52. See Lobbyists Weigh Impact of Caterpillar Strike on Bill to Ban Strike Replacements, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 74, at A-12 (Apr. 16, 1992). 
53. About 300 Caterpillar Strikers Have Crossed Picket Lines, Company Says, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 67, at A-10 (Apr. 7, 1992). 
54. Philip Dine, Job Seekers' Calls Flood Caterpillar, ST. Loms PosT-DISPATCH, Apr. 8, 
1992, at A l; Stephen Franklin, Once Again, Strike Tears at Peoria, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 8, 1992, at 
C-1. 
55. Dine, supra note 54, at Al; Franklin, supra note 54, at C-1. 
56. One Caterpillar employee expressed the tension many strikers felt: 
"There's a lot of guys who can't make up their minds-you're caught between the union 
and the company .... I can't say when, [but] at some point, something will snap and 
I'll go in-no ifs, ands or buts. You've got to pay for the house, for the car and put food 
on the table." 
Michael Abramowitz, The Agony of Crossing the Line-Caterpillar Strikers Tom Between Princi­
ples and Pocketbook, WASH. PosT, Apr. 8, 1992, at C-1 (quoting Caterpillar assembly line em­
ployee Bob Piper) (alteration in original). 
57. "'The guys on top who made this decision, they do not have anything to bet .... We're 
all angry. We're all afraid, and at this point, we are all going hour by hour."' Franklin, supra 
note 54, at C-1 (quoting Rich Gilbert, a third-generation Caterpillar worker). '"It's like two kids 
fighting over a candy bar sometimes, and who's caught in between? Us."' Michael Martinez, 
For UAW, "A Question of Survival": Showdown Tightens the Squeeze on Strikers, Cm. TRIB., 
Apr. 3, 1992, at C l  (quoting an unidentified striker). 
58. Caterpillar, UAW Meet Under Auspices of FMCS, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at 
A-16 (Apr. 14, 1992). 
59. See Kevin Johnson & Andrea Stone, Caterpillar Tests Striking UA W's Will, USA To­
DAY, Apr. 7, 1992, at A l .  At the Aurora, Illinois plant, striking employees erected a mock gal-
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Caterpillar and UAW negotiators began meeting with the director of 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliatiqn Service on April 13 in an effort to 
resolve the strike.60 On April 14, 1992, five months and ten days after the 
strike had begun, the UAW called off the strike and advised its members to 
return to work under the terms of Caterpillar's final offer-with the em­
ployer's agreement to end its efforts to hire replacements, but without a 
collective bargaining agreement.61 The union pointed to the employer's 
threat to hire permanent replacements and the resulting, as well as potential 
further, striker crossover as reasons for terminating the strike. 62 
The confrontation did not end, however, with the strike "busted" and 
the employees returning to work on the employer's terms. When employ­
ees reported for work on April 15, they were told to wait until they were 
recalled by the company; Caterpillar suggested that due to modernization 
during the lockout and strike, the company might not recall ten to fifteen 
percent of the strikers. 63 Caterpillar decided, however, that despite its re­
duced need, it would recall all strikers as a gesture of good will.64 The 
battle in Peoria was finally over, and management had defeated the mighty 
UAW-one of labor' s strongest warriors. 
In the aftermath of "one of the key labor combat fields of the dec­
ade,"65 labor leaders and advocates described the strike, generally regarded 
as the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal,66 as a "suicide mission"67 and 
lows and noose to send crossovers a message. Id. One striker expressed the feelings of those 
refusing to return for the crossovers: " 'It makes me sick . . . . They are screwing my family and 
they're screwing themselves. If we hold out another week, we can win this thing. This is the last 
card that Caterpillar has to play."' Strikers Disobey Caterpillar Order to Report to Work, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 7, 1992, at D2 (quoting Bob Hughes, Caterpillar employee 
for 24 years). 
60. Caterpillar, UAW Meet Under Auspices of FMCS, supra note 58. 
61. Caterpillar Says It Will Begin Recall of Strikers on April 20, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 
75, at A-17 (Apr. 1 7, 1 9 92); UAW Agrees to End Strike at Caterpillar, ST. Lams PosT-DISPATCH, 
Apr. 15, 1992, at I A. 
62. Local 75 1 president Larry Solomon stated that although fewer than 1,000 strikers had 
crossed over in response to Caterpillar's ultimatum, many more were on the verge of crossing 
over. Caterpillar Says It Will Begin Recall of Strikers on April 20, supra note 6I ,  at A-I7. 
63. Cynthia Todd, Caterpillar Locks Its Gates On UAW, ST. Lorns PosT-DISPATCH, Apr. I6, 
I992, at IC. 
64. John Lippert, Caterpillar Will Recall All Strikers, DETROIT FREE PREss, Apr. 17, 1992, at 
IE; Caterpillar Says It Will Begin Recall of Strikers on April 20, supra note 6 1. As a result of 
Caterpillar's turning away employees reporting on April 15,  some of those employees filed a class 
action against the employer alleging breach of individual employment contracts. Caterpillar Sued 
Over Delayed Return, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 1 4, at A-I4 (June I2, 1 992). 
65. Analysts Say UAW-Caterpillar Dispute Could Have Significant Ramifications, supra note 
45. 
66. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note I, at 1322. 
67. More In-Plant Actions Expected In Wake of UAW's Failed Strike at Caterpillar, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 90, at A-7 (May 8, 1992) (quoting Charles McDonald, executive assistant to 
the secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO). 
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suggested that unions would resort to other tactics, including in-plant activi­
ties (such as work slow downs), product boycotts, media campaigns, and 
informational picketing.68 Labor leaders also emphasized that Caterpillar' s 
successful use of the permanent replacement ultimatum demonstrated the 
necessity of passing the pending legislation overturning Mackay. 69 
Labor lost the battle in Washington, D.C. as well, when S. 55 died in 
the Senate. First, the Senate bill banning the hiring of permanent replace­
ments during economic strikes was killed by filibuster as a motion to in­
voke cloture failed. 70 Then, Senator Packwood proposed an amended 
version of the bill as a substitute, which would have prohibited the hiring of 
permanent replacements by an employer if a union agreed both to submit 
the labor dispute to a three-member fact-finding panel and to be bound by 
the panel ' s  recommendations.71 A cloture vote on the amended bill also 
failed. 72 With that vote, organized labor lost the second great battle of 
1 992. But the war was far from over. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The UAW-Caterpillar labor dispute was a remarkable display of the 
weapons and strategies of labor and management-lockout, strike, postur­
ing by union and employer, filing of ULP charges, threat to hire pennanent 
replacements, and consequent breaking of the strike. The dispute is also, as 
both sides contend, a model of the issues involved in one of the most impor­
tant debates in labor law: whether an employer should be allowed to hire 
permanent replacements during a strike. 73 
68. Id. 
69. Id.; Lippert, supra note 64, at I E (quoting UAW Secretary-Treasurer Bill Casstevens 
saying that the dispute would increase support for the legislation). 
70. 138 CoNG. REc. 5791 9-65 (daily ed. June 1 1 . 1992) (debate and failure of cloture mo­
tion); McCallion, supra note 1 6, at CRS-3; Senate Fails to Invoke Cloture on Striku Replaument 
Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 1 4, at A- JO (June 1 2, 1992). 
7 1 .  138 CoNG. REc. S8056-89 (daily ed. June 1 1 , 1992) (amendments 2047-94). 
72. 138 CoNG. REc. 58236-39 (daily ed. June 1 6, 1992) (debate and failure of cloture mo­
tion); McCallion, supra note 1 6, at CRS-3-4; Senate Vote Kills Bill to Restrict Use of Permanent 
Striker Replacements, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 1 7, at A8 (June 17, 1992). 
73. The most significant aspect of the hiring of pennanenl replacements is that it changes 
(a�ver�ly from the.strik�rs' pers�tive) the reinstatement rights of the striking employees if the 
stoke 1s an econorruc stnke. See mfra Part II.A. The hiring of permanent replacements and the 
conco�itant alteri�g of strikers' reinstatement rights is one manifestation of perhaps the most 
pe1:"as�ve struggle m labor law;-the �truggle between an employer's right to manage its business 
as 1t wishes and the employees § 7 nghts to organize and engage in concerted activities. Boe W. 
Martin, The Rights of Economic Strikers to Reinstatement: A Search for Certainty, J 970 Wts. L. 
REv. 1062, 1062; cf ?eborah Eberts, Comment, The Mackay Doctrine: The Grand Dame of 
Lab�r Law Clashes With the Current State of the Union, 57 J. ArR L. & CoM. 257, 258 ( 1991 )  (�tati�� �at. pem_1anent replacement debate " 'captures the essence of labor management rela­tions, p1ttmg nghts of employers against rights of employees) (quoting Randall Sarnbom 
"Replacements " Spur Labor Action, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 1990, at I ,  28). 
' 
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During the UAW-Caterpillar clash, many observers focused on the im­
plications of the dispute for the then-pending striker replacement legisla­
tion. The proposed legislation, like the strike, failed, and the Mackay 
doctrine, in its fifty-fourth year, had v anquished its most recent chal­
lenger.74 At the time, it appeared there might be no further efforts to over­
turn Mackay legislatively for several years. 75 With the election of a 
Democratic President who had pledged his support for such legislation,76 
however, the striker replacement bills were resurrected in the 103d Con­
gress.77 The United States House of Representatives passed the Cesar Cha-
74. H.R. 5 and S. 55 were, at the time, the latest unsuccessful attempts to overrule Mackay 
legislatively. The following bills, which would have abrogated the Mackay doctrine had they 
been enacted, were introduced in Congress from 1 988 through 1991:  H.R. 2620, 1 02d Cong., 1 st 
Sess. (1991); S. 2 1 1 2, l O l st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 3936, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); 
H.R. 2969, 101st Cong., 1 st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1 383, J 0 1 st Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1 989); and H.R. 
4552, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1988). 
In 1991, Representative Goodling introduced H.R. 2620 as a substitute amendment to H.R. 5. 
The bill, which was introduced on June 12, 199 1 ,  would have made it a ULP for an employer to 
hire pennanent replacements during the first eight weeks of an economic strike. It also would 
have amended § 9(c)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1 59(c)(3) ( 1988), by extending the period during 
which economic strikers not entitled to reinstatement are entitled to vote in an NLRB election 
from 12 months to 1 8  months (after the commencement of a strike). McCallion, supra note 16, at 
CRS-7. 
In 1990, S. 2 1 1 2  and H.R. 3936 were introduced in the lOlst Congress. These bills were the 
substantive precursors of the bills introduced in the 1 02d and 103d Congresses; they would have 
made it a ULP either to hire permanent replacements at any time during a strike or to give prefer­
ence to strike crossovers. McCallion, supra, note 16, at CRS-4; McDonald, supra note 16, at 985. 
In 1989, H.R. 2969 was introduced in the l O l st Congress. This bill would have prohibited 
the hiring of replacements who would prejudice the reinstatement status of legal strikers. McDon­
ald, supra note 16, at 985. Also introduced in 1989 was H.R. 1383, first introduced in 1988 as 
H.R. 4552, which would have made it a ULP to hire permanent replacements during the first 10 
weeks of a strike. McCallion, supra note 16, at CRS-4; McDonald, supra note 1 6, at 985. 
For a succinct summary of the types of legislative proposals to limit or overturn Mackay, see 
Douglas E. Ray, Some Overlooked Aspects of the Strike Replacement Issue, 4 1  KAN. L. R.Ev. 363, 
370-72 (1992). 
75. Senate Vote Kills Bill to Restrict Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, supra note 72 
(reporting union and business leaders' predictions that striker replacement legislation would not 
be considered again by Congress while President Bush was in office). 
76. Clinton Transition Aide Says Family Leave, Striker Replacement Bills Are Priorities, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at A-17 (Jan. 8, 1 993). 
77. The House bill was introduced by Representative Clay on January 5,  1993. H.R. 5, 103d 
Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1 993). The Senate bill was introduced by Senator Metzenbaum on January 2 1 ,  
1993. S .  55, 103d Cong., 1 st Sess. (1993). Passage o f  the bills is organized labor's top priority i n  
the l03d Congress. See, e.g., Kirkland Lauds Clinton o n  Issues Vital to Labor, But Rejects 
NAF'IA, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at A- 1 1 (Mar. 25, 1 993); Unions See Striker Replacement 
Bill as Beginning of Wider Labor I.Aw Reform, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 22 1 ,  at A-2 (Nov. 1 6, 
1992). Labor's disdain for Mackay is matched by employers' affinity for it. E.g. , Bill to Ban 
Striker Replacements Still Faces Tough Climb in Senate, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 7 1 ,  at AA- 1 
(Apr. 15, 1993) (discussing business community' s  efforts to solidify cloture-proof block of votes 
in the Senate to defeat S.  55); Employers Converge on Capitol to Oppose Senate Passage of 
Striker Replacement Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 34, at A- 1 1  (July 1 5 ,  1 993) (discussing 
business leaders' rally on July 14, 1993). 
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vez Workplace Fairness Act78 on June 1 5, 1 993.79 The bill, like its 1992 
precursor, would amend the NLRA to make it a ULP �o� an employer �� 
hire or threaten to hire permanent replacements for stoking employees. 
The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee approved a similar 
bill 81 which currently awaits action on the Senate floor.82 In view of the 
pas�age of the bill in the House in 199� , the 1 993 re�ult the�e was �ever in 
doubt. The battle will be won or lost m the Senate JUSt as it was m 1992. 
As of this writing, it appears that the Senate will debate the bill in late April 
or early May 1 994, but supporters appear to be a few votes short of the 
sixty needed to defeat a filibuster.83 
Commentators have presented various arguments for and against the 
Mackay doctrine and striker replacement legislation. Some conclude that 
Mackay should be overturned and employers absolutely banned from hiring 
permanent replacements as in the Workplace Fairness Act. 84 Others con-
78. H.R. 5, 103d Cong., 1 st Sess. (1993). The House Education and Labor Committee 
adopted an amendment that renamed the act in honor of the president of the United Farm Workers, 
who died on April 23, 1993. Striker Replacement Bill Clears House, Senate Panels, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 86, at AA-I (May 6, 1 993). 
79. The House passed the bill by a vote of 239-190. 139 CONG. REc. H3527-69 (daily ed. 
June 15, 1993) (debate and passage of bill); House Approves Bill That Would Ban Permanent 
Replacemen t of Economic Strikers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 1 4, at AA-1 (June 16, 1993). 
80. H.R. REP. No. 1 16, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I ,  at 2, 39 ( 1 993). The prohibition on 
hiring permanent replacements would protect employees who were in a bargaining unit if either of 
two conditions existed: a labor organization was the certified or recognized bargaining represen­
tative of the bargaining unit; or at least 30 days prior to the dispute, a labor organization had filed 
a petition, based on written authorization by a majority of the bargaining unit, for a representation 
election. The bill similarly would amend the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § §  1 5 1 -88 (1988). 
The bill also would overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. In­
dependent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 ( 1 989). H.R. REr. No. I 1 6, supra, at I, 2, 39. 
In that case, the Court held that an employer did not violate the Railway Labor Act by refusing, at 
the conclusion of a strike, to replace (or "bump") junior crossover employees from their jobs with 
more senior employees who did not cross over. Trans World Airlines, 489 U.S. at 432. Discus­
sion of Trans World Airlines is beyond the scope of this Article. For an analysis of that decision, 
see Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, I 990 U. h.L. L. 
REV. 547, 556-59. 
8 1 .  S. 55, 1 03d Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1993). The prohibition on hiring permanent replacements 
in the Senate bill has potentially broader application than the House bill, in that it applies if a 
�nion�on. the b�sis of signed authorization cards by a majority of the employees in the bargain­
mg umt-1s seeking to be recognized or certified, even if the union has not filed a petition for an 
election. Id. 
82. Striker Replacement Bill Clears House, Senate Panels, supra note 78. 
83. See David R. Sands, Unions Seek Senate Support to Protest Strikers, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 
2 1 ,  1994, at A 1 7  (reporting that Senator Mitchell promised to schedule the bill for debate in late 
April or early May)'. 
Thus, earli�r forecasts of the unlikelihood of the bill's passage appear to be 
correct. See, e.g. , Bill to Ban Striker Replacements Still Faces Tough Climb in Senate, Daily Lab. 
Re�. (BNA) No. 7 1 ,  at AA- I  (Apr. 15,  1 993); Senate Ratio Changes with Hutchison Victory, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 108, at A-I O  (June 8, 1993). 
84. E.g., Walter Kamiat, Strikers and Replacements: A Labor Union Perspective in PRo­
CEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43Ro ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAB�R, supra 
1 994] PERMANENT STRIKER REPI.ACEMENTS 829 
elude that the current law should be modified, but that employers should not 
be banned under all circumstances from hiring permanent replacements. 85 
Finally, some conclude that Mackay should be left alone. 86 
note 13, at 23, 26-27, 5 1 ;  Michael H. LeRoy, Changing Paradigms in the Public Policy of Striker 
Replacements: Combination, Conspiracy, Concert, and Cartelization, 34 B .C. L. REv. 257, 
306-07 (1993); Schatzki, supra note 1 1, at 392; Jack J. Canzoneri, Comment, Management's 
Attitudes and the Need For The Workplace Fairness Act, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 205, 243-44 (1993); 
David Radtke, Comment. Banning the Use of Permanent Replacements: Slaying Its Opponent's 
Trojan Horse, 1992 DET. C.L. REv. 881, 901, 906-07; Jonathan Axelrod, Speech Delivered to the 
ABA's Mid-Winter Meeting (Mar. 5, 1991), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at F-1 
(Mar. 6, 1991)); cf. Finkin, supra note 80, at 574 (urging abrogation of Mackay). Professor Wei­
ler's proposal calls for an absolute ban for a specified period. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING 
THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 268 (1 990). Professor Weiler 
proposes amending the NLRA to provide that striking employees can return to their jobs within 
six months of the commencement of the strike even if replacements have been hired. Id. This 
proposal is modeled on the law of Ontario before it was amended in 1992. Id.; see R.S.O. ch. 228, 
§ 73 (1980). It is not clear whether the change advocated by Professor Weiler would permit 
employers, after six months from the commencement of a strike, to retain replacements rather than 
reinstating strikers offering to return even if the employer had no supporting business justification 
for preferring to retain the replacements. Under the law of Ontario prior to 1 992, the Ontario 
Labour Board held that, even after the six-month period provided by § 73, retaining replacements 
rather than reinstating strikers constituted a ULP, discrimination in violation of R.S.O. ch. 228 
§ 66(a) (1980), if an employer could establish no justification for retaining the replacements in 
preference to the strikers. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Shaw-Almex Indus., Ltd., O.L.R.B. 
Rep. 1800, 1825 (1986), ajf'd sub nom. Shaw Almex Indus., Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations 
Board), 28 0.A.C. 7 1  ( 1 988); see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Legal Regulation of Economic 
Weapons: A Comparative Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YoRK UNIVERSITY 43RD AN­
NUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 1 3 ,  at 79, 89-90 (discussing Ontario law 
regarding replacement and the Shaw-Almex decision). In 1992, the Ontario law that appeared to 
allow employers to retain replacements after six months was repealed. 1992 Canadian Labour 
Law Reports (CCH) TI 60,373-60,375. Bill 40, which was approved on November 5, 1992 and 
became effective on January l ,  1993, makes it more difficult for employers to operate during 
strikes; it prohibits employers from having strikers' work performed by permanent or temporary 
replacements or by transferred employees except under specific circumstances. Act of Nov. 5th, 
1992, ch. 21, 1992 S.O. 363. 
85. E.g. , Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revis�d to Preserve 
Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 397, 423 ( 1992); Ray, supra note 74, at 400; George S. 
Roukis & Mamdouh I. Farid, An Alternative Approach to the Permanent Striker Replacement 
Strategy, 44 LAB. L.J. 80, 89-91 (1993); Eberts, supra note 73, at 294-96; Hal K. Gillespie, Com­
ment, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 TEX. L. REV . 782, 782-87 
(1972); McDonald, supra note 16, at 991-94; Note, One Strike and You 're Out? Creating an 
Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine, 106 HARV. L. REv. 669, 669-70 ( 1 993) [hereinafter 
Note, One Strike]; Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike: A Critique and a Proposal for 
Change, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 988, 1009-1 1  (197 1 )  [hereinafter Note, The Unfair Labor Practice 
Strike]; Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A "Negotiations Approach," 
3 1 -36 (Nov. 1993) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
86. YAGER, supra note 1 1 , passim; Baird, supra note 1 1 , at 1 ,  22-26; Brendan Dolan, Mac­
Kay Radio: If It Isn 't Broken, Don't Fix It, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 3 1 3  passim (1991);  Peter G. Nash & 
Jonathan R. Mook, Strike Replacement Legislation: If It Ain't Broke, Don 't Fix It, 16 EMPLOYEE 
REL. L.J. 317, 328 ( 1990-9 1); Westfall, supra note 12,  at 1 58; William C. Zifchak, Strikers, 
Replacements, and S. 2112: Full Employment Law for Organized Labor?, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, supra note 1 3, at 53, 
69-75 (favoring retaining Mackay as is, but discussing alternatives that are preferable to banning 
830 NORTH CAROLINA LA W  REVIEW [Vol. 72 
The Workplace Fairness Act should not become law; on the other 
hand, the current law should not be left alone. It is not necessary to sweep 
away the existing regime to remedy the most palpable injustice in labor law 
manifested in the UAW-Caterpillar dispute and the many others like it-the 
inability of the parties to know at the time that they must make important 
decisions whether the employer lawfully may hire permanent replacements. 
It is necessary, however, to i mplement procedural changes to address that 
injustice. The current substantive law does not bestow upon employers an 
unfettered right to hire permanent replacements for strikers. Under the 
Mackay doctrine, employers are permitted to hire permanent replacements 
only for economic strikers-not ULP strikers. 87 This distinction between 
economic and ULP strikes performs important functions by deterring em­
ployers from committing ULPs and providing a market check on the bar­
gaining demands of unions and employers. 88 Procedural reforms, however, 
could both alleviate the uncertainty of the parties regarding the legality of 
hiring permanent replacements and preserve the useful distinction between 
economic and ULP strikes. 
The UAW-Caterpillar showdown demonstrates the need for procedural 
reform of the law on hiring permanent striker replacements. The VA W 
filed several ULP charges against Caterpillar. 89 In one of those charges, the 
union expressly alleged that the ULPs had converted the strike into a ULP 
strike.90 If the strike was converted from an economic strike to a ULP 
strike, the employer did not have the right to hire permanent replacements 
from the time of conversion. Although it is beyond debate that Mackay is 
so limited,91 the limitation was of no practical use to the striking Caterpillar 
employees faced with the guillotine of permanent replacement. They could 
accept the UAW's assertion that the strike was a ULP strike and that Cater­
pillar could not lawfully hire permanent replacements. They could even 
proclaim that message themselves by carrying picket signs declaring they 
were striking in protest of ULPs. But the employees could not know 
whether the union' s characterization of the strike would be accepted by the 
Board until it rendered a decision, which might occur two or more years 
the hiring ··of permanent replacements); Matthew T. Golden, Student Article, On Replacing the 
Replacement Worker Doctrine, 25 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 5 1 ,  85-90 ( 1991 ); cf George M. 
�ohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The Law and Economics Approach, 
m PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, 
supra note 1 3, at 1 09, 1 1 1 ,  1 17-19 (arguing that Mackay and other law regarding striker replace­
ment promote efficient outcomes). 
87. See infra notes 1 0 1 - 10 and accompanying text. 
88. See infra Part IV. 
89. See supra notes 33, 42, 47 & 48. 
90. See supra note 48. 
. 91. _
See, e.g. , Ray, supra note 74, at 368 (identifying the different reinstatement rights asso­ciated with the two types of strikers as the most important limitation on Mackay). 
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from the filing of the charges.92 Even then the Board's determination might 
be reviewed by a United States Court of Appeals.93 
Thus, under the current striker replacement law there is a gap between 
what the substantive law allows and what the procedural framework for 
effectuating that law permits. Delay in the decisional process results in 
uncertainty at the times when strikers, unions, and employers must make 
crucial decisions. That uncertainty regarding the characterization of the 
strike and the associated reinstatement rights of the strikers creates 
problems not only for the employees, but for all the parties in a labor dis­
pute. Employers, unions, and potential striker replacements also must act in 
ignorance and potentially face adverse consequences if their predictions re­
garding the nature of the strike subsequently prove incorrect. 94 Thus, the 
moral of the UAW-Caterpillar story is that the law should make it possible 
for all the parties in a labor dispute involving a strike and threat of perma­
nent replacement to know, with the greatest degree of certainty possible, the 
characterization of the strike and the accompanying reinstatement rights of 
the strikers before an employer hires permanent replacements .  Mackay, un­
bridled by procedural restraints, can be destructive. Properly c ontrolled, it 
would not be nearly so formidable, but it would continue to serve signifi­
cant purposes. 
This Article proposes a legislative amendment of the NLRA. Using 
the current distinction between economic and ULP strikes, this proposal 
would impose procedures designed to limit the doctrine to its intended area 
of application-economic strikes. The amendment would require employ­
ers to notify the NLRB before they hire permanent replacements and tem­
porarily prohibit employers from hiring them until expedited ULP 
proceedings determine the nature of the strike. The parties to a labor dis­
pute would then know whether the employer can hire permanent replace­
ments at the critical moment when they must take actions likely to have 
significant consequences. 
Part II of this Article examines the distinctions between economic and 
ULP strikes. Part III considers the perceived increase in use of permanent 
92. The median time for a Board decision from the filing of a ULP charge was 688 days in 
the fiscal year ending September 30, 1990. NLRB, supra note 6, at 196 tbl. 23. A 1991 General 
Accounting Office report found that in 1989, 21  % of the cases decided by the Board had been 
pending for more than two years, and 10% had been pending for more than four years. See, e.g., 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: ACTION NEEDED TO IM­
PROVE CASE-PROCESSING TIME AT HEADQUARTERS (Jan. 1991) (cited in 1 3 9  CONG. REc. 
S3044-45 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1 993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger in support of S .  598)). 
93. 29 U.S.C. § 1 60 (e) & (f) (1988) (establishing procedures for petitioning for enforcement 
and review, respectively). 
94. For discussion of the risks associated with the decisions of all the parties, see infra Part 
II.C. 
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replacements and the declining number and effectiveness of strikes as an 
argument for overturning Mackay. Part IV discusses why the principal dis­
tinction between the types of strikes should not be abrogated by categori­
cally prohibiting employers from hiring permanent replacements. After 
describing and evaluating prior proposals to modify the Mackay doctrine in 
Part V, this Article sets forth the details of a new proposal in Part VI. 
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ECONOMIC STRIKES AND UNFAIR LABOR 
PRACTICE STRIKES 
A. The Different Reinstatement Rights and Voting Rights of Economic 
Strikers and Unfair Labor Practice Strikers 
The characterization of a strike as an economic strike or an unfair labor 
practice strike determines the reinstatement rights and voting rights (in 
NLRB elections) of striking employees. A ULP strike is initiated or pro­
longed either wholly or partially in protest of an employer's ULPs.95 In 
contrast, an economic strike is neither initially caused nor prolonged by an 
employer' s ULPs.96 Thus, economic strikes are lawful strikes that are not 
in protest of an employer's ULPs.97 The objective of an economic strike is 
usually, although not always, to force an employer to agree to a union's 
economic demands, such as better wages, hours, health care benefits, or 
other terms and conditions of employment. 98 A strike that begins as an 
economic strike can be converted into a ULP strike if the employer com­
mits ULPs that prolong the strike (or perhaps aggravate or expand the 
strike).99 Similarly, a strike that either begins as a ULP strike or is con­
verted to a ULP strike can be converted or reconverted to an economic 
strike. 100 
The primary significance of the distinction between economic and 
ULP strikes is the different rights of employers to hire replacements and the 
95. E.g., Northern Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 13 13, 1 3 1 9  (7th Cir. 1989) ("A strike that 
is caused in whole or in part by an employer's unfair labor practices is an unfair labor practice 
strike."); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1 100; ROBERT A. GoRMAN, BASIC 
TEXT ON LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 339 (1976); Martin, supra 
note 73, at 1063. For a discussion of the types of practices or acts by an employer that may 
constitute ULPs, see supra note 6. 
96. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1 1 00; GORMAN, supra note 95, at 339; 
Martin, supra note 73, at 1 063. 
97. See Martin, supra note 73, at 1063. 
98. See, e.g., 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 44, at 1 100 (noting that demand for 
consent election also can be basis of economic strike); Martin, supra note 73, at 1063 (recognizing 
that strikes for recognition of a bargaining representative and for consent election have been clas­
sified as economic). 
99. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1 102-03; GORMAN, supra note 95, at 
339; Martin, supra note 73, at 1063; see infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text. 
100. RAY & BARTI..E, supra note 12, § 5.06, at 1 1 - 12. 
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corresponding reinstatement rights of the strikers . As discussed above, 
under the Mackay doctrine, employers may hire "permanent" replacements 
for economic strikers; 101 Mackay is limited, however, to economic 
strikes. 102 Employers are not permitted to hire permanent replacements for 
employees engaged in a ULP strike; they may hire only temporary 
replacements. 103 
Based on the differing replacement rights of employers depending on 
the characterization of the strike, there is a corresponding dichotomy of 
reinstatement rights of striking employees. Economic strikers are entitled 
to immediate reinstatement upon making an unconditional offer to return to 
work, as long as the employer has not hired permanent replacements. 104 If 
an employer exercises its Mackay right by permanently replacing economic 
strikers, the strikers are only entitled to reinstatement to their jobs or sub­
stantially equivalent jobs, if and when vacancies occur. 105 An employer is 
101. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
102. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 ( 1956). 
103. See, e.g., Northern Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 1 3 13, 1319 (7th Cir. 1 989); JAMES B. 
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 31 (1983) (stating that, if a strike 
is deemed a ULP strike, all replacements are considered temporary) (citing NLRB v. Lightner 
Publishing Co., 1 13 F.2d 621 ,  625-26 (7th Cir. 1940); C.G. Conn, Ltd. v NLRB, 1 08 F.2d 390, 
401 (7th Cir. 1939); Jacob Hunkele, 7 N.L.R.B. 1276, 1 288-89 (1938), modified sub nom. 
Tri-State Towel Serv., 20 N.L.R.B. 123 (1940)); RAY & BARTLE, supra note 12, § 5.01, at 1 
("[E]mployer may not hire permanent replacements during an unfair labor practice strike . . . .  "); 
Martin, supra note 73, at 1 064 (stating that ULP strikers have right to immediate reinstatement 
and employer cannot hire permanent replacements). 
104. Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. 741, 74 1 ( 1986), review denied mem., 8 1 2  F.2d 1443 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 845 (1987); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 44, at 
1 105. If it is determined that the replacements are temporary replacements (hired only for the 
duration of the strike), the economic strikers have the right to immediate reinstatement, displacing 
the temporary replacements. E.g. , Hansen Bros. Enters., 279 N.L.R.B. at 74 1 ;  RAY & BARTLE, 
supra note 12, § 6.02, at 3. The burden is on the employer to establish that the replacements are 
permanent replacements. Gibson Greetings, Inc., 3 1 0  N.L.R.B. 1286, 1290 ( 1993); RAY & BAR· 
TLE, supra note 12, § 6.03, at 5. The employer can satisfy that burden by establishing that 
replacements and employer had a "mutual understanding and commitment on the permanent na­
ture of their employment." Gibson Greetings, Inc., 3 1 0  N.L.R.B. at 1290; see also Hansen Bros., 
279 N.L.R.B. at 741 (holding that it is employer's burden to establish mutual understanding). For 
discussion of cases in which employers failed to satisfy their burden of establishing permanent 
replacement, see infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text. 
105. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1 1 04-05; GORMAN, supra note 95, at 
341 -42; Martin, supra note 73, at 1064. The Board and the courts recognize the employer's 
continuing duty to reinstate economic strikers even if there are no vacancies at the time they make 
unconditional requests for reinstatement. Because economic strikers remain employees, the em­
ployer has a continuing duty to reinstate them when vacancies occur, unless those employees have 
obtained regular and substantially equivalent employment or the employer can prove a legitimate 
and substantial business reason for refusing to reinstate them. Laidlaw Corp., 171  N.L.R.B. 1366, 
1369 (1968), enforced, 4 1 4  F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 ( 1970). 
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not permitted, however, to discharge economic strikers based on their par­
ticipation in a strike. 106 
In contrast, ULP strikers are entitled to immediate reinstatement upon 
submission of an unconditional request to return to work. 107 The employer 
has no right to hire permanent replacements; thus, if  the employer hires 
replacements, regardless of how it characterizes them, it must discharge 
them if necessary to reinstate the returning ULP strikers. 108 When a strike 
is converted from an economic to a ULP strike, the strikers have the rein­
statement rights of economic strikers prior to conversion and the rights of 
ULP strikers after conversion. 109 Complementary principles apply to rein­
statement rights when a ULP strike is converted to an economic strike. 1 1° 
Thus, the keys to determining the reinstatement rights of any particular 
striker during a converted strike are the moments when the strike is con­
verted and when the employer hires a permanent replacement for that 
striker. 
A second major difference between ULP strikers and economic strik-
106. Many commentators question whether employees can understand and take comfort in the 
distinction between permanent replacement and discharge. E.g., Schatzki, supra note 1 1, at 383 
(describing the distinction as a "word game" that employees cannot understand and that is practi­
cally meaningless to employers as well as employees); see also Weiler, supra note 3, at 390 
(observing that employee "may be excused for not perceiving a practical difference" between 
discharge and permanent replacement). On the other hand, a number of commentators reject the 
idea that permanent replacement is, in effect, the equivalent of termination. See, e.g., Baird, supra 
note 1 1 , at 12- 1 3  (arguing that there is a significant difference between permanent replacement 
and termination as evidenced by the rights of preferential reinstatement and continued voting in 
NLRB elections within 1 2  months of commencement of strike); Estreicher, supra note 1 1 , at 290 
(recognizing that replaced strikers have a "not insignificant prospect" of reinstatement); Golden, 
supra note 86, at 64-65 (stating that voting and reinstatement rights distinguish permanently re­
placed striker from fired individual). 
In a recent article, Professor Ray acknowledges that permanent replacement differs from 
discharge in that replaced economic strikers have reinstatement rights as well as voting rights (for 
a limited period). Ray, supra note 74, at 3 8 1 -82. He criticizes the Board, however, for restricting 
the reinstatement rights of economic strikers. He argues that the Board, in recent decisions, has 
reduced the reinstatement rights by liberally defining what constitutes hiring of permanent 
replacements, limiting the range of positions to which strikers have reinstatement rights, and limit­
ing the circumstances under which strikers have reinstatement rights when a striker replacement is 
laid off. Id. at 384-98. 
107. E. g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956); Northern Wire Corp. v. 
NLRB, 887 F.2d 1 3 1 3, 1 3 1 9  (7th Cir. 1 989). 
108. See cases cited supra note 107. 
109. E.g., SKS Die Casting & Mach., Inc. v. NLRB, 941 F.2d 984, 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1991); 
see also GoRMAN, supra note 95, at 341 -42 (stating that strikers replaced during period when 
strike is considered ULP strike are entitled to immediate reinstatement); Martin, supra note 73, at 
1064 (same); Brandon C. Janes, Comment, The Illusion of Permanency for Mackay Doctrine 
Replacement Workers, 54 TEX. L. REv. 1 26, 128 ( 1 975) (same). 
1 10. Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1088 (1990) (holding that after ULP strike 
converted to economic strike, employer could hire permanent replacements), enforced, General 
Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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ers is in voting rights. ULP strikers, who cannot be permanently replaced, 
are entitled to vote in an NLRB election, such as a representation election to 
determine whether employees wish to be represented in collective bargain­
ing by a union, or, more significantly when a strike is in progress, a decer­
tification election to determine whether an incumbent bargaining 
representative retains that status. 1 1 1  Replacements for ULP strikers are not 
eligible to vote. 1 1 2 Economic strikers who are not entitled to immediate 
reinstatement because they have been permanently replaced have the statu­
tory right to vote in elections held within twelve months of the commence­
ment of a strike. 1 1 3 Permanent replacements for economic strikers 
generally also have the right to vote in an election. 1 14 This distinction be­
tween the voting rights of economic and ULP strikers has significant ramifi­
cations for the ability of the incumbent union to retain its status as the 
certified collective bargaining representative of the bargaining unit, and 
thus for the future of the collective bargaining relationship. 1 15 
B. Bases for the Distinction Between Unfair Labor Practice Strikes and 
Economic Strikes 
It is settled law that ULP strikers are accorded more favorable treat­
ment than economic strikers. 1 16 Although well established, that dichotomy 
1 1  l .  Kellbum Mfg. Co., 45 N.L.R.B. 322, 325 ( 1 942); l THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra 
note 44, at 424. This right stems from the fact that ULP strikers are entitled to immediate rein­
statement upon unconditional request. 
1 12. Larand Leisurelies, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 838, 838 (1976); Tampa Sand & Material Co., 
137 N.L.R.B. 1549, 1 549 ( 1962). 
1 1 3. 29 U.S.C. § 1 59(c)(3) (1988). The NLRA was amended in 1 959 to provide economic 
strikers with this limited voting right. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 
Pub. L. No. 86-257, sec. 702, § 9(c)(3), 73 Stat. 5 1 9, 542. Prior to that amendment, economic 
strikers who had been permamently replaced did not have a right to vote. See generally Joan 
Flynn, The Economic Strike Bar: Looking Beyond the "Union Sentiments" of Permanent 
Replacements, 6 1  TEMPLE L. REv. 691, 694-97 ( 1 988) (tracing history of the NLRA's treatment of 
the rights of economic strikers); Note, supra note 1 1 , at 635 (outlining the development of the 
permanent replacement rule). Economic strikers may lose their eligibility to vote under § 9(c)(3) 
if they have accepted other permanent employment, they have been discharged for cause (such as 
strike misconduct), or their jobs have been eliminated for economic reasons. W. Wilton Wood, 
Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1675, 1677 (1960). 
1 14. Pacific Tile & Porcelain Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1360 (1962); Axelrod, supra note 84, 
at n.30. Temporary replacements generally do not have a right to vote. William E. Locke, 137 
N.L.R.B. 1 610, 1 6 1 2  ( 1 962). For further discussion of the voting rights of strikers and replace­
ments, see Janes, supra note 109, at 130-33 and Note, Voting Rights of Econ omic Strikers and 
Replacements: The Impact of the Timing of the Strike, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 7 1  passim (1969). 
1 1 5.  For discussion of the threat to a union's status posed by permanent replacement, see infra 
Part 11.C.2. 
1 16. Superior reinstatement rights and voting rights are not the only distinctions between the 
treatment of ULP and economic strikers. First, strikers protesting ULPs are not subject to the 
"cooling off' period and other provisions of § 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C § 1 58(d) (1 988), which 
are designed to delay an economic strike in the hope that it can be averted. See, e.g., Mastro 
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has received mixed reviews among commentators. 1 17 Two principal bases 
exist for granting ULP strikers immediate reinstatement rights and back pay 
from the date of their unconditional offers to return. First, the remedy or­
dered by the Board for the employer' s ULP would be ineffective without 
such protections for the ULP strikers. Second, the only express authoriza­
tion in the Act for the Board to order reinstatement is in situations in which 
an employer has committed a ULP. 1 18  In the absence of such statutory 
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288-89 (1956); Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike, 
supra note 85, at 1001-02. Unlike economic strikers who violate the requirements of § 8(d), ULP 
strikers do not lose their status as employees. Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. at 284-89; Note, The 
Unfair Labor Practice Strike, supra note 85, at 1001-02. Second, a no-strike clause in a collective 
bargaining agreement will render an economic strike unprotected activity; such a clause, however, 
does not always render a ULP strike unprotected. If the ULP under protest is so serious that it is 
" 'destructive of the foundations on which collective bargaining must rest, ' "  then the strike is 
protected activity notwithstanding the no-strike clause. Arlan's Dep't Store, Inc., 1 33 N.L.R.B. 
802, 808 (1961) (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. at 281); see also Studio 44, Inc., 284 
N.L.R.B. 597, 599 (1987) (applying the Arlan 's standard); Note, The Unfair Labor Practice 
Strike, supra note 85, at 999-1001 (discussing the distinction between the effect of contractual 
restraints on ULP strikes and economic strikes). Finally, ULP strikers generally have been 
granted more latitude in picket line misconduct without the loss of reinstatement rights than have 
economic strikers. See Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike, supra note 85, at 997-99. Under 
the Thayer-Kohler approach (NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 756 ( 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 
U.S. 883 (1954); Local 833, UAW v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699, 702-03 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Kohler Co. v. International Union, UAW, 370 U.S. 911  (1962)), the severity of the em­
ployer's ULP is balanced against the employees' misconduct to determine whether the employees 
should be deprived of their reinstatement rights. That distinction was rejected by a plurality of the 
Board, however, in Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1047 ( 1984), enforced mem., 
765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1 105 (1986). Because a majority decision of 
the Board has not rejected Thayer-Kohler, it is not clear whether the Board will apply it in the 
future. See Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1075-76 n.3 (1990) (recognizing that Clear 
Pine was not a holding of the Board on the continued applicability of Thayer-Kohler), enforced 
and review denied sub nom. General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 95 1 F.2d 1308 
(D.C. Cir. 1991). For general discussion of the more favorable status accorded the ULP strike, see 
Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike, supra note 85, passim. 
1 17. One writer observes that, although there is disagreement on the issue among commenta­
tors, "employees who are striking to protest unfair labor practices or whose strike has been pro­
longed by wrongful employer action arguably merit more protection than those who strike to 
advance their own economic interests." Janes, supra note 109, at 127 (footnotes omitted) (citing, 
inter alia, Stewart, supra note 1). Viewing the different protections from the employer's perspec­
tive, another writer asks why an employer that lawfully resists a union's  demands and economic 
strike should be subject to the same sanctions (prohibition on hiring of permanent replacements) 
as an employer that violates the law (commits ULPs). Baird, supra note 1 1 , at 25; see also 
YAGER, supra note 1 1 , at 8 1  (arguing that an employer guilty of ULP should not be allowed to 
compound injury through hiring of permanent replacements, but an employer guilty of no unlaw­
ful conduct should not be prevented from defending its business against economic injury). On the 
other hand, one commentator has argued that according more favorable status to ULP strikes has 
the deleterious effect of encouraging employees to act as "little Boards" by striking as a self-help 
remedy for ULPs. Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike, supra note 85, at 988, 1002-03, 101 1. 
For an argument that the employees' acting as little Boards may be the most effective deterrent 
against employers' committing ULPs, see Ray, supra note 74, at 365-66, 372-75. See also discus-
sion infra Part IV.A. , 
1 18. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1988). 
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authorization, the Board and courts follow the common law. Two court 
decisions rendered soon after passage of the Wagner Act recognized these 
reasons. 
In Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 1 19 the union called a strike 
over economic demands and the employer closed the plant. The employer 
later reopened the plant with a smaller work force and the strike continued. 
The employer refused to meet with the union or conciliators because, it 
contended, the strikers had ceased to be employees. The Board found the 
employer guilty of a refusal to bargain. In ordering a remedy for the em­
ployer's ULP, the Board recognized that it could achieve no effective rem­
edy by merely ordering the employer to bargain with the union because the 
employer, through its refusal to bargain, had obviated the possibility of the 
strikers' returning to work with a contract. 120 The Fourth Circuit agreed 
and affirmed the Board's order. 121 
In Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 122 the employer refused to bar­
gain with the union after a strike commenced and then refused to reinstate 
the strikers. The Board found a ULP and ordered the employer to reinstate, 
with back pay, strikers replaced after the date on which the employer had 
refused to bargain, even if it was necessary to dismiss replacements. 123 The 
Second Circuit, relying on Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co., enforced the 
Board's order. The court observed that only those employees who were 
replaced after the employer committed a ULP were entitled to immediate 
reinstatement because "[t]he act so far as reinstatement is concerned only 
applies after there has been an unfair l abor practice."124 As in Jeffery-De 
1 19. 9 1 F.2d 1 34 (4th Cir.), enforcing Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1 936), 
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937). 
120. Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. at 626-27. The § 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain 
ULP that causes or prolongs a strike best illustrates the ineffectiveness of a remedy in the absence 
of reinstatement: 
But if the employer need not reinstate the strikers, with whom is he to bargain? Cer­
tainly not with the strikebreakers whom the strikers' union does not represent; nor with 
the strikers if they are to be barred from rehiring. It is manifest that an employer could 
provoke strikes with impunity by means of this unfair labor practice, in the absence of 
his duty to reinstate strikers. 
Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35 ILL. L. REv. 817, 819 ( 1941 ). In theory, a union 
does represent the "strikebreakers," Louis Natt, 44 N.L.R.B. 1099, 1 1 07 ( 1 942), but in practice its 
principal concern is usually achieving their discharge and reinstatement of the union' s  striking 
members. For discussion of this tension inherent in a union's duty to represent a bargaining unit, 
see infra text accompanying notes 173-82. 
121. Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co., 91 F.2d at 1 40. 
122. 94 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.), enforcing Black Diamond S.S. Corp, 3 N.L.R.B. 84 ( 1937), cert. 
denied, 304 U.S. 579 ( 1 938). 
123. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. at 93. 
124. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 94 F.2d at 879; see also NLRB v. Lightner Publishing Corp., 
1 13 F.2d 621 ,  626 (7th Cir. 1940) (holding that employer's right to hire employees was "unquali­
fied" until it committed a ULP). 
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Witt Insulator Co. ,  ordering reinstatement was necessary to maintain the 
status quo as it existed at the time of the ULP.125 
Although section 10( c) of  the Act authorizes reinstatement when a 
ULP has been committed, in the absence of a ULP, the Board and courts 
have resorted to the common-law rule that employers are not required to 
rehire employees who have stopped work. 126 Indeed, the Board has ex­
plained reinstatement rights of ULP strikers in terms of an employer's right 
to replace strikers and control its jobs as becoming "vulnerable and defeasi­
ble" when the employer commits a ULP. 127 
The NLRA does not include any reference to a right of an employer to 
replace striking employees permanently, but Mackay and subsequent Board 
and court decisions refer to such a right. 128 Given this approach to employ­
ers' rights vis-a-vis employees' statutory rights under the Act, Professor 
Atleson posits that the Mackay doctrine is based on "deep-seated" com­
mon-law notions that predate the NLRA.129 In short, these beliefs are that 
employers have the right to maintain their businesses and productivity and 
the right to hire whomever they wish because the business is the property of 
the employer. Accordingly, management's  prerogative to continue opera­
tions, hierarchical control, and property rights survive the enactment of the 
NLRA. 130 
1 25. Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 94 F.2d at 879. 
126. Janes, supra note 1 09, at 127 n. 1 1  (citing Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)). 
127. Boudin, supra note 120, at 8 1 8-19  (citing 4 NLRB ANN. REP. ( 1 940)); see also Black 
Diamond S.S. Corp., 94 F.2d at 879 (explaining that because of employer's ULP, "its ordinary 
right to select its employees became vulnerable"); Manville Jenckes Corp., 30 N.L.R.B. 382, 413 
(1941) (holding that employer's "normal right" to select employees became "vulnerable" when 
strike converted into ULP strike). 
128. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
129. ATLESON, supra note 103, at 32. 
130. /�. at 3�-3�; see also Nicholas Unkovic & James Q. Harty, Management's Legal 
Problems m Contmumg Plant Operations During an Economic Strike Under Federal and Penn­
sylvania Law, 67 DICK. L.  REv. 63, 63 ( 1 962) (footnotes omitted): 
Ma?agement has the right to attempt to continue the operation of its business when 
su_bJ�ted �o an economic strike. While the Mackay court did not develop the origin of 
this nght, it clearly flows from the "right of property" guaranteed under both federal and 
state constitutions. This is a well settled and basic rule of law. 
�tle�on argues that courts often use these property rights to overcome employees' assertion 
�f thetr. nghts. c�n�erred by the NLRA. ATLESON, supra note 1 03, at 9 1 -94. He discusses, as 
�llustrative of JUdic1a_l propaga�on of pre-Act property values, the Supreme Court's  decision limit­
mg nonem�loyee. umon organizers' access to an employer's property for organizational purposes. Id. at 93 (discussmg �RB v . . Babcock & Wilcox Co., 35 1 U.S. 1 05 ( 1 956)). Certainly, Atleson would �nd. the Co�rt .s _recent mte�retation of Babcock & Wilcox an even more striking example �� the �tal�ty of a JUd1c1ally reco?mzed employer right emanating from these amorphous property/ ierarc ca control values. In its 1 992 decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 1 12 S. Ct. 841 (l992�, the Court h�ld that an employer did not violate § 8(a)(l )  of the Act by denying union orgaruzers access to its parking I ts fi th · · . 0 or e purpose of orgamzmg the employer's em Jo ees The Court rejected the Board's test from Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 1 1  ( 1988), in whfc/the .Board 
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Thus, one of the bases for the distinction between reinstatement rights 
of ULP strikers and economic strikers is practical: enhanced reinstatement 
detennined whether an employer must grant access to its property by balancing the § 7 rights of 
the employees against the private property rights of the employer. Lechmere, 1 12 S. Ct. at 848. 
The Court held that, when the person s  seeking access are not employees of the employer, the 
balancing test is not performed unless there is no reasonable alternative means of access. Id. at 
849. Further, it limited that exception to the general no-access rule to situations in which the 
employees Jive on the employer's premises. Id. 
The Court' s holding in Lechmere seems at odds with the policy of the NLRA favoring organ­
ization of employees. The Court, nevertheless, couched its rationale in terms of rights under the 
Act, explaining that employees, not nonemployee union organizers, have rights under § 7 of the 
Act. That characterization, however, cannot withstand scrutiny. As the dissent notes, employees 
have a right to learn from others about organization. Id. at 851 (White, J., dissenting). What 
appears to be the driving force behind this decision, one at odds with the policies of the NLRA, is 
the Court's deference to the property and control rights of the employer. Consider the numerous 
references in the majority opinion to the employer's property and the union organizers' trespass 
on the employer's property. Id. at 845-50. For recent criticism of the Lechmere Court's expan­
sive conception of employers' property rights and restrictive conception of employees' § 7 rights, 
see Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REv. 305 
(1994). 
Thus, notwithstanding enactment of the NLRA, there remains a realm of employer rights 
emanating from values of ownership and concomitant control and prerogative regarding opera­
tions. Among the rights the Supreme Court has found to emanate from those values are the rights 
to expel nonemployee union organizers from the employer's private property (in most circum­
stances) and to hire permanent replacement employees for economic strikers. Cf Martin, supra 
note 73, at 1062 ("[T]he controversy over the reinstatement rights of economic strikers is but one 
facet of the continuing struggle which permeates the field of labor relations between the em­
ployer's right to manage his business and the employee's right to organize and participate in 
concerted activities."). 
The debate over the correct relationship between the Act and the earlier common law on 
issues of employees' and employers' rights has generated a body of scholarship. Some commen­
tators are critical of the role of the common-law decisions and values regarding employers' prop­
erty rights in modern labor law, viewing them as inimical to the NLRA and its purposes. E.g., 
AlLESON, supra note 103, at 171 ('The employment relationship is viewed by courts through a set 
of assumptions, involving status and class views, and the NLRA is treated as if it overlaps, but 
barely alters, this presumed relationship. Indeed, the statute is often used to enforce those aspects 
of the contractual relationship that courts create."). Others point out, however, that neither the 
NLRA nor its legislative history indicate that it repealed common-law jurisprudence permitting 
the hiring of permanent replacements. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 290-91;  see also YAGER, supra 
note 1 1 , at 56 (arguing that NLRA said nothing about restrictions on employers' responses to 
employees' concerted action when such action is wielded as an economic weapon). Still others 
are critical of the intrusions that the NLRA has made on common-law concepts of property rights. 
E.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for lAbor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor 
Legislation, 92 YALE L. J. 1357, 1388-89 (1983) (criticizing balancing tests for determining 
whether an employer has violated § 8(a)( l )  of the Act as "cut[ting] back upon the absolute power 
to exclude that is the hallmark of any system of private property"). Professor Fried challenges 
Epstein's analysis for its failure to explain why the original Wagner Act did not represent soci­
ety's redefinition of the social convention of common-law property rights. Charles Fried, Individ­
ual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor lAw and 
Its Prospects, in LABOR LAW AND THE EMPLOYMENT MARKET'. FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
68, 72 (Richard A. Epstein & Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985); see also Estlund, supra, at 310 (arguin� 
that "the NLRA should be interpreted to abrogate property rights . . . to the extent that their 
enforcement interferes with or inhibits conduct protected by the Act."). 
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rights are necessary to an effective remedy when there is a ULP strike. The 
second basis is largely theoretical, stemming from the interaction of the 
NLRA and the common law: the Act authorizes reinstatement only when 
an employer commits a ULP, and the common law prior to the Act, which 
retains vitality in the absence of express legislative abrogation, recognizes 
an employer's right to control its business as it chooses. 
C. Importance of the Distinction 
It would be difficult to overstate the importance to all parties to a labor 
dispute-striking employees, employers, unions, and replacement employ­
ees-of the characterization of a strike as a ULP strike or an economic 
strike when an employer hires permanent replacements or announces that it 
will do so. For employees, the characterization determines whether they are 
entitled to immediate reinstatement to their jobs, 1 3 1  and perhaps whether 
they have the right to vote in an NLRB election (if the election is held more 
than twelve months after the commencement of the strike). 1 32 For a union, 
the characterization ultimately may determine whether the union retains its 
status as the collective bargaining representative for the bargaining unit. 
For an employer, the characterization determines whether it committed a 
ULP by hiring permanent replacements and denying strikers reinstatement, 
and consequently whether the employer is liable for back pay. For replace­
ments, characterization of the strike is one of the factors determining 
whether they retain their jobs. 133 Thus, all parties to a labor dispute face 
risks associated with the characterization of a strike as an economic or ULP 
strike. 
1 .  What Are the Risks to the Striking Employees? 
As discussed above, the reinstatement rights of ULP strikers are supe­
rior to those of economic strikers who have been permanently replaced. 134 
Although permanently replaced economic strikers remain employees and 
have reinstatement rights, as a practical matter they are without- jobs and 
will not reacquire their jobs until vacancies occur in those or substantially 
1 3 1 .  See supra notes 104- 10 and accompanying text. 
132. See supra notes 1 1 1 -15 and accompanying text. 
. 
133. ,,
Even permanent replacements may be, as Professor Atleson words it, "depennanen­
tize[d]. ATLESON, supra note 103, at 3 1 .  If a strike is characterized as an economic strike and 
the employer offers the replacements "permanent" employment, the employer and the union sub­
sequently may agree that a condition of settling the strike is reinstatement of the strikers at the 
expense of the replacements. For example, see the discussion of the United Steelwork­
ers-Ravenswood Aluminum dispute infra at notes 2 1 6-26 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text. 
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equivalent jobs. 135 A recent example of economic strikers' long-term loss 
of their jobs is the strike by the United Paperworkers at International Paper 
Company' s  mill in Jay, Maine. Employees began striking at the Jay mill 
and two others in June 1987. 136 The employer hired permanent replace­
ments for the strikers, and the employees unconditionally ended their strike 
in October 1988, sixteen months after it began. 137 Because the strike was 
an economic strike when the permanent replacements were hired, the strik­
ing employees who had been replaced were placed on preferential hiring 
lists. As of July 1 992, almost four years after the strike ended, 500 former 
strikers were still on the lists awaiting reinstatement. 138 
Moreover, although employees who embark on a strike are affected by 
the characterization of the strike if the employer hires permanent replace­
ments, the importance of the characterization is greater to some than others. 
The effect of replacement is potentially greatest on small workforces, un­
skilled workers, and junior employees. When an employer has a small 
workforce and the entire workforce goes on strike, it will often be easier for 
the employer to replace employees more quickly than for an employer with 
a large workforce. 139 For example, in Hot Shoppes, Inc., 140 the Teamsters 
represented a bargaining unit of twenty-two employees. The union called a 
strike when bargaining was unavailing; three days later the employer re­
placed the entire workforce. Obviously the employer's advantage is even 
further enhanced when the striking employees are relatively unskilled such 
that replacements can be hired and put to work quickly with little 
training.141 
135. E.g., Rose Printing Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1 076 (1991). Professor Ray criticizes the 
Board for limiting replaced economic strikers' chances for reinstatement by not extending rein­
statement rights to vacancies in other positions for which those employees are qualified. See Ray, 
supra note 74, at 384-92. 
136. Paperworkers Woo Striker Replacements to Keep Maine Paper Mill Unionized, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 130, at A-1 (July 7, 1992). 
1 37. Id. 
138. Id. In July 1992, the workforce at the Jay mill consisted of 707 replacements, 53 em­
ployees who crossed the picket line, and 315 strikers who had been recalled. Id. For a discussion 
of the effect on the union of hiring permanent replacements at the Jay mill, see infra notes 156-58 
and accompanying text. 
139. Weiler, supra note 3, at 394. On the other hand, a union may be able to maintain a strike 
for a longer period in a small unit than in a large unit because the union's strike fund will not be as 
quickly depleted. The UAW strike at Caterpillar involved such a large number of employees that 
it would have been difficult to maintain but for the UAW' s  $800 million strike fund. See Robert 
L. Rose, Caterpillar's Success in Ending Strike May Curtail Unions' Use of Walkouts, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 20, 1992, at A3. 
140. 146 N.L.R.B. 802, 802-03 (1964). 
141.  Weiler, supra note 3, at 394. The size and skill level of the workforce are characteristics 
of the employees that affect the employer's ability to hire replacements. A number of factors 
beyond the employees themselves can affect an employer's ability to utilize replacements, such as 
the level of unemployment in the region and the community's attitudes toward unions or strikes. 
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In addition, employees with relatively little seniority are more likely 
than senior employees to be adversely affected by economic strikes when 
pennanent replacements are hired. First, if an employer hires and retains 
pennanent replacements for less than all of the employees on strike, the 
more junior employees are most likely to be denied reinstatement at the 
conclusion of the strike. 142 Second, for strikers placed on a preferential 
hiring list, the junior employees are generally subordinated to senior 
employees. 143 
Some of the heightened risk to junior employees appeared to be allevi-
ated by the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent 
Federation of Flight Attendants, 144 in which the Court held that an em­
ployer is not required to "bump" junior strike crossovers to make room for 
more senior striking employees requesting reinstatement. However, the de­
cision does not help junior employees who wish to remain on strike. In 
fact, it places a premium on junior employees' abandoning the strike to 
obtain jobs over their seniors. Thus, the decision actually increased em­
ployers' leverage over striking junior employees.  Indeed, the decision is 
seen as so divisive to strike efforts that both the House and Senate versions 
of the Workplace Fairness Act would legislatively overrule it. 145 
2. What Are the Risks to the Union? 
If it is true that replacements generally oppose the incumbent union 
(perhaps for no reason other than unions usually seek to have the replace­
ments discharged in order to effect reinstatement of the striking union mem­
bers), 146 then hiring permanent replacements for economic strikers can be 
the first step by the employer toward ending the collective bargaining rela­
tionship with the union through decertification. 147 An employer may even 
attempt to ensure the anti-union sentiments of the replacements by carefully 
ATLESON, supra note 103, at 28 (listing union's strength and ability to hurt the employer, norms 
and nature of surrounding community, tightness of labor market, and strikers' skill levels as rele­
vant factors). 
142. See Robert W. Schupp, Legal Status of Incentives for Replacement and Striking Workers, 
41  LAB. L.J. 3 1 1 ,  3 1 2  ( 1990). 
143. I_d. at 3 1 7- 1 8. I� the
.
a�sence of either a provision in a collective bargaining agreement or 
an establ�shed �as� pr
.
actice, 1t 1s not necessarily a ULP for an employer to order recall on some 
other basis; semonty 1s, however, the usual basis for ordering recall. RAY & BARTLE, supra note 
12, § 6.07, at 13 .  
144. 489 U.S.  426, 432 (1989). 
145. H.R. 5, l03d Cong., 1 st Sess. § 2 (1993); S. 55, 103d Cong.,  1 st Sess. ( 1 993). 146. E.g., Fl�nn •
. 
supra no�e 1 13, at 704 ("Another and more powerful reason for replacements to oppose the .umon 1s the desire for economic survival, pure and simple; if the union successfully set.ties the stnke, the replacements will themselves be replaced to make room fi th tu · strikers."). or e re mmg 
63
��7. ATLESON, supra note 103, at 27; Weiler, supra note 3, at 390; Note, supra note 1 1 , at 
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screening the replacements it hires, 148 although such a practice is fraught 
with potential for the filing of ULP charges and liability. 149 An employer's  
potential use of permanent replacements to terminate the bargaining rela­
tionship is, for its critics, one of the most objectionable facets of the Mac­
kay doctrine. 150 
Even though economic strikers who have been permanently replaced 
retain voting rights for twelve months from the commencement of a 
strike, 151 an employer may create a situation in which the union will be 
decertified within that year by hiring enough anti-union permanent replace­
ments to outnumber the striking employees. 152 Alternatively, the employer 
may achieve the same result, regardless of whether the replacements out­
number the strikers, if the election is not held until the statutory voting 
rights of the economic strikers have expired. 153 Thus, Professor Finkin 
characterizes an employer' s power to hire permanent replacements as mak­
ing a strike "a fight to the death, rather than a periodic test of wills."154 
The numerous examples of such decertifications alleviate the need to 
speculate whether decertification is a possibility when an employer hires 
permanent replacements.155 On July 17 ,  1992, the employees at the Jay, 
148. Axelrod, supra note 84; see also Janes, supra note 109, at 132 ("An employer in the 
Mackay situation has the unique opportunity to hand-pick many of the voters in the upcoming 
representation election."). 
149. A refusal to hire an applicant because of the applicant's union sympathies is a clear 
violation of §§ 8(a)( l )  and 8(a)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l )  & (a)(3) ( 1988). 
150. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 1 1 , at 291-92. Professor Estreicher views the battle be­
tween labor and management, in which each brings its economic weapons to bear, as a "bounded 
conflict." Id. at 288. The warfare should be limited by rules that prevent the battle from becom­
ing a life-and-death struggle with the future of the collective bargaining relationship at stake. Id. 
at 291-94. 
15 1 .  29 U.S.C § 1 59(c)(3) (1988). As discussed supra note 1 13, the NLRA was amended in 
1 959 by the Landrum-Griffin Act to give permanently replaced economic strikers this voting 
right. Prior to the amendment, economic strikers had no right to vote in elections if they had been 
permanently replaced. Consequently, unions were in immediate danger of decertification upon 
the hiring of permanent replacements. For example, in United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic 
Workers, 121  N.L.R.B. 1439 (1958), the employer hired permanent replacements, and the replace­
ments alone voted in a decertification election less than a year after the commencement of the 
strike; the economic strikers were not entitled to vote. Id. at 1442. The union lost the election 
288-5. Id. Lest it appear that all danger of decertification was removed by the 1 959 amendment, 
consider the decertifications that occurred notwithstanding the limited voting rights of the striking 
employees discussed in the text below. See infra notes 1 55-62 and accompanying text. 
152. ATLESON, supra note 103, at 27 n.25. 
153. Id. ; see also Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 674 (recognizing that if employer can 
"sweat [the union] out" for a year, it can probably get the union decertified). 
154. Finkin, supra note 80, at 568 n. 1 4 1 ;  cf Estreicher, supra note 1 1, at 288 (arguing that 
strike-and-replacement situation should not provide opportunity to terminate bargaining 
relationship). 
155. See, e.g., David B. Stephens & John P. Kohl, The Replacement Worker Phenomenon in 
the Southwest: Two Years After Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 37 LAB. L.J. 41, 48 ( 1986) (studying five 
major strikes in the Southwest in the early 1980s, the authors note that the use of permanent 
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Maine International Paper Company mill voted to decertify United 
Paperworkers Local 14 and Firemen and Oilers Local 246. 156 More than 
two-thirds of the bargaining unit voting in the decertification election con­
sisted of replacements who were hired after the union called an unsuccess­
ful sixteen-month strike in 1987. 157 The margin of the vote was 6 1 6  to 361 
with 94 challenged ballots; thus, almost two-thirds of the unchallenged bal­
lots were cast against the union. 158 
In another of the most publicized permanent replacement cases in the 
last decade, Diamond Walnut, the largest walnut producer cooperative in 
the United States, permanently replaced more than 500 workers who went 
on strike in September 199 1. 159 Prior to the one-year anniversary of the 
strike, the Teamsters local filed a petition for a certification election as a 
"preemptive move" to avoid decertification when the strikers' voting rights 
expired. 160 The Board ordered a bifurcated election in which about 450 
strikers voted in one session and approximately 725 permanent replace­
ments voted in the second. 161 Despite its efforts to avert decertification by 
the preemptive petition, the union lost by a vote of 592 to 366, with a 
number of challenged ballots. 162 
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and the Board have made it 
more difficult for employers to rid themselves of unions by hiring striker 
replacements was followed in some strikes by ousting the unions). The article states that Conti­
nental Airlines achieved nonunion status in bankruptcy proceedings. Subsequent to the bank­
ruptcy court's approval of Continental's repudiation of its collective bargaining agreement, the 
union and Continental reached a settlement. The agreement was allegedly so bad for the former 
strikers that some brought an unsuccessful class action against the union for breach of its duty of 
, 
fair representation. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 8 1  ( 1 99 1). . 
156. Maine Paper Mill Workers Vote to Decertify Unions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 139, at 
A-1 (July 20, 1 992). 
157. The employees eligible to vote included 760 replacements and 315 recalled former strik­
ers, with about 500 ineligible former strikers on a recall list. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Resolution of Ballots at Diamond Walnut Shows Apparent Loss for Teamsters Local, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 67, at A-9 (Apr. 9, 1993). 
160. House Field Hearing Scheduled to Examine Strike at Diamond Walnut, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 164, at A-1 (Aug. 24, 1992). 
161 .  Resolution of Ballots at Diamond Walnut Shows Apparent Loss for Teamsters Local, 
supra note 159, at A-9. 
162. Id. The union filed objections to the election. Sandy Kleffman, Labor Official Visits 
Struck Plant: Stockto� Workers, Diamond Walnut Officials Give Versions of Dispute, S.F. 
CHRON., Aug. 7, 1993, at B5. The NLRB ruled that the employer's conduct tainted the results of 
the bifurcated election. Second Vote at Diamond Walnut ls Inconclusive Due to Challenges, Daily 
Lab. 
_
Rep. (BNA) No. 197, at A-5 (Oct. 14, 1993). Consequently, the Board ordered a second 
ele�t10n. Id. The results of that election indicated 3 1 0  for representation by the union and 195 
agamst. Id. The ultimate result is still very much in doubt, however, because another 635 ballots 
were challenged and have not yet been opened. Id. 
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replacements. In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 1 63 the Supreme 
Court approved the Board's position that, for purposes of challenges to an 
incumbent union ' s  majority status, it should adopt no presumption regard­
ing the pro- or anti-union sympathies of striker replacements. 164 The deci­
sion is significant because an employer violates section 8(a)(5) if it 
withdraws recognition without either proof that the union has lost majority 
status in the bargaining unit or a good faith doubt based on objective 
facts. 165 The Board's decision in Phoenix Pipe & Tube, L.P. 166 appears to 
collapse this two-part defense into one by requiring that, in order to show 
good faith doubt, the employer, must establish that a majority of the em­
ployees in the bargaining unit unequivocally repudiated the union. 167 The 
Board has made it even more difficult to satisfy this standard by declaring it 
a ULP for an employer to conduct a poll of its employees to establish a 
good faith doubt unless the employer can satisfy the good faith doubt stan­
dard before conducting the poll. 168 Moreover, an employer risks commit­
ting a ULP if it initiates or participates in employees' efforts to decertify a 
union. 169 
163. 494 U.S. 775 ( 1 990). For a more extensive discussion of Curtin Matheson and its impli­
cations for employers' withdrawing recognition from unions, see Douglas E. Ray, Withdrawal of 
Recognition After Curtin Matheson: A House Built Upon Sand, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 265 passim 
(1991). 
164. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 796. The Board's no-presumption approach means that an 
employer cannot lawfully withdraw recognition from a union, alleging that the union no longer 
has majority support, based on the mere fact that a majority of the bargaining unit consists of 
permanent replacements who probably would not vote for the union. Professors Cohen and 
Wachter argue that Mackay and the other rules governing striker replacement promote economic 
efficiency. See Cohen & Wachter, supra note 86, at 1 1 1 .  They posit that Board and court rulings 
in labor law can increase the likelihood of efficient outcomes in labor disputes by deterring oppor­
tunistic behavior by the parties. Id. at 1 17.  The authors view Curtin Matheson as a case involving 
intervention by the Board and the Court to prevent opportunistic behavior by an employer that 
treats the dispute as an opportunity to oust the union. Id. at 122-24. 
165. E.g., Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1 340 ( 1987), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Buck­
ley Broadcasting Corp., 89 1 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 925 (1990). 
1 66. 302 N.L.R.B. 122, enforced, 955 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1991). 
167. Id. at 122. The Board's apparent merging of good faith doubt with actual loss of majority 
status is consistent with Professor Ray's recommendation that the good faith doubt standard be 
eliminated. See Ray, supra note 163, at 290-91 .  
168. Texas Petrochemicals Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1059 (1989), modified and remanded 
by 923 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1991). In his concurring opinion in Curtin Matheson, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist criticized this Board doctrine, which limits the employer's ability to challenge the ma­
jority status of a union. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 797 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice 
Blackmun also expressed his concern with the Board's decision. Id. at 799 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). Professor Ray argues that "[t]he problem is not with the policy behind Texas Petro­
chemicals"-to prevent the undermining of a union' s  majority status-but is the good faith doubt 
standard itself. Ray, supra note 163, at 286-87. 
169. See, e.g., Warehouse Mkt. , Inc., 2 1 6  N.L.R.B. 216, 216 (1975) (holding that employer 
who "aided and abetted employee decertification activity" committed a ULP). Even if an em­
ployer does not commit a ULP, it may be prohibited from relying on an employee petition as a 
basis for a good faith doubt of the union's majority status because of its actions or statements 
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In addition to the Board and courts erecting barriers against employ­
ers ' use of pennanent replacement as a device to terminate the collective 
bargaining relationship, the distinction between economic and ULP strikes 
itself provides a check. If an employer resists union demands in an attempt 
to provoke an economic strike-so that it can hire pennanent replacements 
and decertify a union-the employer may commit ULPs; indeed, a bargain­
ing strategy of provoking a strike is rife with potential ULPs. 170 If the em­
ployer is found to have committed a ULP, the strike may be deemed a ULP 
strike either at its inception or later under the conversion doctrine.171  If that 
occurs, the replacements hired after the strike becomes a ULP strike are 
temporary and have no voting rights, 172 which thwarts efforts to oust the 
union. 
A second potential problem for a union whose members have been 
pennanently replaced during an economic strike arises when the union ne­
gotiates for a strike settlement with the condition that the employer reinstate 
the strikers. It is standard practice for a union to require this condition-if 
necessary, at the expense of the pennanent replacements . 173 Indeed, a dra­
matic example of a union's successful efforts to save its members' jobs by 
having the employer summarily dispatch its "permanent" replacements oc­
curred in June 1992. A nineteen-month strike (following a lockout) by 
members of the United Steelworkers against Ravenswood Aluminum was 
settled after the Ravenswood board ousted the company's chairperson and 
chief executive officer. The strike ended with the execution of a new col­
lective bargaining agreement that called for the reinstatement of the strikers 
and the termination of 1 ,  1 00 permanent replacements hired by the · com-
regarding the petition. See Laverdiere's Enters., 297 N.L.R.B. 826, 826 (1990) (holding that 
decertification petition could not be used to support good faith doubt when employer's vice presi­
dent incorrectly advised employees that the only purpose for which the petition could be used was 
to support holding a decertification election), enforcement granted on relevant grounds, denied on 
other grounds, 933 F.2d 1045 ( 1st Cir. 199 1).  
170. See Ray, supra note 74, at 375-81 (recognizing that there is no bright line between good 
faith and bad faith bargaining). 
1 7 1 .  Baird, supra note 1 1 , at I 1 - 1 2; Ray, supra note 74, at 368, 372-73; Westfall, supra note 
1 2, at 66-67. 
172. E.g., Larand Leisurelies, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 838, 838 ( 1 976); Tampa Sand & Material 
Co., 1 37 N.L.R.B. 1 549, 1549 ( 1 962). 
� 73. See, e.g., Return of Striking Workers Top Issue in Daily News Strike, Union Adviser Says, 
Dail� Lab'. Rep. (BNA) No. 239, at A-13 (Dec. 1 2, 1990) (reporting that union spokesman dis­cussmg stnke settlement negotiations said union " 'hope[d] . . .  that the end result will be that all 
our members will get their jobs back, and that the permanent replacements will no longer be 
permanent' "); cf Leader of Greyhound Strike Tells Congress Permanent Replacements Have 
Bl�cked Settlement, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 15, at A-1 2  (June 14, 1990) (reporting that the 
umon president, testifying before Senate committee on H.R. 3936 to ban the hiring of pennanent 
r�placements, stated that Greyhound had "frozen itself into a position" blocking settlement by 
hiring and retaining permanent replacements). 
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pany.174 The question thus arises whether permanent replacements who are 
discharged at a union's insistence could prevail if they filed ULP charges 
against the union, alleging violations of sections 8(b)( l)(A) and 8(b)(2) of 
the NLRA. 175 A related question is whether such permanent replacements 
could prevail if they brought an action in federal or state court for breach of 
the duty of fair representation against the union that sought their 
discharge. 176 
At first blush, both means of recourse seem viable. Replacements are 
employees as that term is defined in the Act, 177 and they are members of the 
bargaining unit represented by the union because they occupy j ob classifi­
cations included in the unit.178 However, there are no reported Board deci­
sions in which replacements have prevailed on such ULP charges and no 
reported court decisions in which they have prevailed on breach of duty of 
representation cases. 179 The Board, although never deciding the issue, has 
made statements in its decisions indicating its recognition that unions rou­
tinely seek the discharge of replacements and its belief that the practice is a 
necessary incident of a union' s duty to represent the strikers. 180 Although 
there is little law on this issue, apparently unions would be able to defend 
successfully both the ULP charges and the civil actions on the ground that 
they sought to have employees placed in the jobs on the basis of seniority 
174. Steelworkers Ratify Pact Ending Ravenswood Dispute, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 15, 
at A-1 1  (June 15,  1992). For further discussion of the Steelworkers-Ravenswood dispute, see 
infra notes 216-26 and accompanying text. 
175. Section 8(b)(l )(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l )(A) ( 1 988), is the union analogue to the em­
ployer's ULP under § 8(a)(l ). Section 8(b)(l)(A) prohibits the union from "restrain[ing] or 
coerc[ing)" employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights, which include the right to refrain from 
engaging in union activity. Section 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1 58(b)(2) (1988), is a more specific 
provision that makes i t  a ULP for a union to "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discrimi­
nate against an employee" for the purpose of "encourag[ing] or discourag[ing] membership in 
any labor organization," which would constitute a violation of § 8(a)(3). 
176. Cf Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,  177, 190 ( 1 967) (defining the duty of fair representation 
and articulating the standard for breach of that duty). 
177. Mooremack Gulf Lines, Inc., 28 N.L.R.B. 869, 880-81 (1941). 
178. See Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1 344, 1 350 (1975); Louis Natt, 44 N.L.R.B. 
1099, 1 107 (1942). 
179. See generally Estreicher, supra note 1 1 , at 294-95 (considering the rights of discharged 
replacement workers); Flynn, supra note 1 13,  at 704-05 (recognizing the possibility that bumping 
agreements may violate the duty of fair representation); Janes, supra note 109, at 1 4 1 -45 (discuss­
ing rights of discharged replacement workers). 
180. Goldsmith Motors Corp., 3 10 N.L.R.B. 1 279, 1 279 (1993) ("[A]s a practical matter, a 
union is not expected simultaneously to represent the interests of the replacements as it would the 
interests of the strikers."); see also Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1 350 ( 1 975) ("It 
Would be asking a great deal of any union to require it to negotiate in the best interests of strike 
replacements during the pendency of a strike, where the strikers are on the picket line." (quoting 
from the administrative law judge's opinion that was adopted by the Board)). 
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h h · ffili"ati"on 181 Regardless of the articulated rationale for rat er t an umon a . . 
not holding a union liable under these c ircumstances, Profe
ssor Estre1cher 
suggests that the result actually goes back to an ide� �xp�
essed by Judge 
L d H d S on after the enactment of the NLRA. It 1s of course true eame an o ak h 
trik 
• that the consequences are harsh to those who have t . 
en
. 
t e s ers 
1 . it is probably true today that most men taking Jobs so made p aces, . . . . . . d , ,182 Th th vacant realize from the outset how tenuous 1s their hol . us, e 
potential liability for unions that s��k the �ischarge of permanent replac�­
ments and the reinstatement of staking umon members, although theoreti­
cally viable, appears to be realistically nonexistent. 
3. What Are the Risks to the Employer? 
When an employer hires permanent replacements for its striking em-
1 8 1 .  See sources cited supra note 179. Regarding the ULP charges, a General Counsel advice 
memorandum states as follows: 
It is well established that a union may not discriminate against employees who exercise 
their Section 7 right not to join a strike. However, a union may lawfully seek to parcel 
out a limited number of jobs between strikers and permanent replacements on a nondis­
criminatory basis, such as seniority and/or job qualifications. 
United Steelworkers of Am., Local 8560, 1 03 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1 238, 1 239 (Nat'! Labor Relations 
Bd.) (Dec. 3 1 .  1979) (Advice Mem., Datz) (footnotes omitted), quoted in Estreicher, supra note 
1 1 , at 294; Flynn, supra note 1 13, at 705 n.99. 
As for the civil action for breach of the duty of fair representation, the principal obstacle is 
that the Supreme Court applies a difficult standard for plaintiffs to satisfy: "A breach of the 
statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union' s  conduct toward a member of the 
collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v.  Sipes, 386 U.S. 
1 7 1 ,  190 ( 1967). Supreme Court decisions regarding discharge based on seniority suggest that a 
union's use of seniority to give preference for placement in jobs does not run afoul of the Vaca 
standard for breach of the union's duty. See Janes, supra note 1 09, at 144-45 (discussing Ford 
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 ( 1 953) and Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 ( 1964)). The 
Supreme Court's decision in Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'! v. O'Neill, 1 1 1  S .  Ct. 1 1 27 (1991), 
appears to make a successful action by replacements against a union, on a breach of the duty of 
fair representation claim, even more unlikely if the union can articulate some basis other than 
union affiliation for the allocation of positions. A class of striking pilots represented by the Air 
Line Pilots Association brought an action against the union, asserting, in part, that the agreement negotiated by the union and the employer, Continental Airlines, Inc., "arbitrarily discriminated against.stri�n� pilots." Id. at 1 132. The Court held that the duty of fair representation does apply to a umon m its negotiations, and not just in its administration of a contract. Id. at 1 1 35. How­ever, .it �!so held that, when conducting a substantive examination of a union' s  performance in negottattons, a cou.rt must be "highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators need �o� the effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities." Id. Thus, a product of bargamm�, such as a c�ntract, is evidence of breach of the duty of fair representation only if "it 7.an �e fai.
rly 7har
_
acten��d as so far outside a 'wide range of reasonableness' that it is wholly mattonal or arbitrary. Id. at 1 136 (quoting Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338) (citation omitted). The �ou� further hel� that the alleged discrimination between strikers and pilots who continued work-mg did not constitute a breach of the duty of f · · . . alf representation. Because the agreement was a ��7r;�'.1"se on the rights of the two groups, some system of allocation of jobs was inevitable. Id. 
a
J8
c
:
rt 
�LR� v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 87 1 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576, 
· emed, 304 U.S. 585 ( 1938), quoted in Estreicher, supra note 1 1 , at 294. 
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ployees, the employer is gambling, predicting that, if the union or employ­
ees file ULP charges, the Board will determine that the strike was an 
economic strike at its inception and continued to be so at the time the 
replacements were hired. If the employer' s prediction is wrong-and the 
Board determining either that the strike began as a ULP strike or that it was 
converted to a ULP strike-the employer loses the gamble and must pay­
and perhaps pay a considerable sum. 183 As discussed above, ULP strikers 
have a right to immediate reinstatement to their jobs or substantially 
equivalent jobs upon making unconditional offers to return to work. 184 If 
the employer unjustifiably refuses to reinstate ULP strikers, then it is liable 
for back pay and for making the strikers whole from the date of the refusal 
to reinstate. 185 The usual delay between the filing of a ULP charge and a 
decision by the NLRB 186 greatly increases the potential liability of an em­
ployer because the back pay and other make-whole liability of the employer 
continues to accrue pending a decision by the Board. This may impose an 
enormous liability on the employer that denies reinstatement to a large 
number of ULP strikers. 187 
A recent example portrays the staggering liability incurred by an em­
ployer that gambles and loses regarding the characterization of a strike. 
The highly publicized strike of Greyhound Lines, Inc. by the Amalgamated 
183. UAW International President Owen Bieber, testifying before a House subcommittee on 
H.R. 3936 in 1 990, acknowledged the plight of an employer as it contemplates hiring permanent 
replacements: 
[T]he employer has no way of knowing with any real certainty whether a strike will be 
an economic strike or an unfair labor practice strike at the time the decision is  made to 
hire replacements on a temporary or permanent basis. If the employer guesses wrong, 
the strike then becomes a purely legal contest with an enormous potential backpay 
liability. 
Hearings on H.R. 3936 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House 
Comm. on Education and Labor, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1990) (statement of Owen Bieber, 
UAW Int'! President); see also Schatzki, supra note 1 1 , at 387 (recognizing that employer, if it is 
wrong about characterization of the strike, can be subject to "enonnous backpay sanctions"). 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 1 07-08. 
185. See, e.g., Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1292 (1993) (ordering employer to 
reinstate ULP strikers and make them whole, including interest); see also Baird, supra note 1 1 ,  at 
12 (stating that employer is liable for back pay from time of offer to return to work); Ray, supra 
note 74, at 373-75 (noting that remedy ordered by the Board to make ULP strikers whole may 
include not only lost wages, but also benefits and health insurance, interim raises, interest, etc.). 
186. See supra note 92. 
187. As Professor Ray observes, "It will often take at least two years before the Board issues a 
decision in a contested case. An employer who improperly fails to reinstate one hundred strikers 
after they request reinstatement can easily be exposed to millions of dollars in liability." Ray, 
supra note 74, at 375 (footnotes omitted); see also Dolan, supra note 86, at 3 1 7 - 1 9  (discussing 
several cases in which Board and courts determined, several years after permanent replacements 
were hired, that strikers were ULP strikers and ordered back pay and make-whole relief); Golden, 
supra note 86, at 75-76 (recognizing that the long delay in NLRB proceedings can result in "harsh 
liability"). 
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Transit Union began on March 2, 1 990. Greyhound hired more than 2,000 
permanent replacements. 188 After several months of a violent strike, Grey­
hound filed for bankruptcy in June 1 990. 189 The union and strikers had 
filed over 200 ULP charges against Greyhound. 190 The bankruptcy court 
confirmed a reorganization plan for Greyhound, which capped the com­
pany's back pay liability at $3 1 .25 million in the event the NLRB imposed 
liability. 191  Some observers estimated that Greyhound could have owed the 
strikers as much as $125 million absent the cap. 192 The union and Grey­
hound negotiated a settlement, eventually approved by the union's mem­
bers, providing for the recall of many of the strikers without the termination 
of the replacements and payment of $22 million in back pay to the strikers, 
who numbered more than 6,000. 193 
A second potential problem for employers who predict the Board's 
characterization of the strike and hire permanent replacements is civil liabil­
ity to the replacements. Such liability can arise if an employer must dis­
charge replacements to reinstate ULP strikers under a Board order or if it 
discharges them to settle a strike. In 1 983, the Supreme Court addressed 
the question of whether such civil actions are preempted by federal labor 
law in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale. 1 94 In that case, the employer hired permanent 
188. Proposed Greyhound Settlement Includes $22 Million In Back Pay, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 75, at C- 1 (Apr. 2 1 ,  1993); see STEPHEN R. SLEIGH ET AL., AFL-CIO, THE Cosr OF 
AGGRESSION 2-3 (1992); Amalgamated Transit Union Members Narrowly Approve Greyhound 
Settlement, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 88, at A-8 (May IO, 1993). 
189. Greyhound's Reorganization Plan Con.firmed; Ceiling Set On Back Pay Liability to 
Strikers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 70, at A-9 (Sept. 3, 1 99 1 ). 
190. Id. 
1 9 1 .  Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Amalgamated Transit Union Members Narrowly Approve Greyhound Settlement, supra 
note 188. The Greyhound strike and hiring of permanent replacements is by no means an isolated 
case in which an employer was hit with an enormous make-whole liability. When Colt Industries, 
a gun manufacturer, was struck, the employer hired permanent replacements. UAW Strike Against 
Colt Enters Fourth Week; Company in Three-Year Pact with Sister Local, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 41,  at A-2 (March 3, 1 986). Three years later, an administrative law judge determined that 
the strike was a ULP strike and ordered the employer to make offers of reinstatement and pay 
back pay with interest from September 1 986 until valid offers of reinstatement were made. NLRB 
Administrative Law Judge Finds Colt Strike Caused by Unfair Practices, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 177, at A- 1 1 (Sept. 14, 1989). As a result, the employer settled the case for $ 1 3  million ($10 
million in back pay and $3 million for related matters), terminated the replacements, offered rein­
statement to the strikers, and sold its fireanns division to a newly formed company partially 
owned by the employees. Four-Year Colt Strike Concludes With Sale of Company, $13 Million 
Settlement, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A- 1 3  (Mar. 23, 1 990); see also Michael H. LeRoy, 
The Mackay Radio Doctrine of Permanent Striker Replacements and the Minnesota Picket Line 
Peace Act: Questions of Preemption, 77 M1NN. L. REv. 843, 852 n.58 (1 993) (discussing Colt 
strike and administrative law judge's ruling); Golden, supra note 86, at 75 n. 1 48 (discussing 
conversion of strike and settlement). 
194. 463 U.S. 491 ( 1983). For articles focusing on Belknap, see Anderson, supra note 12; 
Janet L. Braun, Case Comment, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale-Problems with Preemption and the Rights 
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replacements for its striking employees. The employer repeatedly empha­
sized that the replacements were permanent. 195 Indeed, the employer 
went to great lengths to ensure the permanent status of the replacements, 
having them sign a statement acknowledging their permanent status 
as they were hired 196 and thereafter reasserting their permanent status in 
writing. 197 The employer' s plan began to unravel when the union filed a 
ULP charge against the employer, alleging that its unilateral implementa­
tion of a wage increase violated sections 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), and 8 (a)(5) of the 
Act. 198 The regional director thereafter issued a complaint, further under­
mining the employer' s plan. 199 Faced with the prospect of liability for 
ULPs and a ULP strike, the employer agreed to a settlement of the ULP 
charges that required it to recall all of the striking workers. 200 After being 
laid off to make room for recalled strikers, Hale and other replacements 
brought an action against Belknap in state court, asserting misrepresentation 
and breach of contract claims.201 The employer raised as a defense preemp­
tion of the state causes of action. The Supreme Court held that the replace­
ments' state causes of action were not preempted.202 Accordingly, the case 
was remanded to the state court. 203 
Many observers believed that Belknap would make employers either 
reluctant to hire permanent replacements in the first instance or, if an em­
ployer chose to hire them, reluctant to agree to a strike settlement requiring 
discharge of replacements because of the potential liability to the replace­
ments. 204 Notwithstanding the logic of those predictions, neither appears to 
of Economic Strikers, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 381 (1985); Stephanie L. Stromire, Recent Development, 
The National Labor Relations Act Does Not Preempt a Discharged Permanent Replacement 
Worker's State Cause of Action, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1205 ( 1984). 
195. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 494-96. 
196. The statement read as follows: 
I, the undersigned, acknowledge and agree that I as of this date have been employed by 
Belknap, Inc. at its Louisville, Kentucky, facility as a regular full time permanent re-
placement to permanently replace __ in the job classification of 
__ _ 
Id. at 494-95 (emphasis added). The employer's apparent objective in clearly proclaiming the 
permanent status of the replacements was to satisfy the Board's test for lawfully retaining the 
replacements rather than reinstating the strikers. Id. at 537 n. 1 1  (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("More 
than likely, it was the need to carry this burden that caused [the employer] to have [the replace­
ments] sign the statements involved in this case."). 
197. Id. at 495-96. 
198. Id. at 495. For a general explanation of these types of ULPs, see supra note 6. 
199. Belknap, 463 U.S.  at 495. 
200. Id. at 496. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at S 12. 
203. The Supreme Court's decision in Belknap did not address the merits of the replacement 
employees' state causes of action. Finkin, supra note 80, at 553; McDonald, supra note 16, at 
983. 
204. Stephens & Kohl, supra note 155, at 43-44 (discussing early assessments of implications 
of Belknap); McDonald, supra note 16, at 983 (predicting decision would make employers reluc-
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be accurate.2os While Belknap preserves the permanent replacements' state 
causes of action, it also purports to instruct an employer how to insulate 
itself from liability through use of the correct language in the offer of per­
manent employment.206 Some courts have held that Belknap-type agree­
ments do insulate employers from liability.207 Still, the easiest way out of 
such cases for employers, summary judgment on the basis of preemption, 
has been removed by Belknap,208 and discharged permanent replacements 
have recovered in some post-Belknap cases.209 
Belknap raises an additional problem for employers. Out of concern 
tant to guarantee permanent positions); cf Anderson, supra note 12, at 322 (stating that, after 
Belknap, employers are faced with "perhaps the mosi significant challenge to [their] use of re­
placement workers"); Finkin, supra note 80, at 555-56 (noting that settling claims of discharged 
permanent replacements may cost employer or union-if the union has entered into an indemnity 
agreement with the employer-tens of thousands of dollars per replacement). 
205. Professors Stephens and Kohl observe that, in four out of the five strikes they studied, the 
employers "aggressively and publically proclaimed" the permanent status of the replacements. 
Stephens & Kohl, supra note 155, at 47. In the fifth, the Nevada resorts strike, the employers first 
hired temporary replacements, but changed their status to permanent when it appeared that there 
would be no quick settlement. Id. at 48. These commentators suggest that, despite these results, 
Belknap has not necessarily made employers more likely to hire permanent replacements. They 
note that, in the Greyhound strike and at a majority of the resorts, the settlements resulted in the 
dismissal of the permanent replacements and the reinstatement of the strikers. Id. Rather, the 
authors conclude that financially healthy employers will consider the potential for liability to 
discharged "permanent" replacements, while "financially distressed" employers will hire perma­
nent replacements despite the potential liability. Id. at 48-49. 
206. The majority recommended that employers indicate to "permanent" replacements that 
they may not really be permanent if the strike is deemed a ULP strike or if the employer agrees to 
a settlement with the union that requires the reinstatement of the strikers. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 
503. This "conditionally permanent" replacement language has been criticized as creating an even 
more confusing situation for the employer. Anderson, supra note 1 2, at 336. It is likely that this 
language creates even greater confusion for replacements. See infra note 232. 
207. E.g., Walker v. Teledyne Continental Motors, No. 9 1 -0 1 28-T-S, 199 1  U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1 8089, at *7- * 1 0  (S.D. Ala. Dec. 10, 1 991), aff'd mem., 969 F.2d 1048 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1992). Even 
absent the "Belknap waiver," the employment-at-will doctrine, which retains much of its strength 
in many states, makes recovery by a discharged "permanent" replacement unlikely. See, e.g., 
Jacobs v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 323 S .E.2d 238, 239 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that oral 
promises of permanent employment and advertisements for permanent replacements do not give 
rise to cause of action because employment relationship is terminable at will). But see Finkin, 
supra note 80, at 552 ("Belknap, Inc. v. Hale takes on importance because of a fundamental shift 
in the state law of individual employment."). 
208. E.g., Varnum v. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 804 F.2d 638, 640 (I Ith Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
48 1 _u.s. 1049 (1987); Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 803 F.2d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 483 U.S. 1 0 1 1 (1987); Bubbel v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 374, 380 (Alaska 1984). 
209. Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 629-30 (Alaska 1986). After the Alaska 
Suprem� Court held that the replacement' s  breach of employment contract action was not pre­
empted m Bubbel I, 682 P.2d at 380, the trial court entered summary judgment for the replace­
ment, and the supreme court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bubbel II, 723 
P.2d a� 629-30; see also Verway v. Blincoe Packing Co., 698 P.2d 377, 379 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) 
(allowmg r�placem�nts to recover in wrongful discharge action). Arguably, the results would 
have �een different m both of those cases if the employers had used the Belknap waiver language 
and discharged the permanent replacements as a result of an NLRB order or a strike settlement. 
1 994] PERMANENT STRIKER REPI.ACEMENTS 853 
for potential civil liability to replacements in the event the employers 
agreed, or were ordered, to reinstate the strikers, some employers made of­
fers of employment to replacements using ambiguous language regarding 
permanent status. Relying on their assumption that the replacements would 
be deemed permanent, the employers refused to reinstate economic strikers 
when the strikers unconditionally offered to return to work. As illustrated 
by Hansen Bros. Enterprises,210 however, the B oard has determined that 
ambiguous offers do not constitute offers of permanent replacement status 
and accordingly has held the employer liable for ULPs. In Hansen, the 
company's president told the replacements that he "wanted" to consider 
them as permanent employees and "wanted" them to consider themselves as 
permanent employees.2 1 1  The employer also sent letters to striking employ­
ees informing them that they "may" lose their reemployment rights if 
replacements were hired.212 Because the employer thought it had hired per­
manent replacements, it denied the striking employees reinstatement when 
they offered to return. The Board held, however, that the employer could 
not satisfy its burden of proving that there was a mutual understanding be­
tween the employer and replacements that they were permanent.213 The 
Board explained that "vague statements" regarding the employer's intent do 
not satisfy the employer' s  burden and that Belknap does not require a con­
trary result.214 The consequence to the employer was a Board order requir­
ing the employer to make offers of reinstatement and to pay two-and-a-half 
In Bubbel, the employer told the replacements that they were peananent employees and that 
the only things that could change that status were legal actions by some governmental body, either 
the courts or the United States Government. Bubbe/, 723 P.2d at 629. The employer eventually 
discharged the replacements in compliance with the nonbinding recommendation of the Presiden­
tial Emergency Board. The court held that, because the recommendation was not "mandatory, or 
at least, highly coercive," the employer was not excused from its contractual duty. Id. at 629. It 
appears that discharge pursuant to an NLRB order would have produced a different result, but 
discharge under a strike settlement would not. 
In Verway, the discharged replacements testified that the employer promised not to fire them 
if the strike was settled. Verway, 698 P.2d at 378. Thus, it appears that the employer did not use 
the "conditionally permanent" language recommended in Belknap. 
210. 279 N.L.R.B. 741 (1986), review denied mem., 812 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 845 (1987). 
2 1 1 .  Id. at 741. 
2 12. Id. 
2 1 3. Id. 
214. Id. & n.6. Chaianan Dotson, dissenting, found the language used by the employer to be 
based upon Belknap and sufficient to satisfy the employer's burden. Id. at 742-44 (Dotson, Chair­
man, dissenting). The Chairman found the majority's approach to "reflect[ ] an undue taste for 
verbal analysis rather than a recognition of the real world facts." Id. at 742 (Dotson, Chairman, 
dissenting). 
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years of back pay and other benefits to the strikers who were denied 
reinstatement. 215 
The labor dispute between the United Steelworkers of America and 
Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation in West Virginia is perhaps the quin­
tessential Belknap strike-and-replacement scenario. After negotiations to 
reach a new collective bargaining agreement proved unsuccessful, the com­
pany declared an impasse, locked out employees, and immediately had tem­
porary replacements, who had been recruited before the lockout, begin 
work. 216 The employer subsequently implemented an offer it had made to 
the union, informed the union that the locked out employees could return to 
work, and changed the status of the temporary replacements to permanent 
replacements.217 The union filed ULP charges alleging, among other 
things, that the company had unlawfully locked out its employees.218 After 
investigating the charges, the NLRB issued a complaint charging Ravens­
wood with bad faith bargaining and an unlawful lockout.2 19 ULP hearings 
were conducted, but the administrative law judge agreed to withhold his 
ruling for a period of time to give Ravenswood and the Steelworkers an 
opportunity to settle the case. 220 The union also engaged in a corporate 
campaign, 221 which included efforts to persuade beverage companies to dis­
continue their business with Ravenswood and to bring pressure to bear on 
215.  Id. at 742, 744 (Dotson, Chairman, dissenting). For a recent Board decision holding that 
an employer failed to satisfy its burden regarding permanent status of replacements, see Gibson 
Greetings, Inc., 3 1 0  N.L.R.B. 1 286, 1 290-91 (1993) (involving employer that announced to 
replacements that they were "full-time associates"). 
216. Brief of Counsel for the General Counsel to the Administrative Law Judge at 53-54, 
Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., Case 9-CA-28235. 
217. Brief of Charging Party to the Administrative Law Judge at 133, Case No. 9-CA-28235; 
Ravenswood Aluminum Corporation's Post-Hearing Brief at 94-95, Case No. 9-CA-28235. Rec­
ognizing the ramifications of Belknap, the company had the replacements sign a form, when it 
changed their status to permanent, which read, in pertinent part: 
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT RAVENSWOOD ALUMINUM CORPO­
RATION MADE ME A PERMANENT EMPLOYEE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY 
DECEMBER 3, 1990. I UNDERSTAND THAT MY PERMANENT EMPLOYEE 
STATUS IS SUBJECT TO A SETTLEMENT WITH THE UNION, A SETTLEMENT 
WITH THE NATIONAL LABOR REI.AT/ONS BOARD, OR A N  ORDER OF THE NA­
TIONAL I.ABOR REI.ATIONS BOARD DIRECTING THAT RAVENSWOOD ALUMI­
NUM CORPORATION REINSTATE STRIKERS . . . .  
Br�ef of Charging Party to the Administrative Law Judge, supra, at 1 33 (alteration in original). 
This permanent replacement form is unmistakably based on the language suggested by the 
Supreme Court in Belknap. See supra note 206. 
218.  Steelworkers Ratify Pact Ending Ravenswood Dispute, supra note 174. 
219. NLRB to Issue Complaint Charging Ravenswood With Unlawful Lockout, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 140, at A-6 (July 22, 1 99 1 ); Steelworkers-Ravenswood Talks Go Nowhere Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at A-14 (July 3 1 ,  199 1). 
' 
220. Proposed Ravenswood Agreement Would Restore Steelworkers' Jobs, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 1 06, at A-4 (June 2, 1992). 
22 1 .  "Corporate campaign" may be defined as "a campaign utilizing boycotts and other 
nonworkplace-centered forms of pressure." James G. Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and 
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the international interests of the person who allegedly controlled 
Ravenswood. 222 
Under the mounting pressure of NLRB proceedings and the union's 
corporate campaign, the company's board of directors ousted the chairper­
son and chief executive officer.223 Thereafter the company agreed to a set­
tlement that called for the discharge of 1, 100 permanent replacements and 
the reinstatement of the strikers. 224 The company agreed to this settlement 
despite the specter of potential civil liability to the replacements. 225 The 
Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 
889, 895 n.38 (1991). 
222. Steelworkers Wage Corporate Campaign at Ravenswood with Aid From AFL-CIO, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 76, at A-9 (Apr. 20, 1 992). The campaign was directed at pressuring "met­
als trader and financier" Marc Rich, who fled the United States in 1 983 after indictment on "rack­
eteering, tax fraud, and tax evasion charges." Id. The corporate campaign waged against 
Ravenswood by the workers and the union, with the assistance of the AFL-CIO, was multifaceted. 
Among the tactics in the campaign were the following: filing of complaints with the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that led to inspections and fines at the company's 
facilities; hiring environmental consultants to determine whether the company complied with en­
vironmental regulations; financing a lawsuit by local residents against Ravenswood for discharg­
ing pollutants into the Ohio River without permits; and holding local "stakeholders meetings" to 
present the union's position to citizens with a stake in the dispute. Id. 
Although an extensive examination of corporate campaigns is beyond the scope of this Arti­
cle, there is a growing body of literature examining this approach to labor-management disputes. 
See generally CHARLES R. PERRY, UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS (1987) (analyzing corporate 
campaigns); Pope, supra note 221,  at 895 n.38 (same). Recognizing the declining number and 
potency of strikes, some labor leaders have suggested that corporate campaigns should be used to 
supplement strikes. Some have even suggested that corporate campaigns should supplant strikes 
as the primary weapon of labor. See id. Professor Pope discusses the effectiveness of la­
bor-community boycotts, which have as an objective turning public opinion against the target 
employer. Id. at 905-08 (detailing campaigns against J.P. Stevens and Coors). 
When Ron Carey took office in 1992 as president of the International Brotherhood of Team­
sters, he created a new office to assist locals in developing corporate campaigns. Corporate Cam­
paigns: Teamsters Use New Strategies to Build Bargaining Table Pressure, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 1 17, at C-1 (June 2 1 ,  1 993). That office assisted in a campaign against Ryder System, 
Inc., which resulted in an agreement ending a dispute that had lasted almost a year. Id. 
223. Steelworkers Ratify Pact Ending Ravenswood Dispute, supra note 174. 
224. Id. 
225. Although, under Belknap, state law claims made by the replacements would not be pre­
empted, Ravenswood had some protection from liability in that the replacements signed the Bel­
knap-type waiver. Tobin v. Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., No. CIV.A.6:92-0906, 1993 WL 
485552, at * l  (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 1 5, 1993). Additionally, Ravenswood offered a severance pack­
age including placement on a preferential hiring list, one month' s  pay, accumulated vacation, and 
the company contribution of medical insurance for three months. Id. at *2. The consideration for 
preferential hiring and continuation of medical coverage was conditioned on the replacements' 
signing forms releasing all claims against Ravenswood. Id. Many of the replacements accepted 
the full severance package and signed the releases. Id. 
A group of 905 of the discharged replacements later filed suit against Ravenswood, alleging 
in part, that the employer promised them permanent employment and job security. Id. The fed­
eral court granted Ravenswood's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims of 721 
of the replacements who accepted the packages and signed releases. Id. at *4. However, the court 
did not dismiss all the claims of the 184 plaintiffs who did not sign the releases. Id. at *8.  The 
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lesson from the Steelworkers-Ravenswood dispute regarding Belknap, then, 
is that employers probably are more concerned with pot�nti� �ac� P.a� lia­
bility under an NLRB order226 than they are with potential c1vtl habthty to 
discharged permanent replacements. 
4. What Are the Risks to the Replacement Workers ? 
Replacements face the risk of job loss in two scenarios: one, the NLRB 
determines that there was a ULP strike and orders their discharge if neces­
sary to accommodate reinstatement of the strikers; or two, the employer 
settles the dispute with the union and agrees to discharge the replacements. 
Consider, for example, the Steelworkers-Ravenswood dispute227 in which 
the strike settlement required discharge of 1 , 100 "conditionally penna­
nent"228 replacements. Notwithstanding such incidents, the risks encoun­
tered by strike replacements are often overlooked in the Mackay debate.229 
A principal reason that the risks to replacements are not often raised 
may be that they are not viewed as sympathetic characters in most penna­
nent replacement situations. The most disdainful treatment of replacements 
appears to rest on the rationale that striker replacements are stealing the 
jobs-the property-of the regular employees; therefore, the risk of loss 
they face is no more than they deserve. They are considered nothing more 
than "scabs."230 A less virulent view of replacements, but one that also 
court noted that the remaining plaintiffs must satisfy high standards to prevail. Id. at *4-*5. 
Under West Virginia law, the employment-at-will doctrine is still the rule subject to limited ex­
ceptions. Although West Virginia law will enforce a contract for a term other than at will, the 
burden is on the party claiming such a contract to establish it by clear and convincing evidence, 
and the promises must be "very definite." Id. (citing Adkins v. Inco Alloys Int' I, Inc., 417 S.E.2d 
910, 916 (W. Va. 1992); Suter v. Harsco, Corp., 403 S.E.2d 75 1, 754 (W. Va. 1991)). In addition, 
employers can avoid such contracts by explicit disclaimer. Suter, 403 S.E.2d at 754. 
226. Regarding the potential for enormous back pay liability if the Board determines that an 
employer has denied ULP strikers reinstatement, see supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text. 
The settlement between Ravenswood and the union also provided that each striker receive $2000 
and established a "progress sharing" formula. Steelworkers Ratify Pact Ending Ravenswood Dis­
pute, supra note 174. Thus, the total amount paid by Ravenswood in back pay was estimated at 
$3.4 million. Proposed Ravenswood Agreement Would Restore Steelworkers ' Jobs, supra note 
220. The make-whole remedy sought in the complaint was estimated as exceeding $80 million. 
Id. 
227. See supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text. 
228. As discussed above, when the replacements were converted from temporary to permanent 
by Ravenswood.' they signed Belknap-type waivers. See supra note 2 1 7  and accompanying text. 
. 229. Se� Ba.ird, supra note 1 1 , at 6-7 (arguing that those concerned with the rights of strikers 
ignore the rights of those who choose not to strike). This Article does not suggest that replace­
ments have been wholly ignored. See infra note 232. 
230 .
. 
Jack London penned the often-quoted description of the genesis of "scabs": "After God 
had fimshed the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some awful substance left with 
which He made a scab." Jack London, The Scab, reprinted in CARRIER'S CORNER June 1970 
(month!� newslette� �f Old Dominion Branch No. 496 of National Ass'n of Le�r Carriers), 
quoted m Old Domm1pn Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 4 1 8  U.S. 264, 268 (1974). 
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perceives no reason to protect their interests, regards them as having know­
ingly assumed the risks associated with such jobs. 231 
Regardless of whether one considers striker replacements "scabs," be­
lieves that replacement workers are people with job rights equal to other 
workers,232 or holds a view somewhere in between,233 the point is that they, 
like striking employees, are subject to uncertainties regarding the duration 
of their employment.234 For replacements who, prior to accepting the re-
It is not surprising that striker replacements have not been well received on the picket lines. 
It appears, however, that they have not fared much better in Congress. The hearings on H.R. 3936 
included an exchange in which Representative Fawell objected to use of the word "scabs" during 
the hearings to refer to replacement workers. Representative Ford responded, in part, that the 
word is a "descriptive term of art" describing one "who steals another person's job," but that it 
was not being used "to be provocative" or "to offend anybody." Hearings on H.R. 3936 Before 
the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 
l O l st Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1 990). 
23 1 .  See quotation of Judge Learned Hand, supra text accompanying note 182. 
232. Baird, supra note 1 1 ,  at 25-26. Others have seen permanent replacements as victims of 
the battles between employers and unions. E.g.; Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 500 ( 1983) 
("It is one thing to hold that the federal law intended to leave the employer and the union free to 
use their economic weapons against one another, but it is quite another to hold that either the 
employer or the union is also free to injure innocent third parties without regard to the normal 
rules of law governing those relationships."). Despite the Court' s sympathetic depiction of striker 
replacements in Belknap, it seems that the Court's decision, on the whole, is more harmful than 
beneficial to these "innocent third parties." See infra note 234. One commentator views perma­
nent replacements as "unwitting victims" of the Mackay doctrine. Janes, supra note 109, at 126. 
He sees the "permanent" label as deceiving replacements regarding their job security and legal 
rights. Id. at 149. Still, these observations were pre-Belknap, and the deceptiveness of a bare 
designation of "permanent" may be ameliorated by the conditional language suggested by the 
Court in Belknap. See supra note 206. That proposition assumes, however, some conditions that 
actually may not exist. First, it assumes that employers are using the Belknap language, although, 
as discussed above, employers sometimes use variations. See supra notes 210-15 and accompany­
ing text. Second, it assumes that replacements understand the conditional language in a Bel­
knap-type replacement offer. 
233. Cf THE RIVER (Universal City Studios, Inc. 1984) (telling the story of a farmer exper­
iencing financial difficulties who, without knowing that he was replacing strikers, takes a job in a 
steel plant in order to save his farm). 
234. In Belknap, 463 U.S. at 5 12, the Supreme Court purported to protect replacements from 
injury that might befall them in the war between unions and employers by holding that their state 
actions stemming from their discharge are not preempted by federal labor Jaw. See supra notes 
194-203 and accompanying text. By also instructing employers how to word offers to create a 
"conditionally permanent" status, see supra note 206, however, the Court may have created a 
much worse situation for replacements. For replacements unfamiliar with the Jaw and strategies 
of the parties in labor disputes, the Court's suggested language may provide little indication of 
their potentially temporary status. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 1 1 , at 289 (asserting that "per­
manency" is illusory because of employment at will, potential for layoffs, and possibilities of 
Board's finding of ULP strike or settlement with union requiring reinstatement). What the 
Supreme Court's suggested hybrid replacement status probably does for replacements is deprive 
them of a viable state action against the employer for misrepresentation or breach of contract. 
Finkin, supra note 80, at 553 ("In the name of solicitude for the rights of 'innocent third parties,' 
the Court would ask the states to strip them of their common law rights."); A.J. Harper II, Speech 
to the ABA's Mid-Winter Meeting (Mar. 5, 1991) reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 
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placement positions, have no jobs or perhaps �ubstantially less remun�ra­
tive jobs than the replacement positions, the nsk may not be substantial. 
Still, for those who have fairly secure jobs, though perhaps less remunera­
tive than the replacement positions, the risk of loss is greater. 
ill. INCREASED R.EsORT TO PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS AND THE 
DECLINE OF THE STRIKE-AN ARGUMENT FOR 
OVERTURNING MA CKA Y? 
The Workplace Fairness Act, like some of its precursors, would elimi­
nate the most significant distinction between economic and ULP strikes by 
prohibiting employers from hiring or threatening to hire permanent replace­
ments during economic strikes, thus overturning Mackay.235 Why has leg­
islation repeatedly been proposed since 1988 to overrule a doctrine that has 
been established law since 1938? As one commentator posed the question, 
"[W]hat is different in 1993 than in 1938 that would warrant reconsidera­
tion of a principle that for 55 years went without questioning[?]"236 
If the Caterpillar dispute were the only major strike in recent times 
involving the threat of hiring or hiring of permanent replacements, one 
might easily dismiss as unwarranted the tempest of calls for legislative re­
form of the labor laws. Employers, for their part, argue that they hire per­
manent replacements only as a last resort.237 According to many analysts, 
however, the Caterpillar incident is only the latest and most publicized ex­
ample of a recent trend among employers, 238 which exacerbates the risks 
faced by striking employees and unions, renders impotent the right to en­
gage in an economic strike, and facilitates the continuing decline in the 
percentage of the workforce in the United States represented by unions. 
Numerous commentators have noted that, for much of its life, the Mac­
kay doctrine rarely was summoned into battle by employers. 239 There is a 
E-1 (Mar. 6, 199 1 )) ("Belknap . . .  holds that to avoid civil liability to the replacements should 
they be replaced pursuant to a Board order or a settlement agreement providing for reinstatement 
of the strikers, the employer may promise the replacements permanent employment subject to 
such conditions subsequent."). 
235. See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text. 
236. See YAGER, supra note 1 1, at 1 13 .  
237. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2112 Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Senate Comm. on labor 
and Human Resources, l O l st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 ( 1990) (statement of James P. Melican Senior 
Vic� President ?f International Paper Co., which permanently replaced employees at 
'
its Jay, 
Mame plant dunng a strike in 1 987-88). 
�38. See, e.g., �Roy,
_ 
supra note 84, at 262-63 (listing the following post- 1 98 1  strikes in wh�ch e�p�oyers ei�er hired or threatened to hire permanent replacements: Eastern Airlines, United Airlmes, Contmental Airlines: Trans World Airlines, International Paper Co., Greyhound, Ho�el, Ravenswood, New York Daily News, Chicago Tribune, Major League Baseball and the Nat10nal Football League). ' 
. 239. E.�., Estreich�r'. supra n?te I � ·  at 287 (stating that in the modern era most employers with estabhshed bargammg relationships continued operations without resorting to permanent 
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perception among labor leaders,240 some commentators on labor law,241 and 
some government officials242 that in recent years employers' traditional re­
luctance to hire permanent replacements has subsided, and it has now be­
come common procedure for employers to threaten to hire them. They 
believe the Mackay doctrine, dormant for most of its life, recently was 
awakened by employers, who use it to run roughshod over unions and 
employees. 243 
The opposing camps on Mackay simply do not agree on whether there 
is, in fact, an increasing resort to the threat of hiring, or the actual hiring, of 
permanent replacements. A recent episode at a meeting of the National 
Association of Manufacturers demonstrates the disagreement and implicates 
the studies most often cited by each side. At the meeting, Secretary of 
Labor Robert Reich delivered an address in which he stated that employers' 
use of permanent replacements rose in the 1 980s.244 During a ques­
tion-and-answer session, John Irving, a former General Counsel of the 
NLRB and now an attorney in private practice, challenged the Secretary' s  
replacements); Fink.in, supra note 80, at 548 (asserting that the Mackay rule was not utilized by 
large, nationally based unionized companies for much of its history); Eberts, supra note 73, at 260 
(explaining that, due to deference to unions, industry did not often resort to permanent replace­
ments until recently); Axelrod, supra note 84 (asserting that employers were reluctant to perma­
nently replace strikers until the early 1980s). 
240. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Uibor-Management Relations of the 
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1991) (statement of Lane 
Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO), reprinted in Selected Statements on Striker Replacement Legisla­
tion (H.R. 5) Delivered Before House Education and Labor Subcommittee on Labor-Management 
Relations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at D-1 (Mar. 7, 1 99 1 )  (stating that there has been a 
"quantum increase" in the hiring of permanent replacements). 
241 .  See, e.g., GETMAN & POGREBJN, supra note 1 1 , at 140 (stating that the right to perma­
nently replace was not widely used until "quite recently"); Estreicher, supra note 1 1 , at 287 (citing 
use of permanent replacements at Hormel, TWA, and AT&T); Finkin, supra note 80, at 548-49 
n. 1 2  (providing statistics indicating that, as use of strikes has decreased in recent years, use of 
permanent replacements has increased); Stephens & Kohl, supra note 155, at 44-45 (noting "con­
siderable replacement worker activity" in recent years); Eberts, supra note 73, at 290 (asserting 
that the "full force" of Mackay was not felt until the last decade). 
242. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the 
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1993) (statement of Robert B. 
Reich, Secretary of Labor), reprinted in Selected Testimony from House, Education, and Labor 
Committee Hearing on HR 5, Workplace Fairness Act of 1993, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at 
D- 1 (Mar. 3 1 ,  1993) (stating that hiring permanent replacements "became a prominent feature of 
American labor relations only in the last dozen years"). 
243. "What was a loaded pistol waiting to be fired in 1938, and thereafter for a number of 
years, is now used with a vengeance, and the victims are the promises of the NLRA." Pollitt, 
supra note 1 1 ,  at 3 1 1 .  
244. Reich Challenged On Claim of Rise in Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at AA-1 (Mar. 22, 1993). Earlier that week, Secretary Reich had ad­
dressed a UAW political and legislative conference. In that address the Secretary stated, "Before 
1981 no manager would have thought about replacing striking workers. No manager would have 
even contemplated replacing striking workers." Reich Tells Auto Workers ' Conference Workplace 
Reform ls Crucial to Future, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at A-12 (Mar. 17, 1993). 
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assertion. Irving disagreed with the Secretary, stating that in his experience 
it was not true that employers never considered hiring permanent replace­
ments before 1 98 1 .  In support of his position, he cited a 1 9 9 1  study by 
Daniel Yager. 245 Irving also asked the Secretary if he had any empirical 
evidence to support his statements. 246 Although the Secretary did not have 
empirical evidence at the meeting, he thereafter wrote Irving, 247 citing a 
1 990 study by the United States General Accounting Office (GA0)248 and a 
study by Professor Cynthia Gramm. 249 
Both proponents and opponents of the movement to abrogate Mackay 
argue that the GAO study supports their position.250 The study considered 
strikes reported to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in 1985 
and 1 989.25 1 The study estimates that employers announced that they 
would hire permanent replacements in a slightly higher percentage of 
strikes in 1 989 than in 1 985 (thirty-five percent and thirty-one percent, re­
spectively);252 that the percentage of strikes in which employers actually 
hired permanent replacements in both years was about seventeen percent;253 
and that about the same percentage of employees was replaced in 1 989 and 
245. DANIEL V. YAGER, EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOUNDATION, LOADING THE SCALES: THE PRO­
POSAL TO OVERTURN THE MACKA Y DOCTRINE 92 ( 1 99 1 )  (hereinafter YAGER 1 99 1 ). The results 
of Yager's study are also in YAGER, supra note 1 1 , at 1 09-23. 
246. Reich Challenged On Claim of Rise in Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, supra 
note 244. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. The survey was updated by the GAO in 1 9 9 1 .  See U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: STRIKES AND THE USE OF PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS 
IN THE 1970s AND 1 980s 1 8-19 (1991) (hereinafter GAO). 
249. Reich Challenged on Claim of Rise in Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, supra 
note 244 (citing Cynthia L. Gramm, Empirical Evidence on Political Arguments Relating to Re­
placement Worker Legislation, 42 LAB. L.J. 491 ( 1 99 1 )). 
250. McCallion, supra note 16, at CRS- 1 .  Compare Axelrod, supra note 84, at F- 1 (citing the 
GAO study to support the proposition that "(t]he threat of permanent replacement now hangs like 
a Sword of Damocles partially paralyzing the labor movement") with Baird, supra note 1 1 ,  at 16 
(citing GAO study in support of proposition that threat of permanent replacements rarely made, 
even more rarely implemented, and when implemented, most often only after strikes have lasted a 
long time). 
25 1 .  GAO, supra note 248, at 9. 
252. Id. at 1 3 .  
253' . Id. at 1 5. The Bureau of National Affairs conducted surveys o f  work stoppages as re­ported m the popular and labor presses for the years 1 989, 1990, and 199 1 .  The survey showed 
that replacements, either temporary or permanent, were hired in 78 of 444 work stoppages in 1989 
( 17.6%), 72 of 407 work stoppages in 1 990 ( 17.7%), and 47 of 322 work stoppages in 1991 
( 1�.6%). BNA Data Show Most Work Stoppages Occurred in Units of Fewer Than 200 Workers, 
Dally Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 75, at A-1 (Apr. 17, 1992) (discussing THE BUREAU oF NAT'L AF­
FAIRS, INC., REPLACEMENT WORKERS: EVIDENCE FROM THE POPULAR AND LABOR PRESS: 1989 
AND 1990 ( 199 1 )); YAGER, supra note 1 1 , at 108. Because those data include both temporary and permanent replacements, the BNA survey suggests that permanent replacements may be hired somewhat less frequently than is estimated by the GAO study. 
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1 985 (three percent and four percent, respectively).254 No comparable data 
were available for the 1 970s to detennine whether threats and replacement 
increased from the 1 970s to the 1980s.255 To compare the incidence of 
replacement in the 1980s with that in the 1970s, the GAO asked union rep­
resentatives and employers involved in the 1985 and 1989 strikes to com­
pare use of replacements for those periods. The GAO estimates that 
seventy-seven percent of the union representatives and forty-five percent of 
the employers surveyed thought that permanent replacements were used 
more in the period between 1 985-90 than between 1 975-80.256 The study 
thus suggests that, regardless of whether the use of permanent replacements 
is in fact more common now, there is at least a perception among one of the 
relevant groups that this is true. 
The more significant question would seem to be whether employees 
perceive employers as now commonly and quickly resorting to the hiring of 
permanent replacements. If they do, then that perception might dissuade 
employees from engaging in strikes or perhaps even voting for representa­
tion by a labor organization, for fear that such a vote ultimately will lead to 
their being asked to strike and thus jeopardize their jobs.257 It is likely that 
the high visibility of the Caterpillar strike and threat of permanent replace­
ment, as well as similar scenarios at Greyhound,258 The New York Daily 
News,259 and others,260 has produced such a perception among employees. 
254. GAO, supra note 248, at 1 7 .  These figures have been cited by some opponents of abro­
gating Mackay as indicating that even if there is an increasing resort to use of permanent replace­
ments, the number of strikers who are actually being replaced has not increased because there are 
fewer strikes and union membership is decreasing. Dolan, supra note 86, at 320. This argument 
does not counter the anti-Mackay arguments very well; part and parcel of the in­
creased-use-of-Mackay argument is the contention that the practice is decimating the strike and 
contributing to the decline of unions. 
255. GAO, supra note 248, at 2 ( 1985 was earliest year for which automated data were 
available). 
256. Id. at 18. Yager argues that this opinion survey is of questionable value. YAGER, supra 
note 1 1 , at 96 (explaining that GAO study also indicates that 50% of the union representatives 
surveyed believed permanent replacements were hired in 50% or more of the strikes in late 
l 980s-far more than study' s estimate of 17% ). 
257. E.g., Hearings on S. 2112 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor 
and Human Resources, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 1 12-13 ( 1990) (statement of Julius Getman, Profes­
sor, Univ. of Texas Law School) (stating that, in virtually every union organizing campaign, em­
ployer announces that, if union is elected, employer wi11 bargain tough, and if strike is called, it 
will not hesitate to hire permanent replacements); Kamiat, supra note 84, at 34-35 (contending 
that it is "virtually universal" among employers resisting union organizing to tell employees that 
union victory will eventually result in strike and employer's use of permanent replacements). 
258. See Eberts, supra note 73, at 257. 
259. Id. at 258-59. 
260. See supra note 238. 
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Moreover the high-profile incidents of hiring, or threatening to
 hire, penna-
' l 261 nent replacements probably have bred emulation by other emp oyer
s. 
The study by Professor Gramm analyzes use of permanent �eplace­
ments in thirty-two strikes during the period from 1 98� to . 1 988 m a na­
tional sample and twenty-one strikes during the same penod m a New York 
sample.262 Professor Gramm found that permanent replacements were 
hired in 15 .63% of the strikes in the national sample and 23. 8 1  % of the 
strikes in the New York sample. 263 Her findings suggest that employers 
hire permanent replacements "in a substantial minority of [work] 
stoppages. "264 
Finally, the study by Daniel Yager surveys the number of NLRB deci­
sions citing Mackay from 1935 to 1 989.26
5 He determined that, of those 
cases, 25 1 involved employers hiring permanent replacements. 
266 Of those 
25 1 cases, only 22 involved labor disputes that began in 1 98 1  or later.267 
Mr. Yager recently assessed the implications of the study: although it does 
not show that there has been no increase in the use of permanent replace-
261. See LeRoy, supra note 84, at 263-64 (describing the "me-too" effect on small employers 
of large employers' use of permanent replacements). For example, approximately three months 
after Caterpillar issued its ultimatum and ended the strike in Peoria, Peterbilt, a "big rig" tractor 
manufacturer, ended a three-month strike at a plant in Nashville, Tennessee by threatening to hire 
replacements. Peterbilt Strike Ends, BATON RouGE SUNDAY ADVOCATE (La.), Aug. 2, 1992, at 
2A. The striking employees, members of the UAW, approved a contract by a margin of more than 
3-1 that they had rejected a week earlier. One might reasonably infer that the factor which pro­
duced such a drastically different result in the course of a week was the employer's threat to hire 
permanent replacements. The president of the UAW local described the contract as "the worst 
contract that's ever been negotiated in so far as the differences between the old contract and the 
new contract." Id. 
262. See Gramm, supra note 249, at 49 1 -92. 
263. Id. at 492. 
264: Id. �t. 495. Professor Gramm interprets other findings of the study as suggesting the following: hmng permanent replacements may prolong strikes; hiring permanent replacements 
�ay decrease the likelihood that unions will retain their status as collective bargaining representa­
tives; most employers can continue operating without hiring permanent replacements; and tempo­
rary replacements are at least as effective as permanent replacements in continuing operations. Id. 
Professor Gra�m concludes, in part, that, because of size limitations in her study' s  samples, fur­
th�r re�earc� IS needed to determine the effects of hiring permanent replacements on both the �;ions survival as the collective bargaining representatives and the employers' ability to operate. 
265 
· 
. YAGER 1 99 1 ,  supra note 245, at 98. The year used to date the decisions is the year the lab�r. dispute . 
began, rather than the date of the NLRB decision. Id. at 97. This explains why dec1s1ons designated as I 935-37 could cite the I 938 Mackay decision. 
266. Id. at 98; see also id
. at 100-02 (providing charts showing data for each year). 
267 Id at 102 The ye 1981 · 
· 
·ri . · · · ar is s1gm tcant because that was the year of the PA TCO firings SI ee infra note 269 and accompanying text. The high year was 1 948 with 1 2  such cases and th� ow year was I 957 w'th y ' ' • 1 none. AGER 1 99 1 ,  supra note 245, at 98. All years except 1957 had one or more cases. Id. 
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ments since 1981, it does disprove the assertion that employers did not hire 
permanent replacements before 198 1 .  268 
Commentators have speculated on the reasons for an increase i n  the 
use of permanent replacements. One of the most commonly repeated theo­
ries is that President Reagan set the tone for a new aggressive approach by 
employers when, in 198 1 ,  he fired over 1 1,000 air traffic controllers who 
were represented by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization 
(PATCO) and who were participating in an illegal strike.269 If, assuming 
arguendo, the 1980s witnessed an increase in private sector employers' en­
gaging in hard bargaining and hiring permanent replacements, or threaten­
ing to do so, singling out President Reagan' s  action as the cause is too 
simplistic. In fact, few of the commentators who highlight that event view 
it as the principal cause of increased resort to the Mackay doctrine. There 
are many other factors that may have contributed to an increase in employ­
ers' use of permanent replacements. Some that have been suggested in­
clude the following: the wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 1 980s, 
which resulted in an oversupply of personnel, followed by downsizing, 
which left a pool of workers willing to work for less than union wages;270 
deregulation;271 global competition;272 technology;273 slow econormc 
growth;274 and unreasonable labor contracts and demands.275 
268. Reich Challenged on Claim of Rise in Use of Pennanent Striker Replacements, supra 
note 244. 
269. E.g., Craver, supra note 85, at 421 ;  Estreicher, supra note 1 1 , at 287; Pollitt, supra note 
1 1 , at 307; Axelrod, supra note 84. AFL-CIO secretary-treasurer Thomas Donahue stated that 
employers " 'interpreted this as a declaration of open season on unions and went all-out to block, 
weaken or be rid of them.' "  Janice Castro, Labor Draws an Empty Gun, TIME, Mar. 26, 1 990, at 
56. But see Baird, supra note 1 1 , at 1 1  (describing this explanation as a fairy tale). 
For a detailed account of the PATCO strike, see Herbert R. Northrup, The Rise and Demise 
of PATCO, 37 INous. & LAB. REL. REv. 167 passim (1984). President Reagan fired the air traffic 
controllers who did not return to work within 48 hours of his announcement and ordered federal 
agencies not to re-employ them. Id. at 178. On August 12, 1993, the Clinton Administration 
announced that the President had issued an order authorizing the Federal Aviation Administration 
to hire the former strikers. Clinton Gives FAA Clearance to Hire Fired PATCO Members, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 155, at AA-1 (Aug. 13, 1 993). 
270. Rouk.is & Farid, supra note 85, at 84-85. 
27 1 .  Id. 
272. Id.; Randall Samborn, "Replacements" Spur Labor Action, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 1990, at 
1 ,  29 (explaining opinion of Joel Kaplan, attorney who represents management). 
273. Roukis & Farid, supra note 85, at 84. 
274. Id. 
275. Eberts, supra note 73, at 260-6 1 ;  cf Richard Freeman, Is Declining Unionization of the 
U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?, in UNIONS AND EcoNOMIC CoMPETITIVENESS 143 (Lawrence 
Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992). In his recent essay, Professor Freeman elucidates that, when 
United States companies had technological and productivity leads over companies in the rest of 
the world, they had potential "monopoly rents." Freeman, supra, at 165-66. Unions could bar­
gain for the employees' share of those rents, and employers could agree without hurting the com­
panies' investment. Id. at 166. With the "oil shock," the loss of the United States's productivity 
advantage, and deregulation, the monopoly rents no longer existed, and unions were slow to real-
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Proponents of overturning Mackay argue that employers' increasing 
resort to permanent replacements has effected a decline in the number and 
effectiveness of strikes, once labor' s most powerful weapon. 276 One cannot 
dispute that the number of strikes has decreased in recent years.277 As to 
the effectiveness of strikes, there is  no empirical data establishing that 
strikes have become ineffective economic weapons. Nevertheless, one 
could infer from the decrease in the number of  strikes that unions and em­
ployees resort to strikes less often because they perceive them as ineffec­
tive. 278 Even before the UAW-Caterpillar dispute, labor law commentators 
suggested that the right to strike had become a "blunt instrument."279 
No empirical evidence conclusively establishes a causal connection 
between an increased use of permanent replacements and the decline in 
the number and effectiveness of strikes. 28° Commentators have recognized 
ize that the bargaining strategies of the 1950s and 1960s would not work in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Id. ; cf Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Character of 
American Labor Laws, " 1 990 Wis. L. REv. I,  1 06-09 (recognizing the role of U.S. industries' 
monopoly rents and the loss of those rents in both the changing relationship between U.S. employ­
ers and organized labor and the precipitous decline in union density in traditional union 
"strongholds"). 
276. E.g. , Kamiat, supra note 84, at 40 (contending that under Mackay a strike is not necessax­
ily something an employer wishes to avoid because it  provides opportunity to oust union); 
Michael H. LeRoy, The Mackay Radio Doctrine of Permanent Striker Replacements and the Min· 
nesota Picket Line Peace Act: Questions of Preemption, 77 MINN. L. REv. 843, 850-51 (1993) 
(recognizing that no study establishes relationship between increased replacement and decreased 
strikes, but stating that impact on union decision making suggests such a correlation); Pollitt, 
supra note 1 1 , at 300 (asserting that Mackay "makes a mockery of the supposed right to strike"); 
Axelrod, supra note 84 (declaring that "[t]he threat of permanent replacement now hangs like a 
Sword of Damocles, partially paralyzing the labor movement"). Some opponents of legislation to 
overturn Mackay argue that a decrease in the number of strikes is not a malady that needs to be 
remedied, but is one of the principal objectives of the NLRA. See YAGER, supra note 1 1, at 
49-5 1 ;  Zifchak, supra note 86, at 57. 
277. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has compiled figures on major work stoppages since 
1947. The Bureau defines a "major work stoppage" as including both strikes and lockouts. In 
1991,  the number of major work stoppages dropped to a record-tying low of 40, the same level as 
in 1988. Work Stoppages: Major Strikes and Lockouts Last Year Tied Record Low, Labor De· 
partment Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at B-1 (Feb. 5, 1 992). In 1992, the number fell to 
a new record low of 35. Work Stoppages: BLS Report Record Low Number of Major Strikes 
During 1992, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at B-7 (Feb. 4, 1 993). 
278. One measure of the effectiveness of a strike is the extent to which the union can impede 
the employer's operations during the strike. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 3, at 389 (explaining that 
if employer continues operations despite strike, employees lose paychecks, but employer suffers 
little loss in revenues). One way a union can effectively disrupt an employer's operation is to 
prevent the employer from obtaining a sufficient quantity of qualified workers. John G. Kilgour, 
Can Unions Strike Anymore? The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 41 LAB. L.J. 259, 
259 (1990). 
279. See, e.g., Combination of Many Factors Seen Contributing to Decline in Strikes, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No 62, at C-1 (Apr. 3, 1989). 
280. LeRoy, supra note 276, at 850-51 (recognizing that no study establishes relationship 
between employers' growing willingness to employ permanent replacements and the declining 
strike rate). 
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that the decreasing effectiveness of strikes can be attributed to a num­
ber of causes, including increased capital mobility, automated technol­
ogy, deregulation, declining union membership, and increased inter­
national competition.281 It is likely, however, that a perceived increase in 
the use of permanent replacements is at least a cause of the decline of 
strikes.282 
The alleged increase in use of pennanent replacements and the · decline 
of the strike are not, however, the only reasons that the Mackay doctrine has 
come under escalating attack in the last few years. Organized labor has 
been declining as a percentage of the workforce in the United States since 
1954.283 The decline has been most pronounced in the private sector.284 It 
is widely recognized that a number of factors have contributed to the de­
cline of organized labor,285 and Mackay is no more than one of those fac-
28 1 .  LeRoy, supra note 84, at 301-03 (recognizing that increased job mobility, declining 
unionization, and broader deregulation have undermined right to strike); Pope, supra note 221, at 
894 n.35 (stating that economists connect the declining power of strikes with "structural features 
of the emerging postindustrial order such as capital mobility and automated process technology"); 
Combination of Many Factors Seen Contributing to Decline in Strikes, supra note 279 (reporting 
that labor experts cite the following reasons for the decline in strikes: declining power of unions 
as they lose members, changes in structure of corporate America, increased foreign competition, 
and use of permanent replacements). 
282. LeRoy, supra note 276, at 850-51 (stating that employers' increased willingness to hire 
replacements has affected union decision making). 
283. See, e.g., MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED 
STATES passim (1987). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the high point of union 
membership was approximately 1945, when about 35.5% of all nonagricultural workers were 
members. Id. at 10 tbl. 1; Union Membership: Proponion of Union Members Declines to Low of 
15.8 Percent, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at B-1 (Feb. 9, 1993). From that high point, the 
percentage decreased in the period between 1946-1952, when it reached 32.5%. GOLDFIELD, 
supra, at 10 tbl.1 .  Union density increased in 1954 to 34.7%, but thereafter has steadily declined. 
Id. During 1990 and 1991, the decline leveled off at 16. 1 %, but it resumed in 1992 as the percent­
age fell to 15.8%. Union Membership: Proponion of Union Members Declines to Low of 15.8 
Percent, supra. 
284. See Union Coverage of U.S. Private Workforce Predicted to Fall Below 5 Percent by 
2000, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 24 1, at A-1 (Dec. 18, 1989) (discussing paper by Professors 
Stephen Bronars and Donald Deere examining the declining percentage of unionized labor in the 
private sector between 1973 and 1988). From 1973 to 1988, union representation in the private 
sector fell from 25% to 12%. Id. Bronars and Deere predict that, if current trends continue, the 
percentage will decrease to below 5 %  by the year 2000. Id. 
285. Freeman, supra note 275, at 164-66 (citing employers' opposition to organization, dereg­
ulation of trucking and airlines, and U.S.'s loss of productivity advantage); William B. Gould, IV, 
Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board 
and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REv. 937, 942 (1986) (citing foreign competition from Japan, 
Brazil, Korea, and other countries, deregulation, increased use of permanent replacements, and 
unions' failure to organize in developing industries); LeRoy, supra note 276, at 853 (addressing 
the declining union numbers in particular industries and increased international wage competi­
tion); see also YAGER, supra note 1 1 , at 63-65 (describing a shift from manufacturing to service, 
shift of manufacturing to Sunbelt where unions are less popular, growth of white collar jobs, 
reports of violent and corrupt union activities, increased global competition, deregulation, enact­
ment of federal employment laws since 1960, erosion of state law employment-at-will doctrine, 
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tors. But the hoary doctrine has become a primary target of efforts to 
resuscitate the strike and organized labor.286 The escalating attack on Mac­
kay is probably due in large part to the perception that it is a cause of 
decline that can be extirpated by legislation. 
In summary, employers may threaten to hire, and perhaps even actu­
ally hire, permanent replacements more often today than they did before the 
1980s. Even if that is not true, it seems that labor leaders, and perhaps 
employees, perceive it as so. The Mackay doctrine is thus believed to be a 
cause of the declining effectiveness of strikes and declining union density. 
Accordingly, many leaders and supporters of organized labor have at­
tempted to rejuvenate the strike and the labor movement by campaigning to 
overturn Mackay. 
IV. SIGNIFICANT FUNCTIONS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ECONOMIC 
STRIKES AND UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE STRIKES : REASONS EMPLOYERS 
SHOULD NOT BE CATEGORICALLY PROHIBITED FROM HIRING 
PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS 
This Article has discussed the risks that the current state of the law 
under Mackay imposes on the parties to labor disputes. Further, it has con­
sidered the. argument that employers have exacerbated those risks and un­
dermined the right to strike by increasingly threatening to hire, and hiring, 
permanent replacements. The problems sound a clarion call for modifica­
tion of the current striker replacement law. Correction of these problems 
does not require, however, that employers be prohibited from hiring perma­
nent replacements under all circumstances, thus abrogating the principal 
distinction between economic and ULP strikes. The distinction between the 
two types of strikes performs important functions in regulating the behavior 
of the parties to a labor dispute. First, the distinction between the types of 
and employers' voluntary improvements in the workplace). After studying a number of factors 
contributing to union decline, Goldfield selected the following as most significant: "growing of­
fensive of U.S. capitalists" against new union organizing efforts; changes in public policy that 
increasingly favor employers; and unions' inability and unwillingness to fight the losses in union 
density and union influence. GOLDFIELD, supra note 283, at 23 1 .  
286. This Article does not suggest that organized labor has failed to address other causes of 
declining union density. Some labor leaders, for example, have called for abandonment of the 
philosophy of spending almost all of the dues collected on servicing existing members and urged 
unions to embark on aggressive new organizing efforts. See SEIU Organizing Director Calls for 
New Strategies for labor Movement, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 1 2, at A- 1 (June 14, 1 993) 
(discussing speech delivered by Service Employees International Union's organizing director). 
Moreover, some labor leaders have sought to bolster the waning power of the strike with corporate 
campaigns, see supra note 222, and in-plant strategies, such as work-to-rule tactics, see Marc J. 
Bloch & Scott A. Moorman, Working to Rule and Other Alternate Job Actions, 9 LAB. LAW. 169 
passim (1993). The resounding success of some corporate campaigns, such as that of the United 
Steelworkers against Ravenswood Aluminum, see supra notes 2 1 6-26 and accompanying text, 
suggests that such actions may do much to revitalize organized labor. 
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strikes is the most effective deterrent of ULPs by employers. Second, the 
right to hire permanent replacements during an economic strike provides a 
market check on the bargaining demands of the parties. These functions are 
worth preserving. A proposal more narrowly tailored than an absolute ban 
on the hiring of permanent replacements can both alleviate the problems 
created by the Mackay doctrine and preserve the significant functions it 
performs. 
A. The Distinction Between Economic and Unfair Labor Practice 
Strikes-The Most Effective Deterrent Against Employers ' 
Unfair Labor Practices 
The current law regarding replacement of strikers permits employers to 
hire permanent replacements only if a strike is characterized as an economic 
strike. 287 Evidently employers do value the option of hiring permanent 
replacements; one need look no further than the bitter struggle over the 
Workplace Fairness Act and its predecessors to know this is true. Many 
employers never exercise that option nor even threaten to exercise it, but 
even these employers recognize that retention of the option gives them lev­
erage at the bargaining table. 288 
To retain the option of hiring permanent replacements, employers must 
avoid committing ULPs that may result in the Board's characterization of a 
strike as a ULP strike either from its inception or by conversion. Determi­
nation of the type of strike is a minefield for an employer that has engaged 
in any behavior which might be considered a ULP. The topography of this 
minefield is briefly described in this and the next two paragraphs.289 The 
test applied by the Board and the courts for determining whether a strike is 
a ULP strike is whether a ULP constituted a contributing cause of the 
strike.290 The test is nebulous and labor-friendly, in that the strike is a ULP 
strike, even if economic objectives predominate, as long as there is a causal 
connection between the employer's ULPs and the strike.291 
287. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text. 
288. Ray, supra note 74, at 365. 
289. For an extensive treatment of the Board's and courts' standards for determining whether 
a strike is a ULP or economic strike, see RAY & BARTI.E, supra note 12, §§ 5.01-.06. 
290. E.g., Northern Wire Corp. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 1313, 1 3 1 9 (7th Cir. 1989) ("A strike that 
is caused in whole or in part by an employer's unfair labor practices is an unfair labor practice 
strike."); see also General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42, v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1 308, 1 3 1 1  
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that a strike is a ULP strike if employer's violations are "contributing 
cause"); R & H Coal Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 28, 28 (1992) (finding that employer's commission of 
ULPs was "contributing cause") (citing C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638 (1 989)). For a discus­
sion of the types of conduct that constitute a ULP, see supra note 6. 
29 1 .  Teamsters Local Union No. 5 1 5  v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 7 1 9, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied sub nom. Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 515, 498 U.S. 1053 
(199 1 ); Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1 1 80, 1 1 87 (7th Cir. 1990); NLRB v. 
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Even if an employer can avoid the first "mine" by establishing that the 
strike began as an economic strike, the employer still must be circumspect 
in its behavior toward the union and employees and avoid committing ULPs 
during the strike. Otherwise an employer still may lose the right to hire 
permanent replacements, if the economic strike is converted into a ULP 
strike. The test applied by the Board and courts to determine whether an 
economic strike is converted into a ULP strike is no less ambiguous or 
labor-friendly than the test for determining the initial characterization. A 
strike is converted if a ULP is a factor-again, not necessarily the principal 
or sole factor-in prolonging the strike. 292 Although it is possible for an 
employer to take actions that result in the Board's finding that a strike was 
converted from a ULP strike into an economic strike, the standard applied 
to such a conversion is even more ambiguous than the foregoing two stan­
dards, and the Board and courts have not often found such conversions.293 
That standard inquires whether the employer has "cured"294 the ULP or 
otherwise removed it as a cause of prolonging the strike.295 
Moore Business Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835, 840 (5th Cir. 1978). In Northern Wire, the employer 
argued that the strike should be classified as an economic strike because the employer had estab­
lished that the strike would have been called even in the absence of the ULPs. Northern Wire, 887 
F.2d. at 13 19. The court responded that the test is "whether the employees, in deciding to go on 
strike, were motivated in part by the unfair labor practices committed by their employer, not 
whether, without that motivation, the employees might have struck for some other reason." Id. at 
131 9-20. 
292. C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 638 ( 1989). Although the Board usually states the 
conversion standard as whether a ULP "prolongs" a strike, courts of appeals often state the stan­
dard as whether a ULP "aggravates or prolongs" a strike. E.g., NLRB v. Champ Corp., 933 F.2d 
688, 694 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 1 2  S. Ct. 416 (199 1 ); NLRB v. Jann Enters., 785 F.2d 195, 204 
(7th Cir. 1986); Vulcan Hart Corp. v. NLRB, 7 1 8  F.2d 269, 275 (8th Cir. 1983). In Champ Corp., 
the Ninth Circuit, amending its earlier opinion, 9 1 3  F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1990), explained that, 
although it had in the past stated the standard as whether a strike " 'is expanded to include a 
protest over unfair labor practices, ' "  the circuit follows the "aggravate or prolong" standard. 
Champ Corp., 933 F.2d at 694 (citing NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
The variations in statement of the conversion standard do not seem to produce divergent results 
because most courts apparently focus on prolongation. 
293. General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 95 1 F.2d 1308, 1 3 1 1-12 (D.C. Cir. 
1 991)  (noting that there are fewer cases finding conversions from ULP to economic strikes than 
cases finding economic to ULP), enforcing Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1990). 
294. To cure its unlawful conduct and thus relieve itself of liability for ULPs, an employer 
must repudiate the conduct, and the repudiation must be "timely," "unambiguous," "specific in 
nature to the coercive conduct," "free from other . . .  illegal conduct," and adequately published to 
the employees. Additionally, the employer must accompany the repudiation with assurances that 
it will not interfere with the exercise of employees' § 7 rights and thereafter refrain from commit­
ting ULPs. Passavant Mem. Area Hosp., 237 N.L.R.B. 138, 138-39 (1978) (quoting Douglas 
Division, The Scott & Fetzer Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 1016, 1024 (1977)). 
295. Gibson Greetings, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1289 (1993); Chicago Beef Co., 298 
N.L.R.B. 1039, 1040 (1990), enfd mem., 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1 99 1). The two foregoing cases 
arc examples of cases in which employers unsuccessfully argued that the strikes had been con­
verted from ULP strikes into economic strikes. For cases in which employers prevailed on that 
argument, see General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1 308, 1 3 1 3  (D.C. 
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In determining whether a ULP is a contributing cause of a strike or 
prolongation of a strike, the Board looks to both subjective evidence (how 
the striking employees characterize their motivation) and objective evi­
dence (the probable impact that the type of ULP would have on reasonable 
strikers).296 However, the Board does not even examine the subjective evi­
dence for some ULPs, but simply concludes that these ULPs, by their na­
ture, interrupt or burden the bargaining process. 297 The Board and some 
courts have found that an employer' s ULPs were a contributing cause of a 
strike when the employees themselves knew little about the ULPs, but sim­
ply ratified the recommendation of their union to call a strike.298 Generally, 
the Board is more likely to conclude that a strike is a ULP strike if it is 
called soon after commission of the ULP.299 An employer cannot rest as­
sured, however, that the Board or courts will determine that a strike called 
long after the employer committed a ULP is not a ULP strike. 300 Some 
commentators believe that the Board uses the initial characterization of the 
strike and the conversion doctrine to protect the reinstatement rights of em­
ployees who have been permanently replaced: "There is some feeling that 
Cir. 1991); Trident Seafoods Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 566, 569-70 (1979), enforced, 642 F.2d 1 148 
(9th Cir. 1 98 1 ). 
296. E.g., Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1080 (lst Cir. 1981); C-Line 
Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 638 (1989). 
297. E.g., C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. at 638. The Board has stated that the "most notable" 
of these ULPs, which ipso facto result in characterization of a strike as a ULP strike, is unlawful 
withdrawal of recognition of the employees' bargaining representative. Id. For early criticism of 
the Board's expansion of per se rules regarding conversion, see Frank H. Stewart, Conversion of 
Strikes: Economic to Unfair lAbor Practice: II, 49 VA. L. REv. 1 297 passim (1963). 
298. Teamsters Local Union No. 5 1 5  v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 725-26 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (hold­
ing that evidence was sufficient to show that strike was a ULP strike when the union president 
who recommended strike considered employer's insistence on a term in contract unreasonable, 
and employees, most of whom did not know the specifics of the employer's bargaining position, 
were ratifying motive for strike of union president by voting to strike), cert. denied sub nom. 
Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 515, 498 U.S. 1053 (1991); R & H Coal 
Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 28, 28 n.5 (1992) ("[E]vidence shows that . . .  employees had little or no role 
in the decision to strike . . .  that the [union] controlled the decision whether and when to strike, 
and that the [employer's] commission of unfair labor practices was a contributing reason in 
reaching that decision."). 
299. E.g., Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike, supra note 85, at 990 (recognizing the 
importance of timing by suggesting that a strike which occurs shortly after a ULP is implemented 
is probably a ULP strike, while a strike that occurs long after is probably an economic strike); see 
also Bums Motor Freight, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 276, 277 (1980) (stating that timing is significant, 
but not dispositive). 
300. Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1 1 80, 1 1 87 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
strike was ULP strike when employees went out seven-and-one-half months after employer de­
clared impasse and implemented final offer); R & H Coal Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 28, 28 (1992) (hold­
ing that strike was ULP strike when called 1 3  months after employer unilaterally changed terms 
and conditions of employment and explaining delay as strategic decision by union). 
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when replacements occur, the NLRB may be prone
 to find some employer 
. d" tl f Mi k "301 violation, a warping of the act stemmmg tree Y ro
m ac ay. 
Amidst the foregoing body of law, employers attempt 
to preserve the 
option of hiring permanent replacements. To retain this 
option, employers 
must work hard to bargain in good faith with the unions. 
302 Moreover, the 
bargaining obligation continues during the strike, 303 so that a
n employer 
must closely monitor its bargaining conduct during a strike to avoid c
on­
verting an economic strike into a ULP strike. 304 Because the causal rela­
tionship is nebulous, if an employer commits any ULP, it may find in a 
future Board decision that the strike was a ULP strike. 305 If an employer is 
pristine in its conduct toward a union and its employees, or believes it is 
clairvoyant, it may predict that the Board will determine, at some time in 
the future, that a strike by its employees began as an economic strike and 
remained so for its duration. On the basis of that prediction, the employer 
may hire permanent replacements and deny the strikers reinstatement when 
they submit unconditional offers to return to work. If the employer is 
wrong, it will be liable for back pay and other make-whole relief, and that 
liability may be quite large.306 
This potential liability serves as a disincentive to committing ULPs, 
particularly during a strike. Yet, the remedies the Board can order for 
301.  ATLESON, supra note 103, at 3 1 -32; see also Stewart, supra note 297, at 1323 (''The 
Board is using the conversion sanction to give the unions an additional advantage in their eco­
nomic battle with employers; it was meant to remedy unfair labor practices that prolong a 
strike."). 
302. Ra.y, supra note 74, at 372-73. Professor Ray discusses the many types of conduct that may �es�It m the �oard's  concluding that an employer violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing to 
bargam
·
m
· 
goo_d �atth. Id. at 376-80; see also RAY & BARTI.E, supra note 12, § 3.03 (discussing 
cases d1stmgu1shmg between lawf�I "h�d bargaining" and unlawful "retaliatory bargaining"); 
Y �G.ER',,
supra note 1 1 , at 86-87 (d1scussmg the fine distinction between unlawful "surface bar­
gammg and lawful "hard bargaining"). 
3�3. E.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int') Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490-92 (1959); NLRB v. 
Remmgton Rand, ;nc., �4 F.2d 862, 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576, and cert. denied, 
�04 U.S. 585, reh g denied, 304 U.S. 590 (1938). The obligation continues until a union is decer­
tifi�d ?r the employer withdraws recognition and can establish either that the union no longer has 
n_ia.ionty statu� or that the employer has a good faith doubt regarding majority status For discus­
smn of the
. 
difficulty of satisfying the good faith doubt standard, see supra note� 165-69 and 
accompanymg text. 
304. E.g., YAGER, supra note 1 1 , at 88-89. 
[ 3o� . Baird, supra note 1 1 , at 12 ("[B]ecause of the Russian roulette nature of NLRB findings 
n:%p 8�ea7�;;6v�ry ��e�l : avoid any appearance of unfair labor practices."); Golden, supr� .k ' · exp aimng at employers face dual risks in Board's determination--either that stri e commenced as ULP strike o th t · · r a econonuc strike was converted into ULP strike). 
306. See supra notes 183-93 and accompan · Pr 
potentially large liability it is d"ffi It � 
ymg text. ofessor Ray observes that, in light of 
replacements unless it is 
'
sure th 
I
t 
icu
thi 
or. a� employer to refuse to reinstate strikers and retain 
ULP strike. Ray, supra note 74
� 
a
�;
75
�g it as done could have been a contributing cause of a 
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ULPs, other than back pay, are far from intimidating to employers. 307 For 
an employer's refusal to uphold its statutory duty to bargain in good faith, 
the most onerous remedy that the Board can impose is ordering the em­
ployer to cease and desist from refusing to bargain. 308 Thus, the distinction 
between employers' rights to hire replacements depending on the character­
ization of the strike is the most effective deterrent against employers' com­
mitting ULPs.309 If the distinction were removed by the overruling of 
Mackay, employers would have far less incentive to bargain in good faith 
with unions and otherwise avoid committing ULPs.310 Consequently, labor 
law without Mackay might witness a more severe weakening of organized 
labor than labor law with Mackay ever has.311 
B. The Option to Hire Permanent Replacements During Economic 
Strikes-A Market Check on the Parties' Estimations of the 
Value of the Labor Force 
Some commentators argue that that employer' s option to hire perma-
307. See, e.g., Ray, supra note 74, at 380 (asserting that Board's remedies for an employer's 
failure to bargain in good faith are weak). 
308. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988); Ray, supra note 74, at 372. 
309. See Ray, supra note 74, at 365. 
3 10. See id. at 381.; Baird, supra note 1 1, at 12. One response to this is that the NLRA should 
be amended to provide for more effective remedies, such as punitive monetary awards. Given the 
ongoing battle over striker replacement legislation, it is reasonable to predict that an amendment 
providing for more onerous remedies under the Act is unlikely to be enacted. Indeed, this predic­
tion is supported by the failure of the Labor Reform Act of 1977. S. 2467, 95th Cong.,  2d Sess. 
(1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1977). Section 8 of that proposed legislation would 
have provided for several harsher remedies: a ban, up to a maximum of three years, on govern­
ment contracts for employers that willfully violated a Board order or court decree enforcing a 
Board order; double back pay for employees unlawfully discharged during union organizing cam­
paigns or during the period from recognition of the union until a first collective bargaining agree­
ment is reached; and compensation for employees whose employer violates its bargaining duty 
regarding a first contract. Section 9 would have made preliminary injunctions under § 10(1) of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1988), applicable to discharges during organizing campaigns or dur­
ing the period from recognition of a union until the parties enter into a first collective bargaining 
agreement. The House passed the bill on October 6, 1977. 123 CoNo. REC. 32,6 13 (1977). The 
Senate bill died on the Senate floor due to filibuster. 124 CoNG. REc. 1 8,398, 18,400 ( 1 978). 
3 1 1 .  One commentator speculates that a possible unintended consequence of overturning Mac­
kay is that employers may consider locking out employees more often, rather than waiting for a 
strike, when the parties cannot achieve a collective bargaining agreement. Peter G. Nash, Getting 
Prepared for the Coming Labor and Employment Law Changes in the 1990s, in THE SOUTHWEST­
ERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON LABOR 
LAW DEVELOPMENTS §§ 4.05[2)-[4) ( 1 992). One advantage of a lockout over a strike, from an 
employer's perspective, is that the employer chooses the timing of a lockout. Id. § 4.05[3]. On 
the other hand, a disadvantage of lockouts is that employers are permitted to hire only temporary 
replacements. Harter Equip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 (1986), review denied, Local 825, Int'l 
Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1987). If employers were absolutely 
prohibited from hiring pennanent replacements during all strikes, a relative disadvantage of the 
lockout would be removed, and more employers might choose to lock out employees. Nash, 
supra, § 4.05[3]. 
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1 ents during economic strikes produces e
fficient results by 
nent rep acem . k 3 12 Th" 
subjecting the bargaining demands of the �art1�s to the mar et. 1s 
k t heck should be available when a stnke is ca
lled solely to pressure 
mar e c . , 
' ) 
· d 
an employer to accede to the uruon s (and e�ployees econoffilc e-
d 313  The question presented to the market 1s whether t
he employer or 
man s. . 314 
labor is more accurate in its estimation of the value _o� th
e labor force. 
An employer can seek alternative sources of labor wtlhng to_ work
 for the 
wages it is willing to pay, and the employees can seek alternative sources of 
employment willing to pay the wages for which they are will�ng to work.315 
The offer that an employer can safely make to replacements 1s the compen­
sation package that the striking employees had or the one offered to the 
union in bargaining. An employer that offers replacements better terms 
than those offered the striking employees, or those offered to the union and 
bargained to impasse, risks committing a ULP.3 1 6 Thus, if the employer 
can attract permanent replacements sufficient in both quantity and quality, 
3 12. Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 3 19; see also Dolan, supra note 86, at 3 1 6  (stating that 
relationship mirrors the marketplace); Westfall, supra note 12, at 1 46 (explaining that Mackay 
doctrine allows parties to test market); cf. Estreicher, supra note 1 1 , at 287 (positing that em­
ployer's attempt to withstand strike imparts information to parties about their positions and their 
relative bargaining power). 
3 1 3. One may object to the market check function of the Mackay doctrine based on the belief 
that a purpose of the NLRA was to remove wages of organized workers from market checks. This 
theory regarding the Act posits that the Act imposes a labor law regime that cartelizes labor 
markets. See, e.g., Richard A.  Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, in LABOR LAW AND THE 
EMPLOYMENT MARKET: FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 44, 55, 65-67 (Richard A. Epstein & 
Jeffrey Paul eds. ,  1985) (noting, however, that the Act has not been interpreted as fostering carte­
lization to the fullest extent). Many commentators contend, however, that insulating collective 
bargaining and union demands from the market was not a purpose of the Act. See, e.g., Cohen & 
Wachter, supra note 86, at 125 (asserting that the NLRA does not seek to insulate unions from 
nonunion competition in external market); Estreicher, supra note 1 1 , at 287 ("[W]hile the law 
pe�ts a collecti�i�ation of the employees' bargaining position, it does not displace market mech­
amsms for 
_
the pnc1�g. of goods and services."); Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 678 (stating that collective bargammg enables employees to demand market value for labor); William J. Ryan, 
Rec?nt Development, Labor Law: Rights of Striking Employees-Trans World Airlines v. Indep. 
Fed_ �  of Flight �ttendan�s, 1 2  HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'v 1098, 1 1 06 ( 1989) (approving Court's �ec1s10n fo� �ot mterpretmg NLRA and Railway Labor Act as insulating unions from economic 
nsks of stnking). 
A second basis on wh�ch one may object to the market check is that, even if labor law does 
not remove wages of organized labor from market competition it should do s LeR 
84 . . . 
, so. ee oy, supra note , at 304-06 (recogmzmg that the stnker replacement parad· · f h NLRA . . 1gm smce passage o t e has been one of combmation, but advocating movement to cartelization paradigm). 3 14. See Note, One Strike supra note 85 at 680 ("S "k · . . . , ' tn es occur when because of mforma-t10nal deficiencies, _labor and management differ in their estimations of what the labor force is act�ally �or:th. Stnkes are the tools envisioned by the Act to test the market and decide which estimate 1s, m fact, correct.") (footnote omitted)· see z N h & M k ( . .. , a so as oo , supra note 86 at 319 assertmg that free play of economic forces" determ· I f · ' mes resu ts o stnkes) 3 15. Westfall, supra note 1 2, at 146. · 
3 16. See RAY & BARTLE supra note 1 2  § 3 09 J d were allowed to offer repla�em t h" h , · · u ge Posner observes that if an employer en s a 1g enough wage, above the level paid to the striking 
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the demands of the union are supracompetitive, and acceding to them prob­
ably would produce an inefficient result.3 17  Prohibiting employers from 
hiring permanent replacements during economic strikes consequently would 
remove, or at least significantly reduce, the market check and substantially 
cartelize labor markets. 
The banning of permanent replacements would not appear to affect the 
market check on labor's demands because the employer would retain the 
option of hiring temporary replacements. The substitute labor pool, how­
ever, could be affected; consequently, the market test could be skewed. 
Professor LeRoy describes the effect on the labor pool from which the em­
ployer could hire temporary replacements: "[I]n theory employers would 
be free to hire from the same pool of substitute labor as before, because the 
law would place no express limitation on that labor pool. In practice, how­
ever, the legal prohibition against hiring permanent striker replacements 
would sharply limit the substitute labor pool ."318 Professor LeRoy offers, 
as an example, the responses Caterpillar received to its advertisements for 
striker replacements. Many of those responding were willing to relocate in 
order to accept permanent positions, and, according to anecdotal accounts, 
many were employed in other jobs at the time they responded.319 Professor 
LeRoy reasonably infers that many employed persons who would have ac­
cepted a permanent position, would not have quit their jobs to take a tempo­
rary position.320 Thus, he posits that, if an employer were limited to hiring 
temporary employees, its labor pool would be reduced to local unemployed 
people and strikers. 321 That may be an overstatement; even employed per­
sons might accept temporary positions if the compensation far exceeded 
that of their current jobs.322 Nonetheless, Professor LeRoy is  correct that 
employees, then it would not be necessary to offer "permanent" jobs to attract a sufficient number 
of replacements. Posner, supra note 31 3, at 53. 
3 17. Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 3 19; Note, One Strike, supra note 85,  at 68 1 ;  cf Cohen 
& Wachter, supra note 86, at 1 19-20 (asserting that if union struck to obtain or preserve monopoly 
wage premium, employer would be able to attract sufficient replacements). 
3 1 8. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 305; see also Schatzki, supra note 1 1 ,  at 3 84 (recognizing that, 
without Mackay, employer would have less flexibility in hiring replacements because many would 
not leave jobs for positions they would lose at end of strike). 
319. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 305. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. That substitute labor pool may be limited even further because some local unem­
ployed persons may not be willing to cross picket lines and suffer, at a minimum, verbal abuse and 
sometimes even physical violence. LeRoy, supra note 276, at 849; Posner, supra note 3 13, at 54. 
322. Cf Posner, supra note 313, at 53 (stating that if employers could offer high enough 
wages to replacements, promises of permanent status would not be necessary to attract 
replacements). 
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struck employers would encounter a different substitute labor pool (than 
under current law) if they were limited to offering temporary positions.323 
Professor LeRoy, who advocates the overruling of MacKay and the 
cartelization of labor, concludes that employers requiring skilled workers 
would be unable to operate during strikes if they were limited to hiring 
temporary replacements. 324 This conclusion may exaggerate the effects of 
overturning Mackay on most employers. However, Professor LeRoy's  ar­
gument regarding the diminution of substitute labor pools does demonstrate 
that, at a minimum, the market check on labor' s demands would be substan­
tially diluted. 
Although an employer' s ability to operate during a strike and the mar­
ket test of the value of labor are related issues, 325 they are not identical. An 
employer that offers temporary positions is offering substantially different 
jobs than those occupied by the striking employees. The employer, conse­
quently, is not subjecting its estimation of the value of its labor force to the 
market test because a reduced labor pool is considering those offers. An 
323. It is difficult to know how much limiting an employer to offering temporary positions 
(meaning, of course, positions limited to the duration of the strike) would actually alter the substi­
tute labor pool available to the employer. Professor Weiler points out that the best offer that an 
employer can make to replacements is that it may be able to retain them beyond the duration of 
the strike. Weiler, supra note 3, at 392. The employer cannot promise longer employment be­
cause the Board may determine the strike was a ULP strike, or the employer may settle the strike 
with the union under an agreement requiring reinstatement of the strikers-with discharge of 
replacements if necessary. Id. Thus, Professor Weiler questions how much of a recruiting advan­
tage an employer derives from being able to offer "permanent" status to replacements. Id. 
This is a difficult question because the answer depends, at least in part, on what the employer 
says in its advertisement of the replacement positions and what the potential applicants understand 
from the employer's statements. Some employers will have replacements sign forms using the 
language from Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 ,  503 ( 1983), see supra note 206, to create 
conditional permanent status and to avoid civil liability if they discharge the replacements. For 
example, Ravenswood Aluminum had its permanent replacements sign such forms. See supra 
note 217.  Such language, seemingly, would advise applicants of the precarious nature of the jobs 
and reduce the substitute pool to roughly the same group that would apply for temporary posi­
tions. As Professor Westfall suggests, however, potential replacements may make a material dis­
tinction between positions that are certain to end when a strike ends and those that have "the 
potential for permanency and will not automatically cease when the strike ends." Westfall, supra 
note 12, at. 150. Moreover, all employers do not use the Belknap language, even when they apparently mtend to .do so. See suf!ra text accompanying notes 2 1 0-15. Some employers do not even a�empt to eqmvocate regardmg permanent status. Caterpillar, for example, ran advertise­
m�nts m newspapers for ".'permanent employees to replace non-returning striking workers. ' "  �me, supra �ote 54; Fra�m, sup�a note 54. As discussed above, Caterpillar reported that i t  was �nundat� with calls regardmg the Jobs, and many, according to accounts, were persons employed 
m other Jobs. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. Thus, the variance between the substi­
tute labor pool available when an employer advertises for temporary replacements and that avail­able when it a�vertises f�
.
r permanent replacements may depend, in part, on the extent to which 
the employer dilutes the permanent" status with qualifiers. 
324. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 305-06. 
325. Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 679-80. 
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employer may choose not to hire from this pool, deeming the applicants to 
be underqualified. Alternatively, an employer may choose to hire from this 
pool rather than cease operations during the strike. Notwithstanding its 
ability to hire temporary replacements from this underqualified pool, an em­
ployer may still find it necessary to accede to supracompetitive demands of 
the union, rather than maintain its bargaining position, because it is unwill­
ing to operate with an inferior substitute labor force for an extended period 
of time. An employer's bargaining position may consist of terms that 
would have attracted qualified replacements, which would have enabled the 
employer to stand its ground on its bargaining position if it had been per­
mitted to offer permanent status. To apply a market test accurately to the 
conflicting bargaining positions, an employer must be allowed to offer its 
estimation of labor's value, including jobs not limited to the duration of the 
strike.326 
What would be the consequences of removing or diluting the market 
check on labor' s demands by banning the hiring of permanent replace­
ments? As Professor LeRoy predicts, striking employees would exercise 
substantial cartel power in relation to their employers. 327 The extreme pre­
diction is that employees would strike often and would do so no matter how 
exorbitant their demands. 328 This argument goes too far. 329 Even if the 
employees could not be · permanently replaced for engaging in economic 
strikes, they would not strike routineiy because they would suffer loss of 
their regular paychecks and benefits while striking.330 
It is reasonable to predict, however, that without the possibility of per­
manent replacement, unions would, at least, be quicker to call strikes.331 To 
avoid such strikes and the possibly more difficult (and in some cases impos-
326. See Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 3 1 9  (arguing that, if employers are prohibited from 
hiring pennanent replacements, market forces will not operate freely to determine outcome of 
disputes). 
327. LeRoy, supra note 84, at 305. 
328. Cf. Westfall, supra note 12, at 146 (noting that employees could do so without risk of 
losing their jobs). 
329. This prediction of dire consequences from the pro-Mackay camp is similar in its hyper­
bole to the anti-Mackay camp' s  description of the effect of the current law-that employers will 
not bargain in good faith because they can oust unions by hiring permanent replacements. Of 
course, most employers do not ignore their duty to bargain in good faith because they would 
commit a ULP. See supra Part N.A. As a consequence, they would have no right to hire perma­
nent replacements and could be subject to substantial make-whole relief if they hired them any­
way and refused to reinstate ULP strikers. See supra Part 11.C.3. 
330. E.g., Pollitt, supra note l l , at 3 10; see also WEILER, supra note 84, at 129 (describing 
strike as "two-edged sword" inflicting costs on both employers and employees). 
331 .  Dolan, supra note 86, at 3 17. Employees generally are not "strike happy," and most 
realize that their economic welfare is interwoven with that of their employer. Kamiat, supra note 
84, at 43; Pollitt, supra note 1 1 , at 3 10. It does not necessarily follow, however, that such realiza­
tion will always provide the needed check on excessive demands and accompanying strikes. 
Westfall, supra note 12, at 147. 
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sible) task of hiring temporary replacements, m�re �mployers might �ban­
don their bargaining positions and agree to umons demands, even if the 
demands are supracompetitive. 332 In the extreme, such results would cause 
some employers to curtail operations, relocate assets, or perhaps eventually 
go out of business333-harming employer and employees, 334 the commu-
nity. and consumers. 335 
v. PROPOSALS FOR MODIFYING THE MACKAY DocTRINE-POSSIBILITIES 
AND PROBLEMS 
There have been numerous proposals to modify the Mackay doctrine. 
Many of them were born or resurrected in response to Congress' s several 
attempts to abrogate Mackay. This section discusses the different types of 
proposals and explains the reasons why each inadequately addresses the 
interests of the parties to a labor dispute. 
A. Proposals That Would Make It an Unfair Labor Practice for an 
Employer to Hire or Threaten to Hire Permanent Replacements 
Unless It Can Prove Business Necessity 
A few proposals of this variety appear in academic writings. 336 One 
such proposal would apply a modified version of the test of NLRB v. Great 
Dane Trailers, Inc. 337 to the hiring of replacements. 338 Under this proposal, 
an employer would commit a ULP by hiring permanent replacements unless 
it could bear the burden of proving that it was motivated by business neces-
332. See Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 319-20; Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 681 .  
333. Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 319-20; Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 682. 
334. Nash & Mook, supra note 86, at 31 9; Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 682 (arguing 
that the burden of inefficiency ultimately is borne by employees). 
335. Estreicher, supra note 1 1 , at 288 ("[M]anagement usually represents consumer welfare 
[at the bargaining table]."). 
336. E.g. , Gillespie, supra note 85, at 795-97; McDonald, supra note 16, at 991 -94; Note, One 
Strike, supra note 85, at 682-83. Professor Weiler would require such a showing at a minimum. 
Weiler, supra note 3, at 39 1 .  
337. 388 U.S. 26 (1967). In Great Dane Trailers, the Court distinguished between an em· 
ployer' s discriminatory conduct that is '"inherently destructive"' of important employee rights, 
and that which has a " 'comparatively slight' " effect on employee rights. Id. at 33-34 (quoting 
NLRB v.  Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287, 289 (1965)). In cases involving both types of conduct, the 
Court placed the burden of proving "that he was motivated by legitimate (business] objectives" 
on t�e employer. Id. �t 3�. In �ases involving "inherently destructive conduct," the plaintiff is not 
required to prove antlumon ammus, and the employer can be held liable for a ULP even if the 
e�p1�7�r proves a bus.in�ss justification. Id. In cases involving conduct having a "comparatively slight impact, the plamt1ff must prove antiunion motivation if the employer proves a "legitimate 
and substantial" business justification. Id. 
33� .. Gillespie, supra note 85, at 795-97. Under this version of the Great Dane Trailers test, 
the hmng of temporary rep�ac�ments would be categorized as having a "comparatively slight" 
adverse. effect on e.
mploy��s nghts. Id. at 795. The hiring of permanent replacements would be 
categonzed as havmg an inherently destructive" effect. Id. at 796. 
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sity-essentially, that there were no alternative methods of continuing its 
operations and protecting its business. 339 Another proposal would make it 
a ULP for an employer to hire permanent replacements unless it could sat­
isfy the burden of proving that it could not hire a sufficient quantity and 
quality of temporary replacements.340 These proposals are similar, but the 
first type is more stringent from the employer's perspective; it defines "al­
ternatives" more broadly than the second and thus narrows the circum­
stances under which an employer may hire permanent replacements. 
One criticism of these proposals is that they add to the already vague 
and difficult inquiries used to determine the type of strike and correspond­
ing reinstatement rights of the strikers.341 Employers know only too well 
that Board doctrine changes-and perhaps more importantly, Board mem­
bership changes-over time.342 Because of the time delay between the fil­
ing of a ULP charge and a final decision by the Board, 343 an employer that 
made offers of permanent status to replacements, believing that it could 
satisfy the business necessity test as applied by the Board at that time, may 
find its chances diminished by the time the B oard decides the case. 344 If the · 
employer's prediction is incorrect, it must pay potentially large sums of 
back pay and �ther make-whole relief. 345 
My principal objection to this type of proposal is that it relieves no 
uncertainty regarding the rights of the parties at the critical moment-when 
the employer either declares that it will hire permanent replacements or 
actually begins doing so. Indeed, as other commentators have suggested,346 
this type of proposal adds one more uncertainty: employer, employees, 
union, and replacements must guess not only how the Board will character­
ize the strike, but also whether the Board will find that the employer has 
satisfied the business necessity test. What is needed in this area of the law 
is more certainty, not less. 
339. Id. The proposal would not impose the full force of the Great Dane Trailers test on an 
employer hiring permanent replacements, in that the Board would not be free to impose liability 
even if the employer succeeded in proving business necessity. Id. 
340. McDonald, supra note 16, at 992; Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 682-83. 
341. Westfall, supra note 1 2, at 147-48 (contending that a business necessity test would raise a 
"host of factual issues" and expose employers to potentially huge liability); Zifchak, supra note 
86, at 65 (arguing that a business necessity test would impose another level of litigation). But see 
Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 684-85 (arguing that Westfall overstates the complexity of the 
inquiry and ignores that a similar inquiry is currently required in the context of sympathy strikes). 
For discussion of the difficult inquiries under the current state of the law regarding classification 
of the type of strike, see supra text accompanying notes 289-301 .  
342. Westfall, supra note 12, at 148. 
343. Zifchak, supra note 86, at 65-66; see also supra note 92. 
344. Westfall, supra note 12, at 148. 
345. See supra notes 1 83-93 and accompanying text. 
346. See supra note 341.  
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B. Proposals That Would Prohibit an Employer from Hiring Permanent 
Replacements if the Union Agrees to Submit the Parties ' 
Bargaining Differences to Fact Finding 
Senator Packwood's substitute amendment to S .  55, which was intro­
duced in 1992 after the bill banning the hiring of permanent replacements 
failed on a first cloture vote, prohibited an employer from hiring permanent 
347 
. h h'b' . replacements under specific circumstances. To activate t e pro i itlon, a 
union, seven days before striking, would be required to notify both the Fed­
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service and the employer that it agrees to 
the formation of a three-member fact-finding panel.348 If the employer did 
not agree to formation of the panel, the union would be permitted to strike, 
and the employer would be prohibited from hiring permanent replacements. 
If the employer agreed to formation of the panel, the collective bargaining 
agreement would remain in force and the status quo (including no strike and 
no hiring of permanent replacements) would be maintained for forty-five 
days, while the panel met to conduct fact finding and recommend resolu­
tions of disputes between the parties. If the union accepted the panel's  rec­
ommendations and the employer rejected them, the union could strike and 
the employer would be prohibited from hiring permanent replacements. If 
neither party agreed or only the employer agreed to accept the panel's  rec­
ommendations, then the employer would be allowed to hire permanent 
replacements. 349 
Labor leaders declared their support for the Packwood amendment 
before the second cloture vote in the Senate.350 Management representa-
347. 138  CONG. REc. S8056-89 (daily ed. June 1 1 , 1 992) (amendments 2047-94 submitted by 
Sen. Packwood); Statements and Summaries of Amendment to S. 55 by Sen. Bob Packwood and 
AFL-CJO President Lane Kirkland, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 14, at E- 1 (June 1 2, 1 992); Ray, 
supra note 74, at 370-7 1 .  Although Senator Packwood labeled the amendment a compromise on 
the striker replacement bill, John Irving and other members of a panel assembled by the Alliance 
to Keep Americans Working stated that the label was a misnomer, since no one in the business 
community was consulted. Business Representatives Oppose Packwood Amendment to Striker 
Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1 1 6, at A- 12  (June 1 6, 1992). 
348. The panel would consist of one member chosen by the union, one chosen by the em­
ployer, and one jointly chosen. 138 CONG. REC. S8057 (daily ed. June 1 1 , 1 992) (amendment 
2047 submitted by Sen. Packwood); Statements and Summaries of Amendment to S. 55 by Sen. 
Bob Packwood and AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, supra note 347, at E-1 .  
349. 138 CONG. REc. S8056-89 (daily ed. June 1 1 , 1 992) (amendments 2047-94 submitted by 
Sen. Packwood); Statements and Summaries of Amendment to S. 55 by Sen. Bob Packwood and 
AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, supra note 347; Ray, supra note 74, at 370-7 1 .  
350. Statements and Summaries of Amendment to S. 55 by Sen. Bob Packwood and AFL-CIO 
President La_ne Kirkland, supra note 347, at E-1 .  Although labor leaders supported the Packwood 
amend�ent m 1992, they may no� be w�lling to support such compromise legislation in the future. 
Addressmg the AFL-CIO Industrial Umon Department's nineteenth constitutional convention In­
ternation�l Brot�erhood of Teamsters President Ron Carey said his union would reject any �uch 
compromise. Kirkland lauds Clinton on Issues Vital to labor, But Rejects NAFTA, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at A- 1 1  (Mar. 25, 1993). Carey described the Packwood amendment as 
1 994] PERMANENT STRIKER REPLACEMENTS 879 
tives, in contrast, announced their opposition to the Packwood amendment 
for a couple of reasons.351 First, the proposal would reduce the incentive 
for the parties to work hard at collective bargaining and to reach agreement, 
knowing that the panel eventually would resolve the dispute. 352 Second, 
the Packwood proposal would undermine the principle that la­
bor-management disputes should be settled by the parties to the dispute. 353 
Management' s first objection may be an accurate prediction of the ef­
fect of the proposed law. The concern is that the parties would become 
overdependent on the fact-finding process to resolve their disputes.354 Evi­
dence concerning this "narcotic effect" of fact finding suggests that, over 
time, parties do rely more on the fact-finding process rather than settling 
their own disputes. 355 An additional reason that fact finding might detract 
from constructive collective bargaining between the parties-resulting in 
overuse of the procedure-is described as the "chilling effect" of fact find­
ing; parties may become wary of making their best offers in negotiations 
prior to third-party intervention because they believe that the third party 
will recommend a resolution between the stated positions of the parties. 356 
Regardless of whether the intervention of third-party fact finders 
would have the foregoing effects on collective bargaining, management's 
second rationale for opposing the Packwood proposal is stronger. Adjust­
ment of the Mackay doctrine does not require infringement upon a basic 
"tak[ing] the right to strike and put[ting] the faith of the members in the hands of government." 
Id. UAW Secretary-Treasurer Bill Casstevens echoed Carey's opposition days later while ad­
dressing the same convention, saying Democrats made "a mistake" supporting the amendment in 
1992. Unions See Striker Replacement Bill as Beginning of Wider Labor Law Reform, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 221 ,  at A-2 (Nov. 16, 1992). Casstevens said the labor movement should make it 
clear that it will accept nothing less in the 1 03d Congress than an absolute ban on the hiring of 
permanent replacements. Id. 
351 .  Business Representatives Oppose Packwood Amendment to Striker Bill, supra note 347. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. 
354. A variation on the Packwood proposal seeks to give the parties incentive to reach an 
agreement themselves, rather than relying on third-party intervention. Roukis & Farid, supra note 
85, at 89-90. That proposal would require the parties to submit their unresolved issues to advisory 
arbitration when a strike or lockout occurred. Id. at 89. The incentive to avoid resort to arbitra­
tion is that mild monetary sanctions would be levied against the parties at the commencement of 
the hearings-a portion of the employees' wages and the employer's profits or cash flow. Id. at 
90. The funds would be placed in an interest-earning account and returned if the parties reached 
an agreement. Id. If the parties did not reach an agreement as a result of the hearings, they could 
resort to self help (strike and permanent replacement), but a portion of the trust fund would not be 
returned. Id. 
355. THOMAS A. KOCHAN & HARRY c. KATZ, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RE­
LATIONS 282 (2d ed. 1988). 
356. Id. at 280. 
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tenet of collective bargaining.357 Although the ;ackw
ood ame?dme�t 
would not require the parties to accept the panel s recomm
endations, it 
would create strong incentives to accept them. Such a law wo�
ld represent 
a movement toward writing the contract, or at least some of its terms, for 
the parties. 358 
C. Proposals That Would Prohibit an Employer from Hiring or 
Threatening to Hire Permanent Replacements During a 
"Cooling-Off" Period for the First Eight to Ten Weeks of 
a Strike 
Proposals to prohibit an employer from hiring or threatening to hire 
permanent replacements during a cooling-off period have enjoyed some 
support in both legislative359 and academic360 forums. Proponents of this 
type of proposal argue that the cooling-off period provides the employees 
with job security, while the parties attempt to reach an agreement pursuant 
to their duty to bargain in good faith. 361  Such a proposal does not go far 
enough, however, to alleviate the risks to the parties, and indeed may not 
have any effect on many strike-and-replacement situations. In many strike 
situations, employers do not resort to permanent replacements until the 
strike has lasted for a few months. Consider, for example, the 
357. Cf YAGER, supra note 1 1 , at 141-43 (arguing that third-party resolution of disputes is 
inconsistent with an underlying premise of collective bargaining). The bargaining obligation im­
posed on the parties by the NLRA is stated as follows: 
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer 
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but 
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) ( 1 988) (emphasis added). 
358. The Supreme Court has held that the Board does not have the power to order that a party 
agree to a term in a collective bargaining agreement. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 
108 (1970). A proposal like the Packwood amendment would give a party outside the collective 
bargaining process considerable input in writing terms of the contract for the parties. 
359. H.R. 4552, introduced by Representative Joseph Brennan in 1988, would have prohibited 
employers from hiring permanent replacements for the first ten weeks of a strike. H.R. 4552, 
lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1988). In the l 03d Congress, the ten-week prohibition was included in a 
proposal by Representative Tom Ridge as a substitute amendment to H.R. 5 in June 1 993. 139 
CONG. REc . H3560 (daily ed. June 1 5 ,  1993); House Approves Bill That Would Ban Permanent 
Replacement of Economic Strik�rs, supra note 79. The House defeated the proposed amendment. 
139 �ONG. R�c. H3567�68 (daily ed. June 15, 1993). In the l 02d Congress, an eight-week ban 
was mcluded m a substitute amendment to H.R. 5 introduced by Representative Goodling. 1 37 
CoNG. REc. H5565 (daily ed. July 1 7, 1 991). 
360. Ray, supra note 74, at 399-400. 
�61 . Id. at 400; House Panel Considers Bill to Limit Right to Permanently Replace Strikers, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 136, at A-8 (July 15, 1 988). 
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UAW-Caterpillar dispute, during which Caterpillar did not announce its de­
cision to hire permanent replacements until the strike had lasted more than 
five months. The cooling-off period would not appear to have much effect 
on such situations. If an employer weathers the designated period, this pro­
posal leaves it free to hire permanent replacements. 362 
The cooling-off period may have negative effects other than mere inef­
fectiveness. First, there is a substantial chance that either or both of the 
parties will abuse the cooling-off period. An employer may bargain during 
that period without attempting to reach an agreement because, in the end, it 
can still threaten, and perhaps implement, permanent replacement. Second, 
when agreements are not achieved during that period, unions may file a 
greater number of section 8(a)(5) ULP charges, alleging that the employer 
engaged in surface bargaining or otherwise failed to bargain in good faith. 
Thus, unions may use the cooling-off period as a shield to protect the rein­
statement rights of employees363 and as a sword to gain bargaining 
leverage. 364 
The parties may reach an agreement during the cooling-off period, and 
they may not. If not, the employer still may declare that it will hire perma­
nent replacements, and the union may respond by filing ULP charges and 
arguing that the strike is a ULP strike. Then the parties are back in the 
same position as they would be under current law, with no one-not the 
employer, the union, the striking employees, or potential replacements­
knowing at that crucial time whether the law allows the employer to hire 
permanent replacements. 
362. YAGER, supra note 1 1 ,  at 140 (arguing that employers would simply begin hiring perma­
nent replacements with the same consequences to strikers as now exist under Mackay). Yager 
also argues that the cooling-off period would seriously harm many businesses because temporary 
replacements cannot be hired in most situations. Id. at 139-41. Although there undoubtedly are 
businesses for which that is true (Yager gives as examples businesses that have particular times of 
the year during which they conduct a disproportionate percentage of their annual business, such as 
ski resorts and department stores), the problem is overstated. For further discussion of this issue, 
see infra Part Vl.B.3. 
363. Cf An.ESON, supra note 103, at 28 n.29 ("Many 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain cases . . .  are 
fought to protect the status of replaced strikers rather than for the often minimal vindicatory value 
of a cease-and-desist order."). 
364. Similarly, it has been suggested that unions increasingly have used infonnation requests 
as a basis for unfair labor practices charges and for establishing the characterization of strikes as 
ULP strikes. Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., Recent Developments at the National Labor Relations Board, 
22 STETSON L. REv. 1 15, 121  (1992). 
Id. 
As it has become more difficult for unions to mount a successful economic strike, un­
ions have turned to other forms of gaining bargaining leverage. One of these is to make 
extensive information requests that, if not satisfied by the employer, result in the union's 
filing unfair labor practice charges. Thus, the infonnation request is not only a means of 
understanding the other side's bargaining position and ferreting out all its nuances, but 
is increasingly becoming a tactical weapon . . . .  
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It is certainly possible that constructive barg�ining and. a significai_it number of agreements would result from the coohng-off �nod. But this 
type of proposal invites opportunistic be�av�or ?Y the parties .and do�s not provide a means for the parties to asc�rtam,
_ 
m time, the one piece of m
�or­
mation they need-the type of strike m which the employees are engagmg 
and the corresponding reinstatement rights of the strikers and replacement 
rights of the employer. 
D. Proposals for Expedited Hearings and Board Decisions When an 
Employer Hires Permanent Replacements or When There Is a 
Strike 
One legislative proposal and at least one academic proposal call for 
expedited decisions when an employer hires permanent replacements or 
when there is a strike. Senator Durenberger introduced the Justice for Per­
manently Displaced Striking Workers Act of 1993365 ("Justice Act") in the 
Senate on March 17. 366 Although the bill does not expressly purport to be a 
compromise on the permanent replacement issue, it offers some possibility 
for reaching a compromise. The bill proposes amending the NLRA to re­
quire expedited ULP proceedings when "a collective bargaining agreement 
has expired and a person alleges that a party to a collective bargaining 
agreement has failed to negotiate in good faith as required by the Act, and 
where permanent replacements have been hired."367 The Justice Act pro­
poses expedited proceedings under the foregoing circumstances. First, an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) has sixty days from the issuance of a com­
plaint within which to hold a hearing; the ALJ then has sixty days from the 
conclusion of the hearing within which to render a decision. 368 At that 
point, the parties have thirty days to file exceptions and briefs with the 
Board, and the opposing parties have fifteen days to file responsive 
briefs.369 Finally, the Board has ninety days from the filing of briefs to 
render a decision and an additional thirty days if oral argument is 
granted. 370 The parties may mutually agree to extensions of these time 
periods. 371 
Th� Justice Act is important, regardless of the practicability of its 
mechamcs or the sufficiency of its attempt to address the risks created by 
the permanent replacement of strikers. It recognizes and seeks to address 
365. 
366. 
367. 
368. 
369. 
370. 
371 .  
8 .  598, l 03d Cong., lst 8ess. (1993). 
1 39 CoNG. REc. 83044-46 (daily ed. Mar. 17,  1993). 
8. 598, l03d Cong., lst 8ess., § 3(a)(2), 139 CoNG. REc. 83046 ( 1993) Id. § 3(b)(I ), 1 39 CONG. REC. at 83046. 
. 
Id. § 3(b)(2), 1 39 CONG. REC. at 83046. 
Id. § 3(b)(3), 1 39 CONG. REC. at 83046. 
Id. § 3(b)(4), 1 39 CONG. REC. at 83046. 
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the critical problem-that delay in the adjudication of ULP charges renders 
the current system ineffective.372 Others have sounded the message that 
delay in enforcement of the NLRA results in ineffective remedies and en­
courages disregard for the law.373 The Justice Act purports, by speeding up 
the determination of the strike's characterization, to benefit both perma­
nently replaced strikers and employers who have hired permanent replace­
ments: striking employees get reinstatement and make-whole relief and the 
employer avoids further accrual of back pay liability if the strike is a ULP 
strike. This is a laudable objective, but the Justice Act does not fully ad­
dress the problems raised by permanent replacement. 
A principal defect of the proposal, from the perspective of adjusting 
the Mackay doctrine, is that it leaves the threat of permanent replacement in 
the hands of employers as a strike-breaking weapon. What effect would the 
Justice Act have had on the UAW-Caterpillar dispute? When Caterpillar 
issued its ultimatum that it would hire permanent replacements if the strik­
ers did not return to work, would the act have enabled the UAW to maintain 
the strike? That seems unlikely. The UAW could have told its striking 
members that it considered the strike a ULP strike, and if the Board agreed, 
under the Justice Act, the employees would get their jobs back and receive 
back pay more quickly. Would the employees have been willing to stay on 
strike under those conditions? Probably not. Thus, the threat of permanent 
replacement would still serve as the trump card to break a strike because the 
employees risking their jobs would not know their reinstatement rights at 
the critical moment. 
A second proposal that calls for expedited ULP proceedings involves 
amending section 10(1)374 to require priority investigation of charges alleg­
ing certain ULPs when either a strike is in progress or a union has given 
formal authorization for a strike. 375 Under the proposed amendment, a field 
examiner would conduct an investigation when such a charge is filed, and if 
the Board found reasonable cause to believe that a "flagrant'' ULP had oc­
curred, it would petition a federal court for temporary injunctive relief, as 
currently mandated by section 10(1) for certain alleged union ULPs.376 If 
372. 139 CoNG. REc. S3045 (statement of Senator Durenberger asserting that NLRB takes too 
long to vindicate rights of ULP strikers). 
373. E.g., Zifchak, supra note 86, at 69; Charles J. Morris, Renaissance at the NLRB-Oppor­
tunity and Prospect for Non-Legislative Procedural Reform at the Labor Board, 23 STETSON L. 
REv. IOI ,  107 ( 1 993) (asserting that delay renders the Board a "paper tiger" in the view of 
employers). 
374. 29 u.s.c. § 160(1) (1988). 
375. Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike, supra note 85, at 1007- 1 1 . 
376. Id. at 1009. Section 10(1) currently requires an officer or regional attorney to petition for 
"appropriate injunctive relief' pending final adjudication by the Board if, after the investigation, 
the agent has reasonable cause to believe that one of the following ULPs has been committed by a 
union: secondary activity violating § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) ( 1988); hot cargo agreements 
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an injunction against the employer' s conduct were obtain�, the employees 
still would strike at their own risk with none of the protections accorded to 
ULP strikers, since the Board would give priority to its final determina­
tion. 377 If the Board did not find reasonable cause to believe a flagrant 
ULP had been committed, then, the proposal suggests, the employees 
"might be accorded the safeguards presently accruing to unfair labor prac-
tice strikers."378 
The foregoing proposal is significant for its combination of expedited 
proceedings with resort to some type of prohibition of the employer' s un­
lawful activities. Nonetheless, it poses several problems. The principal 
problem is the set of conditions triggering both the expedited proceedings 
and the Board's efforts to obtain an injunction. The trigger is  a strike situa­
tion when a flagrant ULP has been alleged. Rather than tolerating the 
now-existing uncertainty regarding reinstatement rights, unions presumably 
would invoke this procedure any time they wished to strike and reasonably 
could claim that a "flagrant" ULP had occurred. Although the proponent of 
this proposal acknowledges that it could involve considerable cost,379 it is 
more accurate to predict that the cost would be prohibitive because unions 
would be well advised to make use of the expedited proceedings whenever 
they could do so. The second problem with this proposal is that unions 
would strongly oppose the subjection of employees to permanent replace­
ment if they struck after the Board determined that there was probable 
cause to believe that the employer had committed a flagrant ULP. It would 
be naive to suggest that most ULP strikes are conducted for the sole pur­
pose of protesting the employer' s ULPs, and that a strike would not be 
needed under this proposal because the B oard would expeditiously resolve 
the ULP charge. The overwhelming majority of strikes also have economic 
motivations,380 and the employees and union derive added bargaining lever­
age if the superior reinstatement rights of ULP strikers provide the strikers 
with some measure of job security. Yet another problem with this proposal 
is that employers would be equally dismayed with it because, if the Board 
concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe that a flagrant ULP 
had been committed, the employees would be protected as ULP strikers if 
they chose to strike. Notwithstanding these problems, this proposal sug­
gests a couple of features that should be included in an adjustment of Mac-
violating § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988); or recognitional picketing violating § 8(b)(7) 29 
U.S.C. § l 58(b)(7) ( 1 988). 
' 
377. Note, The Unfair Labor Practice Strike, supra note 85, at 1010. 
378. Id. 
379. Id. 
�80. E.g., Stewart, supra note 1 ,  at 1326 ("[A] ll strikes emerge from economic strife between umon �nd employer, and every strike is designed to make the employer give what he would not otherwise concede."). 
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kay: expedited proceedings and a prohibition of permanent replacement 
until the characterization of the strike is determined. 
Although he does not propose a legislative amendment limiting Mac­
kay, one commentator offers another alternative involving expedited pro­
ceedings. He suggests that the Board, using its discretionary power to seek 
injunctions under section 10(j)381 of the Act, could have employers en­
joined from hiring permanent replacements after a complaint is issued when 
an employer has engaged in flagrant bad faith bargaining to provoke a 
strike. 382 This suggestion offers a way to curb abuse of the permanent re­
placement device without amending the NLRA. Although not referring to 
the prevention of the hiring of permanent replacements, another commenta­
tor recently encouraged the Board to expand its use of this "powerful instru­
ment" to assure that delays in ULP proceedings do not frustrate the 
purposes of the Act. 383 
There are several problems, however, with relying on increased resort 
to section lO(j) injunctions to address the problems of permanent replace­
ment. First, seeking injunctive relief under section IO(j) is discretionary. 
The regional director must obtain the B oard's  approval to petition for lOG) 
injunctive relief. 384 Thus, policies regarding use of l O(j) injunctions to pro­
hibit hiring of permanent replacements might vary among the regions and 
over time, depending on the composition of the Board. Second, the federal 
courts apply various standards to petitions for 100) injunctions,385 so results 
may differ among the districts and circuits. Third, because hiring perma­
nent replacements is not itself a ULP under current law, courts might not 
consistently enjoin such conduct. There should be consistent treatment of 
all labor disputes involving permanent replacement or the threat of perma­
nent replacement. Reliance on section l O(j) injunctions would not provide 
that consistency. 
381. 29 U.S.C. § 1 60(j) ( 1988). As discussed below, petitioning for a § IO(j) injunction is 
within the Board's discretion, whereas petitioning for a § 10(1) injunction is mandatory if there is 
good cause to believe a union has committed one of the ULPs enumerated in § 10(1). See infra 
note 384. Also, whereas § 1 0(1) injunctions are limited to certain ULPs by labor organizations, 
see supra note 376, § IO(j) injunctions can be sought to enjoin any type of ULP. 
382. Zifchak, supra note 86, at 69-72. William Zifchak suggests that the increased use of 
§ lOG) should be directed not only against employers; he recommends that the Board should seek 
§ lOG) injunctive relief against a union engaging in flagrant bad faith bargaining involving "threat 
of a strike to extort concessions." Id. at 70. 
383. Morris, supra note 373, at 1 15-23. In the article, Professor Morris develops procedural 
reforms discussed in his earlier work, Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House-Can an 
Old Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 ( 1987) [hereinafter Morris, The NLRB in 
the Dog House]. 
384. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1988) (''The Board shall have power . . .  to petition any 
United States district court . . . .  " ) with id. § 1 60(1) ("{T]he officer or regional attorney . . .  shall, 
on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court . . . .  "). 
385. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1 817-2 1 .  
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The permanent replacement of strikers under Mackay s��uld be re­
stricted. Employers should not be prohibited, however, from h1r_
mg perma­
nent replacements under all circumstances. The proposal descnbed below 
attempts to confine Mackay in practice to its current theoretical parame-
ters-economic strikes. 
A. The Proposal 
The principal tenets of this proposal are twofold. First, employers 
should not be permitted to hire permanent replacements until the characteri­
zation of the strike and the corresponding reinstatement rights of the strikers 
have been determined, thereby reducing the uncertainty under which em­
ployers, employees, unions, and potential replacements must act. Second, 
this determination should be made expeditiously so as to deprive the em­
ployer of the permanent replacement option for the shortest possible time, 
thus minimizing the risk of injury to its business and facilitating speedy 
resolution of the labor dispute. To implement these two principles, this 
proposal recommends both a temporary or interim ban on the hiring of per­
manent replacements until it is determined that the strike is an economic 
strike and expedited ULP proceedings. In addition, the NLRA should be 
amended to make it a ULP for an employer to hire permanent replacements 
before such a determination is made. 386 As the following paragraphs 
demonstrate, there is a tension between the objectives of reducing uncer­
tainty and determining the characterization of the strike expeditiously. To 
achieve absolute certainty regarding the strikers' reinstatement rights, the 
proposal would have to forsake any expeditious determination; conversely, 
the earlier the determination occurs in the sequence of proceedings, the less 
certain are the parties that the final decision will reach the same conclusion. 
This proposal chooses among alternative approaches, at several stages, 
which best accommodate these objectives. 
1 .  Triggering the Interim B an 
Under this proposal, an employer would be required to notify the 
Board that it intends to hire permanent replacements. If the union contends 
386. It is not necessary to amend the Act to make premature threats to hire permanent replace­
�ents a ULP. Threats �y an employer to engage in unlawful conduct, such as discriminatory 
d1�charges and plant closmgs for the purpose of "chilling" organizing efforts, are considered vio­
lahons. of .§ 8(a)(I ). See, e.g., l THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 44, at 108-15. The potential m terrorem effect of threats to hire permanent replacements could be reduced if the 
�o�rd. w_ould promulgate a rule requiring all employers and labor organizations under the Board's JUns�1ct1on to post notices with a general description of rights and obligations under the Act. See 
Moms, supra note 373, app., at 134 (letter from Professor Thomas C. Kohler). 
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that the strike is a ULP strike, the employer' s notification would trigger the 
interim ban. If the union or the employees have filed ULP charges before 
the employer' s  notification and contend that the strike is a ULP strike, the 
ban would become effective upon the employer's notification to the Board. 
The union and employees would have a short period of time after the em­
ployer's notification to file ULP charges and notify the Board that they 
consider the strike a ULP strike. 387 Requiring the employer to notify the 
Board and using that as the trigger for the ban eliminates the possibility of 
(lawful) unannounced hirings. Of course, employers might hire permanent 
replacements without notifying the Board in violation of the law. Such un­
lawful conduct could be addressed through the Board's use of section IO(j) 
petitions for injunctions. Because petitioning for an injunction under sec­
tion 100) is discretionary, however, the better approach would be to amend 
section 10(1) to include the premature hiring of permanent replacements as a 
ULP that requires the regional office to petition for an injunction. 388 
An alternative approach would make the union' s announcement of its 
intention to strike the trigger mechanism, but this approach is unsatisfactory 
for several reasons. First, it is more efficient and economical to place the 
trigger mechanism in the employer' s  hands because threats of strikes and 
actual strikes occur more often than threats of permanent replacement and 
actual hiring of permanent replacements. In most strikes, the employer will 
never threaten to hire replacements, so it would be overkill to invoke the 
interim ban and expedited proceedings each time a strike is called. Second, 
the employees are not in immediate danger of permanent replacement (if, as 
under this proposal, the employer is required to notify the Board of its in­
tention to hire permanent replacements) at the beginning of a strike, and 
thus do not need to know their reinstatement rights at the inception of every 
strike. Finally, knowing that it will give up the valued option to hire perma­
nent replacements and the concomitant bargaining leverage-at least during 
the interim ban and perhaps beyond-an employer will be reluctant to in-
387. Although allowing the filing of charges to trigger the interim ban on hiring permanent 
replacements after the employer's notification may encourage spurious charges, the alternative of 
not allowing a short time for post-notification filing presents a greater problem. If no 
post-notification filing could trigger the interim ban, the employer might file the notification early 
in the strike, before the union filed ULP charges, thus avoiding the ban and expedited 
proceedings. 
Additionally, unions and employees should be precluded from relying on any pre-notification 
conduct of the employer as a cause of a ULP strike if they fail to file a charge regarding that 
conduct either before the employer's notification or during the period allowed for post-notification 
filing. Cf Stewart, supra note 1 ,  at 1 330-31 (arguing that the Board should refuse to apply the 
conversion doctrine if an employer asks a union why it is striking and the union refuses to declare 
its reason). If the law were otherwise, the proposal would do little to reduce an employer's uncer­
tainty regarding its right to hire permanent replacements. 
388. For discussion of ULPs to which § 10(1) injunctions are applicable, see supra note 376. 
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voke these procedures if it can operate by other means during a strike. 
Thus, the interim ban on hiring permanent replacements and the expedited 
ULP proceedings should be triggered by an employer' s  notification to the 
Board that it intends to hire permanent replacements rather than by a 
union's announcement of a strike. 
2. Lifting or Extending the Interim Ban 
The interim ban should be accompanied by legislatively mandated ex­
pedited ULP proceedings.389 Furthermore, the ban should be lifted or ex­
tended depending on the determination of the type of strike. This aspect of 
the proposal raises a question: Which determination in the proceedings re­
sults in a lifting or extension of the ban? Before addressing that issue, a 
thumbnail sketch of the relevant ULP proceedings is necessary. 390 
When a ULP charge is filed with a regional office of the NLRB, a 
Board agent conducts an investigation to determine whether a charge has 
merit and a complaint should be issued. 391 If the investigation reveals that 
the charge is without merit, the regional director recommends that the 
charge be voluntarily withdrawn by the c harging party.392 If the charge is 
not withdrawn by the charging party, the regional director dismisses the 
charge.393 If, on the other hand, the investigation reveals that a charge has 
merit, the regional office generally attempts to give the parties an opportu­
nity to submit evidence, arguments, and offers of settlement, in an effort to 
resolve the case without issuing a complaint. 394 If a case is not settled, the 
389. For discussion of the timetable for proceedings, see infra Part Vl.A.3. 
390. For a more extensive treatment of ULP proceedings, see JEFFREY A. NORRIS & MICHAEL 
J. SHERSHIN, JR., How TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NLRB pt. 3 (6th ed. 1 992). 
391 .  NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1 0 1 .4 ( 1 993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra 
note 390, § 12.10. A major component of an investigation is the Board agents' interviews with 
parties and witnesses. 1 NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEED­
INGS «JI 10056 (1989) [hereinafter NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL]. For an insightful discussion 
of the investigation, see Matthew M. Franckiewicz, How to Win NLRB Cases: Tips from a For­
mer Insider, 44 LAB. L.J. 40 passim (1993). 
392. NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1 0 1 .5 ( 1 993); NORRIS & SHERSHlN, supra 
note 390, § 12. 1 1 .  
393. NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1 0 1 .6 ( 1 993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra 
note 390, § 12.12. The charging party may appeal this decision to the General Counsel. NLRB 
Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § !01.6 ( 1 993). 
394. NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1 0 1 .7 ( 1 993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra 
note 390, ch. 14; 1 NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 39 1, 1 10126.2 (detailing steps 
that should be taken to reach settlement after determination is made to issue complaint and recog­
nizing that experience has shown this is "critical and fruitful" stage for settlement). Although the 
ultimate decision on issuance of a complaint or dismissal of a charge rests with the regional 
director, the parties are first advised of the investigating agent's recommendation to the regional 
director. Franckiewicz, supra note 391, at 43. The agent ' s  supervisor authorizes the agent to 
communicate to the parties the recommendation that will be made to the regional director. Id. If 
the agent is not successful in obtaining a withdrawal or settlement, the case is "agendaed" and 
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regional director, on behalf of the General Counsel, issues a complaint and 
serves it on the parties. 395 The respondent has fourteen days from service 
of the complaint to file an answer.396 An ALJ then conducts a hearing and 
renders a decision. 397 If the ALJ renders a decision adverse to the party 
against whom the complaint was issued, that party may voluntarily comply 
with the decision. 398 Parties may file exceptions (and cross-exceptions) to 
the decision of the ALJ and supporting briefs with the NLRB; parties may 
also file briefs in support of the ALJ's decision, as well as reply briefs.399 
If exceptions are not filed within the time allowed, the decision of the ALJ 
becomes the decision of the Board. 400 
In cases in which exceptions are filed, the Board typically delegates 
decision-making authority to three-member panels as authorized by stat­
ute,401 although the full five-member B oard may review cases that establish 
or change policy.402 The Board, in deciding a case, may adopt, reject, or 
modify the findings and conclusions in an ALJ's decision.403 Board orders 
are not self-enforcing; hence, the Board may petition to have its order en­
forced by an appropriate United States Court of Appeals.404 A party ag­
grieved by a Board order also may petition an appropriate court of appeals 
for review of the order.405 Finally, decisions of the courts of appeals either 
enforcing Board orders or denying enforcement are subject to review by the 
Supreme Court upon certification or the granting of a writ of certiorari.406 
Considering the framework of ULP proceedings, at what stage of the 
proceedings should a decision be made to lift or extend the interim ban on 
the hiring of permanent replacements under this proposal? To eliminate 
wholly the parties' uncertainty regarding the characterization of the strike 
and the strikers' reinstatement rights, one would propose that the ban 
reviewed by the regional committee. Id. The regional director may or may not attend the agenda; 
regardless, the case must be reviewed with the regional director before he issues a complaint or 
dismisses the case. Id. 
395. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra 
note 390, at 379. 
396. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.20 (1993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra 
note 390, § 15.6. 
397. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.34-.45 (1993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, 
supra note 390, § §  16. 1 -.21.  
398. NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra note 390, § 1 7  .2. 
399. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.46 (1993); NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra 
note 390, §§ 17.4-.8. 
400. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(a) (1993); NoRRIS & SHERSHIN, supra 
note 390, § 17 .2. 
401. 29 u.s.c. § 1 53(b) (1988). 
402. NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra note 390, § 17 .10. 
403. Id. § 17. 1 1 .  
404. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988). 
405. Id. § 160(f). 
406. Id. § 160(e). 
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should continue until the last tribunal to consider the case has rendered a 
decision. However, such a proposal would abandon the goal of a speedy 
detennination for lifting or extending the ban. Furthermore, there probably 
is not a meaningful distinction between a long interim ban and an absolute 
prohibition on hiring permanent replacements. For some employers, such a 
long ban might damage the business severely. Furthermore, some employ­
ers might abandon reasonable bargaining positions rather than attempt to 
endure such a long ban. Consequently, this proposal strikes a balance be­
tween the competing objectives of speed and certainty. Under this propo­
sal, the continuation of the ban would be determined at each of the 
following stages: the regional director' s decision w hether to issue a com­
plaint; the ALJ's decision; and the Board's decision. Additionally, if the 
detennination is made to lift the ban at any stage of the proceedings, the 
striking employees should be given a short period of time-no longer than a 
week-in which to make offers to return to work before the ban is lifted. 
The recommendation that the Board's decision be detenninative of the ban 
is unremarkable; however, the recommendation that the two earlier stages 
also be treated as determinative merits discussion. 
Initially, if the regional director does not issue a complaint alleging a 
ULP strike,407 the interim ban should be lifted; conversely, if the regional 
director does issue such a complaint, the ban should be extended. One 
might argue that the ban should not be lifted at this stage because a regional 
director' s decision not to issue a complaint can be appealed to the General 
Counsel.408 Thus, if an appeal is filed, an alternative approach would be to 
extend the ban, notwithstanding the regional director ' s  dismissal of the 
charge, until the General Counsel ' s  office decides the appeal. That alterna­
tive should be rejected because it could result in extension of the interim 
ban for a couple of months or more.409 In the attempt to balance adequately 
the goals of certainty and expeditious determination, this issue should be 
resolved in favor of speed because little is lost in certainty. The General 
407. In cases involving a strike and the filing of a ULP charge alleging a ULP strike, the 
General Counsel is to "plead [in the complaint] and litigate the nature of the strike in addition to 
the primary unfair labor practice issue." 1 NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 391,  CJ[ 
10266. 1 .  The General Counsel also must seek a Board order requiring reinstatement of strikers if 
the complaint alleges that the strike began as, or was converted to, a ULP strike. Id. The com­
plaint must contain specific details regarding the acts causing the ULP strike. Id. 
408. NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 101 .6 (1993). 
409. 1:he foll�wing time allowances under the appeal procedure indicate how long an appeal 
may remam pending: from service of notice of a regional director's decision not to issue a com­
plaint, a charging party has 14 days to file an appeal, NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. 
§ l02.1 9�a) ( 1 993); extensions m�y be granted for filing appeals, id.; oral argument may be 
granted, id.
_ 
§
_
102. 19(b); and a m_otton for reconsideration of the General Counsel's decision may 
be ?led w1th1� 14 days of service of the decision, id. § l02.19(c). In addition to these time 
pen
_
o?s, there is the time from the filing of an appeal to the General Counsel's renderin of 
dec1s1on. 
g a 
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Counsel reverses the regional directors' decisions not to issue complaints in 
only a small percentage of cases, so an appeal should not result in an exten­
sion of the ban.410 
If the regional director issues a complaint alleging a ULP strike and 
the interim ban is  extended, few cases would advance to hearings before 
ALJs because most would settle.41 1  In those cases that did proceed, if the 
ALJ determines that the strike is an economic strike the ban should be 
lifted; conversely, if the ALJ determines that the strike is- a ULP strike, the 
interim ban should be extended until the Board renders a decision. One 
might argue that the ban should not be lifted at this stage because the Board 
may reverse the ALJ' s decision as to the characterization of the strike. An 
alternative approach would be to extend the ban at this stage, even when the 
ALJ finds the strike is economic, if the General Counsel files exceptions to 
the ALJ's decision. Again, this alternative should be rejected because it 
does not represent a proper balancing of the objectives of certainty and 
expeditious determination. First, the delay occasioned by extending the ban 
until the Board' s decision would be substantial, effectively rendering the 
interim ban permanent.412 Even if the Board were required to comply with 
the timetable proposed in the Justice for Permanently Displaced Striking 
410. In fiscal year 1991,  the General Counsel's Office of Appeals decided 3,648 appeals and 
reversed only 3.5% of the cases. NLR.B General Counsel's Summary of Fiscal Year 1991 Opera­
tions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 189, at D-1 (Sept. 29, 1992). The reversal rate in fiscal year 
1 990 was 2%. Id. 
411 .  Statistics compiled by the General Counsel establish that the issuance of a complaint, 
which occurs in only a small percentage of meritorious cases, is a very reliable indicator that an 
employer will be found to have committed a ULP. Regional directors determined that formal 
proceedings were warranted for only 36.1 % of the ULP cases in fiscal year 1 99 1  and only 35.4% 
of the cases in fiscal year 1990. NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Fiscal Year 1991 Opera­
tions, supra note 4 1 0. This percentage, called the "merit factor," has been between 3 1 % and 36% 
over the years. Id. Regional directors actuaIIy issue complaints in only a small percentage of 
cases in which they determine that the ULP charges are meritorious because most such cases 
settle. For example, in fiscal year 1991, 93.2% of the meritorious cases settled, and in fiscal year 
1990, 91.5% settled. Id. It is likely that even a higher percentage of cases would settle if the ban 
on hiring permanent replacements were extended based on issuance of a complaint. 
Arguably, employers should not have such pressure applied to them to settle cases before the 
formal hearings in front of ALJs. The General Counsel's success rate in cases before ALls and 
the Board suggests, however, that employers are well advised to settle cases in which complaints 
are issued. The General Counsel won "in whole or in part" 84.8% of the Board and AU decisions 
in fiscal year 1991,  and 83.4% in fiscal year 1990. Id. ; see also Franckiewicz,, supra note 391, at 
41 ("[W]hether a party wins or loses at the NLRB is essentiaily determined by whether or not the 
regional director decides to issue a complaint."). Moreover, a high percentage of the Board's 
decisions are enforced by the federal courts. The Appellate Court Branch of the General Counsel 
won, "in whole or in part," 86.5% of the cases decided by the Courts of Appeals in fiscal year 
1991 and 88.8% in fiscal year 1990. Id. 
412. For discussion of the delay from the time of the AU's decision to the Board's decision, 
see infra text accompanying note 424. 
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Workers Act,413 the interim ban could extend for a year or more from the 
filing of a ULP charge to the rendering of a decis�on by the
_ 
�oard.4 14 Sec­
ond the certainty of the parties regarding the ultimate dec1S1on would not 
be ;ubstantially diminished by making the ALJ' s decision determinative of 
the status of the interim ban. Decisions by ALJs are usually adopted by the 
Board or adopted with some modifications. Although an ALJ' s findin�s 
and recommendations are not binding on the Board, and the Board bases its 
findings of fact upon a de novo review of the entire record, it is rare for the 
Board to overrule credibility determinations by an ALJ who listened to the 
testimony and observed the witnesses.415 
Notwithstanding the possibility of reversal if a ban is lifted at the first 
stage or the second stage under this proposal, the affected parties will be in 
a better position to make decisions than they are under current law. At the 
first stage, if a regional director dismisses a ULP charge, the case is over 
unless the General Counsel reverses the regional director' s decision. The 
employer is permitted to hire permanent replacements, and the striking em­
ployees know that they must either return to work or risk not being rein­
stated immediately in their j obs. Alternatively, if the regional director 
issues a complaint, the employer continues to be prohibited from hiring 
permanent replacements, and the striking employees know that they do not 
risk losing their right to immediate reinstatement by continuing to strike. 
At the second stage, if the ALJ determines that the strike is an eco­
nomic strike, the employer is permitted to hire permanent replacements, and 
the strikers know that they must return to work or risk losing their jobs. 
The employer still faces the risk that, if it hires permanent replacements, the 
413.  S. 598, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1 993). For discussion of the bill, see supra notes 365-73 
and accompanying text. 
414. The timetable in the Justice Act is not inclusive of all periods in the proceedings, but 
§ 3(b) of the act does set forth the maximum periods for many of the stages. See supra notes 
368-7 1  and accompanying text. The sum of those maximum allowances is 285 days. The median 
time for issuance of complaints, a matter not regulated by the bill, was 46 days in 1991 and 45 
days in 1 990. NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Fiscal Year 1991 Operations, supra note 
410. Additionally, the Justice Act would not regulate the number of days for the hearing or the 
number of days the parties are allowed to submit post-hearing briefs to the AU. Thus, the time 
from the filing of a ULP charge to Board decision under the timetable in the Justice Act could be 
approximately one year. 
4 1 5. Standard Dry Wall Prods., 9 1  N.L.R.B. 544, 545 (1950), enforced, 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 
195 1) .  Anyone who reads many decisions of the NLRB becomes accustomed to seeing the fol­
lowing footnote: 
The �esponde�t h�s excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings. The Board's 
established pohcy 1s not to overrule an administrative law judge' s  credibility resolutions 
�nless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are 
m�orrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 1 88 F.2d 362 (3d 
Cir .
. 
195 1 ) . We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the 
findings. 
E.g., Gibson Greetings, Inc., 3 10 N.L.R.B. 1 286, 1286 n.2 (1993). 
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Board may reverse the ALJ and order the employer to reinstate the strikers 
and discharge replacements if necessary. For several reasons, however, that 
uncertainty should not seriously hinder an employer' s ability to choose a 
course of action. First, the chance that the Board will reverse the ALI' s 
determination is small. Second, because the employer will not have hired 
permanent replacements prior to this stage and the Board's  decision will be 
rendered according to a legislatively mandated expedited schedule, any 
make-whole relief ordered by the Board (if it reverses the ALJ) will be 
relatively small compared to such liabilities under current law. Third, the 
employer may not find it necessary to hire many, if any, permanent replace­
ments, because many strikers will return to work rather than risk losing 
their right to immediate reinstatement. Alternatively, if the ALJ determines 
that the strike is a ULP strike, the employer continues to be prohibited from 
hiring permanent replacements, and the employees can remain on strike 
without the fear of losing their jobs to replacements. 
Thus, determining the status of the interim ban when the regional di­
rector decides whether to issue a complaint, and, if the case proceeds, when 
the ALJ renders a decision, accomplishes the dual objectives of this propo­
sal. The foregoing approach reduces uncertainty and determines the status 
of the ban expeditiously. 
3 .  Expedited Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings 
An interim ban on the hiring of permanent replacements creates an 
increasingly greater risk of harm to the employer's business the longer it 
lasts. This proposal therefore requires expedited ULP proceedings at all 
stages. The timetable for the ULP proceedings should be as fast as practi­
cable without sacrificing the thoroughness and quality of the investigations, 
hearings, and decisions. In order to require such case handling, section 10 
of the Act should be amended to provide that no type of ULP case takes 
priority over cases involving a strike and an employer's  notification of its 
intent to hire permanent replacements.4 16 
Consideration of the time now required for a decision at each stage 
indicates the extent to which each should be expedited. At the first stage at 
which the interim ban could be lifted under this proposal, the regional of-
416. Under current law, ULP charges alleging union violations of §§ 8(b)(4)(A)-(C), 8(e), and 
8(b)(7) are given priority over other types of charges. 29 U.S.C. § 1 60(1) (1988). 
Strike-and-replacement cases should be accorded the same priority. At a minimum, the Act 
should be amended to give strike-and-replacement cases second priority under § lO(m), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 160(m) ( 1988). Section lO(m) currently gives § 8(a)(3) and § 8(b)(2) cases priority over other 
types of ULP cases, other than those listed in § 10(1). The proposed Justice for Permanently 
Displaced Striking Workers Act of 1993, S. 598, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1993), would amend 
§ lO(m) by adding § 8(a)(5) and § 8(b)(3) ULP charges. See 139 CONG. REc. S3044 (daily ed. 
Mar. 17, 1 993). 
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fices' recent record on handling charges, from filing of the charge through 
issuance of the complaint, does not seem to impose an onerous burden on 
employers. The median time for issuance of complaints in
. 
fisc�l ye� 199
.
1 
was forty-six days.417 Although this stage should be expedited if feasible, it 
is not the stage at which a substantial lapse of time occurs.418 
In contrast, the second stage at which the interim ban could be lifted, 
the rendering of the ALJ' s decision, must be expedited. In fiscal year 1990, 
the median time from filing of  a ULP charge to decision by an ALJ was 357 
days, including a median of 1 54 days from the issuance of a complaint to 
the close of a hearing and a median of 155 days from the close of a hearing 
to the issuance of an ALJ' s decision.419 One could argue that substantial 
delay at this stage is not as significant as it would be at the first stage; only 
a small percentage of ULP cases proceed to an ALJ decision, and a substan­
tial maj ority of those result in a finding that the employers committed 
ULPs.420 In short, because most ALJ decisions would not result in lifting 
of the interim ban, the long delay at the second stage is less important than 
the delay at the first stage. Those facts notwithstanding, some employers 
who would succeed in having the interim ban lifted as a result of an ALJ's 
decision could suffer severe harm to their businesses as a result of the ban 
lasting a year. 
The timetable for adjudication proposed in section 3(b) of the Justice 
Act provides some guidance for establishing constraints on the second stage 
in expedited proceedings: a maximum of sixty days from issuance of com­
plaint to hearing before an ALJ421 and a maximum of  sixty days from com­
pletion of hearing and submission of posthearing briefs to the ALJ' s 
decision. 422 Although these proposed time constraints would help expedite 
proceedings for the period from issuance of the complaint to an ALJ' s deci­
sion, even they should be tightened if practicable. 423 
417. NLRB General �oun�el's Summary of Fiscal Year 1991 Operations, supra note 4 10. In 
fiscal year 1 990'. the median time .from charge to complaint was 45 days. Id. The Board's time goal from the filmg of a charge to implementation of the regional director' s decision is 45 days. l 
NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 391 ,  f 1005 1 .  
418. Cf. Morris, supra note 373, at 127. In evaluating the NLRB's  published statistics for 
fiscal year 1 990, Professor Morris observed as follows: "[T]he medi'an t. ' btaJ. · 
Au' d · · f . 
1me .or o mng an 
s ec1s1on rom the filmg of the charges to the issuance of the d 
· · 
· . ec1s1on is one year, or more spec1fi�all�, 357 days. Almost all of that time-309 days-occurs following the issuance of the 
complamt. Id. (footnote omitted). 
419. 55 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 6, at 196 tbl. 23 (1992). 
420. See supra note 4 1 1 .  
421 .  This allowance exceeds the NLRB's time target o f  4 5  days. 1 NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 391, 'I 1005 1 .  
422. See S .  598, 103d Cong., 1 st Sess., § 3(b), 139 CoNo. REc. S598 S3045 (dail ed Mar 17, 1993) (statement by Sen. Durenberger). ' 
y · · 
423. Professor Morris has suggested a reorganization of th AU • · expedite this ta f th d' 
e s operations that also could s ge 0 e procee mgs. His proposal consists of the following changes: ( l )  as-
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The third stage at which the ban could be lifted, the Board's decision, 
also must be expedited. In fiscal year 1990, the median number of days 
between the issuance of an ALJ' s decision and the issuance of the Board' s 
decision was 3 1 4  days, making the median number of days from filing a 
charge to issuance of a Board decision 67 1 days. 424 Again, the timetable in 
the Justice Act suggests time constraints at the Board stage of the proceed­
ings: a maximum of thirty days for the filing of exceptions and briefs in 
opposition to the ALJ' s  decision; a maximum of fifteen days for the filing 
of reply briefs; and a maximum of ninety days from the filing of briefs to 
the Board' s decision, with a maximum of thirty additional days if oral argu­
ment is scheduled. 425 It may be difficult to impose tighter constraints on 
the Board than those provided in the Justice Act. Streamlining the proce­
dures for handling cases involving an interim ban, however, offers some 
possibility for further expediting Board decisions.426 
B. Potential Problems With the Proposal 
I .  Cost 
The first objection may be that implementing this proposal will be 
costly. There certainly are expenses associated with establishing and utiliz­
ing the proposal described above. On this objection, for the time being, the 
response of a commentator who proposed a business necessity amendment 
will suffice: 
Unquestionably, the administration of such a scheme would 
impose costs. However, it must be remembered that employers 
do not resort to hiring permanent replacement workers all that 
often, and thus the number of disputes is not likely to be great. 
signing ALls to cases immediately after complaints issue and having the assigned AU handle all 
motions and rulings for each case; (2) giving AUs authority to act upon all motions, and encour­
aging prehearing conferences and motion practice (including discovery and summary judgment 
and partial summary judgment); and (3) further decentralizing the ALls' home-base locations by 
assigning them to major metropolitan areas. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House, supra note 383, 
at 46-47; Morris, supra note 373, at 127-29. 
The Acting General Counsel recently outlined some administrative changes being considered 
to reduce delay, which could be implemented without statutory amendment. NLRB General 
Counsel Outlines Possible Changes for Labor Board To Better Meet Statutory Goals, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at A-13 (Jan. 24, 1994). Among those changes is a "fast-track" proceeding 
system for ULP cases in which there is a need for immediate relief. Id. This system would 
represent a departure from the current "first-in, first-out" approach. Id. 
424. 55 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 6, at 196 tbl. 23. 
425. See 139 CONG. REc. S598, S3045 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1993). 
426. One of Professor Morris's recommendations for expediting § 100) injunction cases might 
also result in faster Board decisions in cases involving interim bans: maintaining a stand-by 
three-member Board panel, with one member assigned primary responsibility for this special 
docket. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House, supra note 383, at 45-46; Morris, supra note 373, at 
122. 
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Furthermore both of the extreme rules have costs of their own 
. . . . [T]he prudent course is to avoid the risks of either 
extreme. 427 
As a final note on cost, it is reasonable to expect that resort to pennanent 
replacements would be even less frequent under this proposal than under 
the current law.428 
2. Conversion of the Strike 
Another potential problem with this proposal is the changing nature of 
some strikes. A strike may start as an economic strike, then convert into a 
ULP strike (or vice versa), and then even be reconverted.429 How can this 
proposal capture a moment in time to determine the type of strike and the 
corresponding reinstatement rights of the strikers? 
First, consider possible conversion after the interim ban is lifted. If it 
is determined that the strike is economic and that the employer is pennitted 
to hire permanent replacements, that will, in many cases, end the strike, and 
there will be no subsequent conversion.430 If the strike continues after the 
interim ban is  lifted, however, the employer's reliance on the characteriza­
tion of the strike is unlikely to be frustrated by a subsequent conversion. If 
the employer hires a full complement of permanent replacements soon after 
the interim ban is lifted and the strike is converted thereafter, the striking 
employees would not have a right of immediate reinstatement because they 
were economic strikers when the replacements were hired.431 
Second, consider possible conversion during the period of the interim 
ban on the hiring of permanent replacements, which lasts from the em­
ployer's notification of its intention to hire permanent replacements to the 
lifting of the ban. It is certainly possible that, while the ULP proceedings 
are being conducted, a union may file new ULP charges, alleging that the 
employer has committed ULPs during this period. These ULPs could con­
vert the strike even if the regional director, the ALJ, or the Board deter-
427. Note, One Strike, supra note 85, at 685. 
428. A large majority of �LP cases settle. before proceeding to a hearing before an ALJ. See supra note 4 1 1 .  Thus, one rrnght reas�n that if employers could operate their businesses by other 
means, they wo�l� .be reluctant to notify the Board of their intention to hire permanent replace­ments and thus m1t1ate NLRB proceedings. 
429. See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text. 
430. For examples of strikes that ended when employers threatened to h "  t I . . ire permanen rep ace-ments, consider the UAW strike of Caterpillar, discussed in the Prologu d h UAW 
"k f p b"l d" d 
e supra, an t e 
stn e o eter 1 t, 1scusse supra note 261 For general discussi·on o f  th f" f h · 
. 
. . 
· e e iect o t reatemng to hire and of hinng permanent replacements on strikes, see supra Part III 
431. E.g. ,  C-Line Express, 29� N.L.R.B. 638, 639 (1989). If the unio� contends that the strike was converted by a ULP comnutted between the lifting of the int · b d · 
· 
. enm an an the hmng of 
permanent replacements, that filing should not trigger a new ban and d" d · . . expe 1te proceedmgs Such a filing should be treated m the same manner as ULP charges filed d · h 
· 
· 
· 
urmg t e mtenm ban. 
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mines that the strike was an economic strike immediately prior to the 
commencement of the investigation. This possibility raises the question of 
how these new charges affect the already-commenced expedited proceed­
ings and the ban on the employer' s hiring of permanent replacements. In 
short, charges filed during the interim ban would not trigger a new interim 
ban and a second set of expedited hearings. Such a situation would be 
completely unworkable; if that were allowed, unions could frustrate em­
ployers' efforts entirely by filing new ULP charges and alleging a conver­
sion during each set of expedited proceedings. This would achieve, in 
effect, a permanent prohibition on hiring permanent replacements at consid­
erable administrative cost. 
To account for the possibility of meritorious ULP charges during the 
interim ban, however, an accommodation can be made at the first stage of 
the proceedings because that would be the most important stage for lifting 
or extending the ban. Under some circumstances, a regional director should 
be permitted to extend the interim ban once for a short period, not to exceed 
twenty days, to supplement an already-conducted investigation or to hold 
meetings with the parties regarding new ULP charges. This extension 
should only be granted, however, upon submission of substantial evidence 
supporting the contention that a strike has been converted; a mere filing of a 
ULP charge including an allegation of conversion should not be sufficient. 
Corresponding rules should apply to an employer' s contention that a strike 
was converted from ULP into economic during the interim ban; new expe­
dited proceedings would not be commenced to determine whether a conver­
sion occurred. 
Thus, ULP charges and allegations of conversion during the interim 
ban would not invoke a new ban and expedited proceedings. Consequently, 
a scenario is possible in which the parties are uncertain regarding the out­
come of new charges and therefore do not conclusively know the reinstate­
ment rights of the striking employees if the interim ban is lifted. This 
problem would have significance only if the ban were lifted. The union 
would contend that the new ULP charges converted the strike and the strik­
ers now had rights to immediate reinstatement, although they would not 
have had such rights based on the ULP charges considered in the proceed­
ing. This introduces some uncertainty into the scenario. Should the em­
ployer, with the interim ban being lifted, risk hiring permanent 
replacements? Should striking employees remain on strike notwithstanding 
the employer' s freedom to hire permanent replacements, hoping that the 
Board will find that the strike was converted after commencement of the 
expedited proceedings? 
Given the possible uncertainties even if expedited proceedings were 
held regarding all pre-proceeding ULP charges, does this proposal accom-
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plish anything? Yes. It does not eliminate uncertainty. but it does substan­
tially reduce it. Even in the scenario posed in the preceding paragraph, 
based on the decision of a regional director, an ALJ, or the Board, the par­
ties would know the nature of  the strike from its inception until at Least the 
time the investigation was conducted. This is important infonnation on 
which all parties can base their actions, and it is much better information 
regarding the employees' reinstatement rights and the employer' s right to 
hire permanent replacements than the parties have under the current law. 
Would an employer be deterred from hiring permanent replacements when 
the interim ban is lifted by the possibility of conversion based on new ULP 
charges? The question would require an employer to evaluate its own con­
duct during a short period of time. Unless an employer knows or has good 
reason to think that it has committed ULPs after commencement of the 
expedited proceedings, it is not likely to be deterred .  Would striking em­
ployees feel comfortable remaining on strike in the hope of a finding of 
conversion based on the new ULP charges? Unless a n  employer has com­
mitted egregious ULPs, most would not. 
In sum, the possible conversion of a strike after an employer hires 
permanent replacements is not likely to reduce the value of the expedited 
proceedings in clarifying the reinstatement rights o f  the striking employees. 
Possible conversion during the interim ban may reduce the value of the 
expedited proceedings, but only marginally. Although uncertainty regard­
ing the employees' reinstatement rights and the employer' s right to hire 
replacements is not eliminated i n  that situation, it is substantially reduced, 
and the parties have much better information on which to base their courses 
of action than under the current law. 
3. Devastating Effect of the Interim Ban on Some Employers 
Some have argued that a temporary ban on the hiring of permanent 
replacements would severely harm and perhaps even destroy some busi­
nesses.432 Such harm is particularly likely for businesses that have seasons 
in which they do a disproportionately high percentage of  their annual busi­
ness; if a strike begins during one of those periods of the year these busi­
nesses could be crippled.433 This potential problem does no� overcome 
however, the be�efits of an i�terim ban on the hiring o f  permanent replace� 
m�nts accompanied by expedited proceedings for several reasons. First, the 
stnke-and-permanent-replacement situation is infrequent. Second c 
b · · h d. . 
, even 1or 
usmesses wit tspropor:tmnately. profitable seasons, hiring of temporary replacements may be a viable option, depending upon several factors, in-
432. E.g., YAGER, supra note 1 1 , at 1 39-4 1 ;  see supra note 362. 
433. YAGER, supra note 1 1 ,  at 1 4 1 .  
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eluding the local market and the skill level of the striking employees. 
Third, many employers have other options for operating during a temporary 
ban on hiring permanent replacements, which they may use instead of, or in 
conjunction with, temporary replacements. These possible options include 
the following: operating with employees who do not strike and nonbargain­
ing unit employees, such as managerial and supervisory personnel; subcon­
tracting some bargaining-unit work on a temporary basis; relying on 
inventories built up in anticipation of a strike; and assigning work to other 
nonstruck facilities or transferring employees from such facilities to the 
struck facility.434 This is not to suggest that employers could easily operate 
during an interim ban by implementing one or more of the foregoing op­
tions. Such operations might require careful advance planning,435 which 
has not always been necessary for employers having the right to hire perma­
nent replacements immediately. Additional reasons that this proposal will 
not be particularly harmful to seasonal employers involve the lifting or ex­
tension of the ban. The interim ban of this proposal may be lifted at several 
stages in the proceedings. If it is lifted by the regional director' s  decision 
not to issue a complaint, the duration may be shorter than the most fre­
quently discussed temporary ban of ten weeks. Moreover, if the ban is not 
lifted at the complaint stage, it is highly likely that the employer will be 
found to have committed ULPs; thus, the interim ban spares the employer 
from future discharge of permanent replacements, reinstatement of strikers, 
and a potentially large back pay liability. 
In sum, there probably are some employers and situations in which a 
temporary ban on the hiring of permanent replacements would be devastat­
ing to the employer' s business. In view of the other options available for 
operating during the ban, however, there are not many such situations. 
Moreover, careful prestrike planning may ameliorate the difficulties of even 
the few employers that otherwise would be severely harmed by the interim 
ban.436 
434. See, e.g:. CHARLES R. PERRY ET AL., OPERATING DURING STRIKES: COMPANY EXPERI­
ENCE, NLRB POLICIES, AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS 51-68 (1982); Finkin, supra note 80, 
at 562. 
435. See, e.g., PERRY ET AL., supra note 434, at 5 1 -68. 
436. An alternative approach is to provide a procedure that would exempt from the interim 
ban employers who could demonstrate that the interim ban would inflict great harm on Iheir 
businesses. This approach is, of course, a version of the business necessity test. Its use in con­
junction with the interim ban is objectionable for the same reasons that the business necessity test 
in conjunction with a permanent ban is objectionable: it injects another difficult factual determi­
nation into Ihe process, thereby slowing down the expedited proceedings. Moreover, employers 
might attempt to invoke the emergency exception in nonemergency cases on a regular basis. In 
the end, however, such an exception may be needed. For furrher discussion of business necessity 
tests, see supra Part V .A. 
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c. Beneficial Effects on Both the Parties and the Adjudication of Unfair 
Labor Practice Charges 
All parties to a labor dispute would derive benefits from implementa­
tion of this proposal because the risks encountered by all parties would be 
reduced. Applying this proposal to the UAW-Caterpillar dispute on April 
1 ,  when Caterpillar issued its ultimatum, demonstrates those benefits. Ad­
ditionally, implementation of this proposal would facilitate the adjudication 
of ULP charges. 
Caterpillar' s striking employees would have benefited from applica­
tion of this proposal. Caterpillar would have been required to notify the 
Board of its intention to hire permanent replacements. B ecause the UAW 
filed ULP charges asserting that the strike was a ULP strike, Caterpillar 
would have been prohibited from hiring permanent replacements until the 
nature of the strike was determined. Accordingly, the employees, not fear­
ing loss of their jobs, could have remained on strike. If it were determined 
that the strike was economic, then it would have been necessary for them to 
decide whether to risk their right to immediate reinstatement by continuing 
to strike, but they would have known their reinstatement rights and had an 
opportunity to offer to return to work before Caterpil lar began hiring per­
manent replacements.437 
The union also would have benefited. The UAW would not have 
feared that its members would lose their jobs to replacements before their 
reinstatement rights were determined. Therefore, the UAW could have ad­
vised its members to remain o n  strike pending a determination of whether 
the interim ban should be lifted or extended. Just as the strikers ' rights to 
immediate reinstatement would not have been in immediate jeopardy, the 
UAW' s status as the collective bargaining representative would not have 
been in j eopardy because of potential decertification b y  replacements. 
Rather than announcing a decision to hire permanent replacements to 
its employees and thereby causing the strike to collapse, Caterpillar would 
have been
_ 
requ�red t� notify the B oard of its decision .  Although employers 
may consider it a disadvantage to be prohibited from hiring permanent 
replacements until the nature of the strike is determined, the practice would 
confer some obvious and some not so obvious benefits on employers. It is 
apparent �hat employers are spared pote�tially large make-whole liability. 
If Caterpillar had followed through on its ultimatum, i t  could have been 
strapp�d with � very large _
back pay
. 
and make-whole liability for denying 
the strikers remstatement if the stake were determined, a year or more 
437. Although many opponents of Mackay object to the inability to co d t . . . . n uc an economic strike free of nsk, there are reasons for treating economic and ULP strikers d"ff; 1 
Part 11.B and Part IV. 
I erent y. See supra 
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thereafter, to be a ULP strike. Under this proposal, such liability is averted. 
Caterpillar also may have faced civil lawsuits if it had been required to 
discharge permanent replacements. Although the Supreme Court has sug­
gested how employers might insulate themselves against such liability, it is 
not always effective;438 indeed, Caterpillar's newspaper advertisements 
seeking "permanent employees to replace non-returning striking work­
ers"439 could have made such actions viable. This proposal would avoid 
such potential civil liability. Another benefit of this proposal to employers 
such as Caterpillar is that, even if they have committed ULPs that are con­
tributing causes of a strike, it affords them an opportunity to take corrective 
action intended to convert a strike into an economic strike and to obtain a 
determination of whether their efforts have been successful. Thus, under 
this proposal, if Caterpillar had known that it would need to hire permanent 
replacements, before filing its notification with the Board, it could have 
attempted to cure its ULPs.440 
Finally, replacements would benefit from implementation of this pro­
posal. Even under this proposal, employers might still feel it necessary to 
condition the replacements' continued employment on a final decision (by 
the Board or court of appeals) or a strike settlement. Under this proposal, 
however, if Caterpillar had actually hired permanent replacements, it could 
have advised them that the strike had been characterized as an economic 
strike. The replacements would have possessed more definite information 
on their status and could then have decided whether it would be worthwhile 
to leave another job or move from another part of the country, or world, to 
take the replacement position. 
Implementation of this proposal also would benefit the process of ad­
judicating ULP cases. Employers charged with committing ULPs and their 
attorneys have different approaches to the initial investigation by Board 
agents.441 Some are not very cooperative. Under the procedures described 
in this Article, employers who notify the Board of their intention to hire 
438. See supra notes 194-215 and accompanying text. 
439. Dine, supra note 54, at lA. 
440. Because an expeditious detennination of the character of a strike has been unavailable, 
employers have had little incentive to attempt to "cure" their ULPs. Even if they took action, they 
still would be uncertain of the type of strike until a Board decision, which might not be forthcom­
ing for a year or two. Commentators have argued that the conversion doctrine has been too 
one-sided and that employers should have an opportunity to convert ULP strikes into economic 
strikes. Stewart, supra note 1 ,  at 1330-33 (arguing that unions should be required to respond to an 
employer's inquiry regarding reasons for strike so that employer could attempt to remedy ULPs); 
see also James M. Rabbitt, Comment, Reconversion of Unfair-Labor-Practice Strikes to Eco­
nomic Strikes, 64 GEo. L.J. 1 143, 1 151  (1976) (proposing a procedure whereby regional NLRB 
offices could certify that an employer had taken corrective measures that would relieve the em­
ployer of ULP strike liability) . 
441. NORRIS & SHERSHIN, supra note 390, at 332. 
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permanent replacements would have an incen�ve to cooperate in. such in­
vestigations so that the interim ban could be hfted at the complamt stage. 
D. Flexibility of the Proposal 
The proposal outlined in this Article is malleable. �s discusse�, there 
are alternative approaches at several stages. The precise mechamcs are 
open to debate. The basic principles undergirding this proposal ar� that 
employers should not be allowed to hire permanent replacements untll the 
nature of the strike is determined, thus reducing the risks undertaken by all 
of the parties, and that the determination should be made as quickly as pos­
sible, so that an employer's business is not harmed. At that time, the par­
ties, equipped with knowledge of their rights, can resolve their dispute 
quickly. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Under the Mackay regime of striker replacement law, employers have 
been permitted to hire permanent replacements for strikers. Although the 
doctrine has been limited under the substantive law to economic strikes, in 
practice employers have threatened to replace permanently, and have re­
placed, both economic and ULP strikers. The limitation recognized by the 
substantive law has provided little comfort to parties to a labor dispute 
when employers have either announced that they would hire permanent 
replacements or begun hiring them. None of the parties-employer, strik­
ing employees, union, or replacements-know whether the strike is eco­
nomic or ULP at that critical time when they must take action. 
Consequently, all of the parties encounter substantial risks, with the em­
ployees facing the greatest risk-potential loss of their right to immediate 
reinstatement to their jobs. In some cases, like UAW-Caterpillar, the strik­
ing employees and union abandon the strike rather than risking the loss. 
Those calling for the abrogation of Mackay are correct that the law 
regarding permanent replacement of strikers should be changed. That does 
not, however, require categorically prohibiting employers from hiring per­
manent replacements. The primary distinctions between economic and 
ULP strikes are the different rights of employers to hire replacements and 
the corresponding rights of striking employees to reinstatement. The dis­
tinction between the two types of strikes serves the important purposes of 
deterring employers from committing ULPs and providing a market check 
on the parties' bargaining positions. Accordingly, the distinction is worth 
preserving. 
There have been many proposals to reform striker replacement law 
over the years. In the last six years, a number of bills have been introduced 
in Congress, ranging from a ten-week ban on hiring permanent replace-
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ments to an absolute prohibition. Although the Mackay doctrine has sur­
vived the onslaught so far, its margin of victory has dwindled, and some 
change now seems imminent. 
This Article, after considering and critiquing prior proposals for re­
form of striker replacement law, fashions a new proposal. This proposal 
would reduce the risks imposed on the parties, while preserving the useful 
distinction between economic strikes and ULP strikes. The proposal ac­
complishes its objectives by imposing procedural constraints on the Mackay 
doctrine that substantially confine its applicability in practice to economic 
strikes. The fundamental principles of the proposal are that an employer 
should not be allowed to hire permanent replacements until the characteri­
zation of a strike is determined, but that employers should be prohibited 
from hiring permanent replacements for the shortest time possible. 
The current law regarding replacement of strikers will be altered in the 
near future. It should be changed, but it is important that the reasons for the 
change be examined and the new law developed to accommodate those rea­
sons. There are elements of the current law that should be preserved. The 
reform advocated in this Article reduces the risks and uncertainties encoun­
tered by the parties to a labor dispute and does so without unconditionally 
depriving employers of the option of hiring permanent replacements. This 
approach to reform of the law on permanent replacement of strikers is a far, 
far better thing than the Workplace Fairness Act. 
